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Abstract 
Mauritius faces a problem of water shortages, especially at the end of the winter season, 
which is revealed by seasonal water accounts. A household survey shows that 43% of 
households adapt to those shortages using water tanks and pumps. The study forecasts an 
increase in water demand of up to 51% by 2030 leading to a water shortage of up to 52 
million m3 taking the effects of climate change into account. After analyzing different 
options, it seems that improvements in the water sector necessitates restructuring tariffs in 
different sectors with new roles of institutions in raising revenues. Current water sector 
governance, however, seems ineffective to solve these issues. The micro-institutional setting 
according to the distribution of tasks for each of the main transactions reveals a multitude of 
water actors at the national level. Responses from these water actors collected for this study 
point to a certain number of challenges putting sustainability at stake, including a lack of 
political commitment and discontinuity of reforms. These issues seem to be aggravated by a 
lack of independence of the main water agencies. The study concludes with policy 
recommendations to increase efficiency of the water sector. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Aleksandra Peeroo and Riad Sultan 
 
1.1 Water Situation in Mauritius 
 
Water is a vital natural resource for human activities and survival generally. While it may be 
abundant on a regional scale, only a small portion is typically usable, making it a de facto 
scarce resource. Of the total global water demand, 11 percent comes from households, 19 
percent from industry (including energy production), with the bulk, 70 percent, coming from 
agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2012). Because of population growth and 
related increases in the demand for food and energy, it is expected that water demand will 
rise further in the future, putting more pressure on water resources. 
 
These constraints on water resources are exacerbated by climate change. Among other 
impacts, rising sea levels risk contaminating freshwater supplies, and droughts and floods 
are becoming more frequent and more severe (International Environment Agency, 2012). 
Over-usage of water poses important threats. This is illustrated by the example of Mexico 
City, where the depletion of the underground aquifer has resulted in the city sinking by 
several meters, causing negative externalities like damage to buildings, roads, pipes and 
other infrastructure (Haggarty et al., 2002). In addition, competition for water provision 
between different consumer groups leads to conflict and may even cause social unrest 
(Ménard and Peeroo, 2011). Therefore, the sustainability of water is becoming a major 
policy issue for decision-makers. 
 
In small island states, such as Mauritius, sustainability of the provision of water is an urgent 
issue for relevant stakeholders – including the various consumer groups, civil society groups, 
policymakers and the water supply industry. In 2013, Mauritius received 3,821 million cubic 
meters of rainfall of which 70 percent was available for exploitation through surface runoff 
(2,293 million m3) and groundwater (382 million m3). The remaining 30 percent (1,146 
million m3) cannot be used for water production because it is lost to evapotranspiration. 
Furthermore, given the topography of Mauritius, a large proportion of the surface water 
runoff flows directly into the sea. For this reason, only 8 percent of available water was 
abstracted by the water supply industry for distribution to households, industry, government 
agencies and agriculture in 2013. 
 
At first sight, it appears that there is no apparent water scarcity in Mauritius. However, two 
major issues pose a threat to the availability of drinking water. Firstly, there is a significant 
difference between the wet and dry seasons. Water reservoirs may be depleted by the end 
of the latter. Secondly, the production of drinking water by the national provider, the Central 
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Water Authority, involves a very high percentage of Non-Revenue Water,1 amounting to 
around 55 percent (National Economic and Social Council, 2014, pp. 14 f.). Physical losses 
through leaky pipelines account for 35-40 percent of produced drinking water. Another 10-
15 percent are commercial losses due to defective meters, illegal connections, etc. The 
remainder are explained by authorized unbilled consumption – for example, for fire fighting. 
Together, the amount of water lost correponds to about four times the capacity of the 
largest reservoir on the island. This water wastage has been going on for decades. Given the 
high percentage of Non-Revenue Water, it is, therefore, not surprising that the supply of 
water scarcely meets the demand. As a consequence, some regions in Mauritius do not have 
access to potable water on a 24/7 basis. 
 
1.2 Sustainability and Water Sector Governance 
 
The current water situation in Mauritius urgently calls for sustainability considerations to be 
taken into account. Three facets of sustainability must be ensured with regard to water 
resources, and drinking water and wastewater services: economic, environmental and social. 
In this respect, effective water sector governance is vitally important for water (resource) 
management.2 Problems in the governance of the water sector – understood as the system 
in place to oversee, plan, direct, monitor and enforce transactions between the various 
water uses – lead to dysfunctions that may become apparent in indicators of low 
performance, such as high leakage rates. In addition, sectoral characteristics, such as the 
natural decentralization of the water sector, usually influence the governance of the water 
sector (Peeroo, 2014, pp. 23 ff.). Decentralization is explained by two reasons. Firstly, water 
is physically heavy, one liter of water weighing one kilogram. This makes it difficult and 
costly to transport over long distances. As a consequence, water resources management is 
typically local or regional. Secondly, water utilities themselves are usually local. Therefore, 
local and regional actors play a natural role in the governance of the water sector (Ménard 
and Peeroo, 2011). A coherent system of water sector governance requires a clear 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities across various water actors. In order to direct 
policies toward the consideration of sustainability issues, the governance of the sector needs 
to be well understood so that institutional dysfunctions can be addressed (Peeroo, 2014, pp. 
79, 158). The role of information is critical. Information must be relevant, standardized and 
coherent in order to provide a basis for good decision-making (ibid., p. 166). 
                                                     
1  Non-Revenue Water measures the percentage of water that has been produced but which has not 
generated any revenue. 
2 The Mauritian water sector involves water policy and politics with a specific set of actions and 
actors, separated from other public policies. Within the water sectors of high-income countries, two 
different sub-sectors can often be distinguished: one relating to water resources and the other to 
water services (both drinking and wastewater). In Mauritius, however, as in many developing 
countries, there are no such sub-sectors: the water sector consists only of one set of actors, although 
diversified and multiple. Formally, a specific Water Resource Unit exists, but it does not hold enough 
decision-making power to constitute a distinct sub-sector for water resources with independent 
actors and policies that are separated from the actors and policies concerning water services. We are 
grateful to Bernard Barraqué who pointed out this difference between the water sectors of 
developed and developing countries. 
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1.3 The Case for Water Accounts to Improve Decision Making and 
Governance 
 
Information plays a crucial role in decision-making. In order to manage water sustainably, 
there is a need to organize information on water – including water storage, water 
distribution, and water use – in a relevant, standardized and coherent manner (Peeroo, 
2014, p. 166).  Natural resource accounting in the water sector provides information on the 
present state of water management in terms of its current use and economic contributions. 
It also assists in identifying future water uses and water management policies. Furthermore, 
it helps gain an understanding of how different policies will impact on water demand and 
informs on potential trade-offs. It also permits the conceptualization of the economic value 
of water. Consequently, the impact of droughts, climate change and any negative 
externalities on the water sector can be analyzed in terms of changes in the total volume, as 
well as changes in the natural wealth. A complete water account is useful to better manage 
water as a natural resource and to design instruments to ensure the sustainability of the 
water sector. 
 
At the same time, water accounts may increase the informational basis for decision-making 
and, in turn, policymaking. However, the successful implementation of policies will depend 
on the governance and institutional setting. The economics of water indicates some ways to 
achieve efficient water management. Infrastructural weaknesses may require specific 
investment decisions, but institutional and governance issues may prevent a review of the 
tariff structure and thereby the necessary investments. 
 
Therefore, an analysis of the governance issues in the Mauritian water sector is important in 
response to some of the questions that are raised from an analysis of supply and demand. A 
lack of effective water sector governance explains why it is so difficult to remedy a system 
which is not responding to the requirements of the population. The study of water 
governance issues also illustrates how (in)effective the system is in designing policies and 
strategies for the sector. In this respect, governance and economic accounting of water in 
Mauritius will play an important role in addressing the water crisis which the island is facing. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 
The aim of the study is to conduct an assessment of governance issues in the context of a 
need for sustainable water services and to construct a water account system, together with 
an analysis of the economic contribution of water for the small island state of Mauritius. 
 
The objectives of the study are: 
 
• To make an assessment of the current water situation in Mauritius 
• To conceptualize the physical use and supply of water in the Mauritian context and 
construct the economy-water linkages and a water account – based on the system of 
Environmental-Economic Water Accounting for Water (SEEA-Water) 
• To study the demand for water in different sectors (agriculture, industry, energy, 
tourism and households) and its economic value to the economy 
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• To provide a scenario-based analysis of the impacts of climate change and changing 
trends of water use 
• To draw a picture of the micro-institutional setting that governs the Mauritian water 
sector (actors with their respective responsibilities and levels of intervention) 
• To critically analyse governance issues in the Mauritian water sector and its political 
economy 
• To analyze the link between governance and sustainability considerations 
• To design policy recommendations for sustainable water use and efficient water 
sector governance 
 
1.5 Roadmap 
 
Our study is structured in three sections. Section one (Chapters 1 and 2) are dedicated to 
questions related to the water accounts for Mauritius. The current trends of water demand 
are analyzed and data and information are collected to construct water accounts for the 
country. This offers insights on key indicators including price and income elasticities for the 
household sector, and output elasticity and marginal productivity of water in various 
economic sectors of Mauritius, which might prove helpful for policymaking. A survey on the 
water use by households has also been conducted, the results of which are provided in  sub-
section 3.7 of this study3. Furthermore, because sustainable water policies depend on future 
trends of water abstraction and water use, Chapter 3 forecasts water consumption for the 
non-residential and residential sectors in Mauritius for 2015 to 2030, taking into account 
different scenarios of how climate change and economic growth might impact on water 
demand. 
 
Section two (Chapters 4 and 5) focuses on Mauritian water sector governance. Chapter 4 
elaborates on the nature of water sector governance in general, and the issue of 
sustainability. It also provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of water sector 
governance, which is then applied to the case of Mauritius. Using an original dataset, the 
framework identifies the various water governance actors and their respective 
responsibilities. The objectives of Chapter 4 are thus twofold: firstly, to develop an 
institutional map for water sector governance in Mauritius and secondly, to analyse the 
extent to which the various water actors take sustainability considerations into account. 
 
Chapter 5 is centered around a number of specific governance issues in the Mauritian water 
sector that have been highlighted by a survey that was conducted as part of the research. It 
appears that the main impediments to a more sustainable water sector are linked to 
weaknesses in governance – a lack of coordination of the multitude of water actors in an 
institutional environment with little transparency. 
 
Chapter 6 sums up the major findings emanating from the previous chapters and provides 
policy implications for improving the sustainability of water supply in Mauritius. More 
specifically, it highlights some aspects of Mauritian water sector governance that endanger 
                                                     
3 The reader should contact Riad Sultan (r.sultan@uom.ac.mu) to btain further information on this 
survey. 
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the sustainability of water and proposes a number of concrete policy measures that could be 
adopted to improve water sector governance. 
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Chapter 2: Water Accounting in Mauritius 
 
Riad Sultan 
 
 
Introduction   
 
The United Nations report, ‘Water for a Sustainable World’ (WWAP 2015), observes that 
over-abstraction of water is often the result of out-dated models of natural resource use.  A 
sustainable water management system, therefore, calls for an efficient mechanism to 
organise information on water in the economy, in a relevant, reliable, understandable, 
comparable and timely manner (Molden, 1997; Molden and Sakthivadivel, 1999; Burrell et 
al., 2012; Chalmers et al., 2012).  Water accounting has been a response to the lack of 
organised data in the water sector. It is a method of organising and presenting information 
relating to the physical volumes of water in the environment and economy, and the impacts 
of human activities on water resources (Vardon et al., 2007) and allows us to model the 
potential impacts of different policies in the water sector. It can be used to integrate the 
economic aspects of water supply and use. Moreover, managers in the water sector are 
facing greater demand for transparency with defined lines of responsibility and 
accountability. Therefore, a systematic means to record and report diverse data relating to 
water is becoming a necessity. Many countries are already preparing water accounts on a 
regular basis, while others have started their water accounts on a pilot basis (Lange and 
Hassan, 2006).  
 
Following the pioneering work of the World Resources Institute (Repetto et al., 1989; Lange, 
2007), water accounting is becoming increasingly popular in the analysis and design of 
sustainable development strategies. It aims at providing answers on how water is currently 
being used, the economic contribution of water use at a sectoral level, the opportunity cost 
of water use for each economic sector and whether the present use of water represents its 
best use (Lange, 1997). It may be further used to shed light on future water uses, with due 
consideration of the water demand by different sectors, and examine how policies may 
affect the demand for water to meet development objectives. Water accounting can help 
analyze economic trade-offs more easily and establish priorities (Lange, 1997). 
 
This section of the study aims to construct water accounts for the small island economy of 
Mauritius, by analyzing the physical stock and flow of water, the utilization of water in 
different sectors and the supply of water from various sources (surface and ground). Water 
accounts are prepared for the year 2013, as well as on a seasonal basis to differentiate 
between summer and winter, using the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting for 
Water (SEEA-Water) guidelines. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.1 provides a brief literature review on water 
accounting, followed by a description of the conceptual framework in Section 2.2. Reference 
is made to SEEA-Water, a document on the design of water accounts, published by the 
United Nations Statistics Division in 2007 (UN, 2012). Section 2.3 provides an overview of the 
water sector in Mauritius, together with water accounts for the country. Sections 2.4 to 2.11 
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provide the findings of the water accounts – explicitly classified as water asset accounts; 
water balance; total water abstraction; water abstracted by the water supply industry; 
physical flow acount of water; water abstraction at regional and seasonal levels; and 
seasonal accounts. 
 
2.1  Water Accounting Systems: A Brief Review of the Literature 
 
It is increasingly recognized that for the effective management of a resource such as water, a 
systematic approach is needed to report information in a transparent manner. Water 
accounting enhances our understanding of the link between the water cycle and human 
activity, and provides a tool for improved management of water (Lange and Hassan, 2006). 
However, water accounting systems have different origins. According to Chalmers et al. 
(2012), water account systems can be regarded as a response to a social and institutional 
practice designed for intervening in the functioning of a sector. Over the years, several water 
accounting systems have been developed, such as the General Purpose Water Accounting 
(GPWA), the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting for Water (SEEA-Water), Water 
Footprint Accounting and a system implemented by the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI WA). 
 
The GPWA reports include a Statement of Physical Flows, a Statement of Water Assets and 
Water Liabilities, and a Statement of Changes in Water Assets and Water Liabilities (Burrell 
et al., 2012). The Statement of Physical Flows shows how holdings of water evolved during 
the reporting period. In the Statement of Water Assets and Water Liabilities, the assets 
component contains an overview of the water rights and other entitlements to water, while 
the liabilities component reports obligations to provide water or water rights (Chalmers et 
al., 2012). The Statement of Changes in Water Assets and Water Liabilities shows 
movements in water assets and water liabilities during the reporting period. According to 
Chalmers et al. (2012), the GPWA is more an assessment of accountability for water 
management and the consequent allocation of economic, environmental or social resources. 
It is primarily designed for stakeholders as a tool to facilitate decision-making on the 
allocation of resources. 
 
The SEEA-Water was developed by the United Nations Statistics Division, in collaboration 
with the London Group on Environmental Accounting. This system is a conceptual 
framework for the organization of both physical and economic information related to water 
using concepts, definitions and classifications, consistent with those of the System of 
National Accounts 2008.4 The SEEA-Water is an extension of the United Nations System of 
Environmental-Economic Accounting, recording information on environmental and related 
socioeconomic indicators in a manner similar to the way in which many countries’ national 
accounts record information about economic transactions. SEEA-Water accounting includes 
a physical supply and use table, showing flows of water from the environment to the 
economy and the movement of water within the economy. It also includes a water emissions 
                                                     
4 The System of National Accounts 2008 was adopted by the UN Statistical Division as the 
international standard for compilation of national accounts statistics and for the international 
reporting of comparable national accounting data. 
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account. Asset accounts record water stocks in physical terms (the volumes of water) and 
report their amounts at the beginning and end of a period, as well as the changes during a 
reporting period. According to Chalmers et al. (2012), SEEA-Water is based on the 
information needs of an assumed audience of policy analysts and informed researchers; as 
opposed to a general-purpose approach, which provides information for use by 
policymakers or stakeholders. 
 
IWMI WA provides information on the supply and use of water and relates water use to the 
economy (Molden, 1997; Chalmers et al., 2012). It is a multi-scale method to account for the 
amount of water available, the amount of water used by various sectors and the value 
derived from water use. It is based on a water balance approach, which translates water 
balance components, and inflows and outflows into various water accounting categories 
such as net inflow, process consumption, non-process depletions, committed outflow and 
uncommitted outflow. One major difference between the IWMI WA and other accounting 
frameworks is the use of water consumption as opposed to water withdrawals. Accordingly, 
this approach helps to track water reuse as it accounts for consumed water rather than 
diverted flow to a particular domain. However, it does not show water withdrawals and the 
efficiency of water use (Karimi et al., 2012). 
 
Many countries including China (Zhu et al., 2009), Australia (Chalmar et al., 2012; Turner et 
al., 2014), Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Lange et al., 2006) have developed water 
accounts on a regular basis. Water accounts have been used to analyze issues such as 
poverty, economic growth and international trade, among others. Gao et al. (2013) use a 
water accounting model in Beijing to analyze development patterns and water consumption. 
Their study makes use of the input-output model. Biltonen and Dalton (2003), designed a 
framework which links water accounting to poverty. Lange and Hassan (2006), extend the 
water account systems prepared in Lange et al. (2006) to examine the link between 
international trade and water use in three countries: Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. 
 
Physical and monetary accounts of water can be used to analyse a wide range of issues 
pertaining to water, including the constraints on water posed by the possible effects of 
climate change, the role of water pricing and conflict management among users. 
Consequently, they may also be used to analyze policies which maximize the wealth or 
economic efficiency of water as a natural resource, with due consideration of equity in, and 
sustainability of, the water sector. 
 
2.2  Water Accounting: Conceptual Framework 
 
Water accounting forms part of the National Resources Accounting detailed in the 
Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounting Handbook (UN, 2003). Since water 
requires specific treatment, the United Nations Statistical Division published the System of 
Economic-Environmental Accounting for Water (SEEA-Water) in 2007. The SEEA-Water 
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provides a framework to analyse the role of water in the economy through a system of 
satellite accounts linked to national accounts.5 
 
Water accounting, according to SEEA-Water, is separated into water asset (or stock) 
accounts and water flow accounts (UN, 2012): 
 
1. Asset accounts measure the stocks at the beginning and at the end of the accounting 
period and, record the changes in stocks that occur in between. There are two types of 
water assets, ‘produced assets’ and ‘water resources’: 
 
a.  Produced assets include the infrastructure to abstract, distribute, treat and 
discharge water. 
 
b. Water resources describe the volume of water resources in the various asset 
categories at the beginning and the end of the accounting period and all the 
changes therein that are due to natural causes (precipitation, evapotranspiration, 
inflows, outflows) and human activities. In addition, quality accounts record 
stocks of water in terms of its quality. 
 
2. Water flow accounts record the volume of water that passes from the environment into 
national economies. More specifically, they record the volume of water supplied by an 
economic agent either for its own use or for delivery to another use. It also records the 
volume used by both economic and domestic sectors (Arntzen et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 1, reproduced from the SEEA-Water document (UN, 2012), describes physical water 
flows within the economy. Water flow is divided into three components: (i) the flow of water 
from the environment to the economy; (ii) flows of water within the economy and between 
economies; and (iii) flows from the economy to the environment. 
 
                                                     
5 As satellite accounts of the System of National Accounts, SEEA-Water is linked to a full range of 
economic activities with a comprehensive classification of environmental resources. 
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Figure 1: Physical Water Flows within the Economy 
 
 Source: SEEA-Water (UN, 2012) 
 
Water supply and use tables are used to record components of the ‘inland water system’ – 
which includes surface water (rivers, lakes and artificial reservoirs), groundwater and soil 
water, within the territory of reference. All flows associated with the inland water system 
are recorded in the asset accounts for water resources, including flows to and from 
accessible seas and oceans. 
 
According to SEEA-Water, physical supply and use tables can be compiled at various levels of 
detail, depending on the required policy and analytical focus, and data availability. A basic 
supply and use table for water is divided into five sections as follows: 
 
1. Abstraction of water from the environment 
2. Distribution and use of abstracted water across enterprises and households 
3. Flows of wastewater and reused water (between households and enterprises) 
4. Return flows of water to the environment 
5. Evaporation, transpiration and water incorporated into products 
 
The aim of physical flow accounting is to record the physical flows underpinning monetary 
transactions, primarily with respect to goods, and then to extend the supply and use tables 
to record physical flows from the environment to the economy (such as natural resources) 
and physical flows from the economy to the environment (such as emissions into air and 
water). 
 
A specific terminology is used with regard to water accounts. The common definitions are as 
follows: 
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Available water: Available water is defined as the availability of internal renewable 
water resources. This gives an indication of the amount of water that is internally 
made available through precipitation (minus evapotranspiration, i.e. efficient 
precipitation). These resources are computed by adding up the volume of the 
average annual surface runoff and groundwater recharge occurring within a 
country’s borders (UNSD, 2012). Thus the amount of internal renewable water 
resources is equivalent to the sum of the surface runoff and groundwater recharge. 
 
Water abstraction refers to the amount of water which is used in economic sectors 
and the domestic sector. Abstraction must be distinguished from water which does 
not return to the environment, either because it has evaporated or because it has 
been incorporated in products or services. 
 
Water use refers to the water received by economic and domestic sectors and which 
is returned to the environment after use with some alterations in its composition (e.g 
waste water). Use describes the total amount of water withdrawn from its source to 
be used elsewhere. 
 
Water consumption is the amount of water used which is not returned to the 
original water source after being withdrawn. Water consumption also includes water 
lost into the atmosphere through evaporation or transpiring from a product or plant 
if it is no longer available for reuse (World Resouces Institute, 2013). 
 
Outflow to sea: The difference between surface runoff and abstraction is the amount 
of water which runs to the sea. In other words, outflow to sea = surface runoff - 
abstraction + discharge of used water. 
 
Distribution loss: This is the difference between production (supply) and use and 
consumption. 
 
Utilization: Utilization is made up of consumptive use (irrigation, households and 
businesses) + non-consumptive use (incorporated into manufacturing products and 
hydropower consumption). 
 
The first step in water accounting is to define the spatial domain (Molden, 1997; Karimov et 
al., 2012). Water stocks are classified by the SEEA-Water as surface water, groundwater and 
soil water. Surface water is further disaggregated and includes artificial reservoirs, lakes, 
rivers, snow, ice and glaciers. The net inflow is equal to the gross inflow minus the change in 
storage. The gross inflow comprises of efficient precipitation plus surface water and 
groundwater flows across the boundary. To avoid repetition, further explanation is provided 
in the section on water accounts for Mauritius. 
 
2.3 Water Accounts for Mauritius: Empirical Evidence 
 
The Republic of Mauritius is an island fringed by coral reefs. It has a surface area of 1,870 
km2 and a 322 km-long coastline. The island was formed as a result of a volcanic eruption 
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and, therefore, most of the rivers originate from the central plateau and flow toward the 
sea. 
 
 The population of Mauritius is currently 1.2 million and GDP is MUR 323.2 billion (USD 9.1 
billion) – see Table 1. There are two seasons in Mauritius: winter, from May to October and 
summer, from November to April. The average annual precipitation over the island is 2,000 
mm. The water resource system is replenished during the summer season, when two-thirds 
of the mean rainfall is captured by reservoirs (Government of Mauritius, 2014). 
 
Table 1: Basic Statistics for Mauritius for 2013 
  
Population (millions) 1.217 
Urban Population (millions) 0.508 
GDP at basic prices (MUR billions / USD billions) 323.2 / 9.1 
Per capita GDP at basic prices (MUR / USD)1 265,603 /7,481 
Annual real growth rate (%) 3.2 
Mean annual rainfall (mm) 2,049 
Annual fresh water abstraction (all recorded sectors) 
(million m3) 
Annual fresh water abstraction from surface water 
(million m3) 
608 
 
487 
Potable water produced (million m3) 217 
(Metered) Potable water consumed (million m3) 96 
Daily per capita domestic water consumption (liters) 165 
 
Notes: 1 Exchange rate USD 1 = MUR 35.5 
Source: Digest of Environment Statistics (2013), Digest of Energy and Water (2013) and National 
Accounts of Mauritius (2013) 
 
The water distribution systems and facilities have improved significantly over the last 30 
years. At present, 99.6 percent of the population are connected to potable water. The 
present domestic water demand is met from groundwater (55 percent), and surface water 
(45 percent). However, despite these improvements, the water sector is currently facing 
serious challenges in mobilizing additional water resources to meet the rising demand from 
the growth in population and businesses. In addition, the impact of climate change is likely 
to exacerbate the serious risk of water shortages. 
 
According to a report by the National Economic and Social Council in 2014 (NESC, 2014), 
some 200 million liters of treated drinking water are lost on a daily basis, mostly through 
leaky underground pipes. On average, around 35-40 percent is lost in the distribution 
network and around 10-15 percent is lost to faulty meters or illegal connections; a further 10 
percent is explained by unbilled consumption, such as for fire fighting. This loss is equivalent 
to about four times the annual capacity of the largest reservoir on the island. The waste of 
such a valuable resource has been going on for decades. 
 
This has serious repercussions for households, many of which have had to install water tanks 
to ensure a continuous supply of water. The 2000 census for Mauritius recorded that 36.4 
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percent of households had a water tank or domestic reservoir. This figure rose to 48.1 
percent in the 2011 census.6 
 
2.4 Water Asset Accounts 
 
There have been a number of initiatives to construct water accounts in Mauritius. In fact, 
Statistics Mauritius has published a range of information pertaining to water assets and 
flows in the Digest of Energy and Water Statistics (since 1999) and, more recently, in the 
Digest of Environmental Statistics. In June 2015, Statistics Mauritius published its first annual 
water account for Mauritius. The Southern African Development Community, in 
collaboration with the European Union, compiled a training manual for ‘Economic 
Accounting of Water Use’ in Mauritius in 2010 (Arntsen et al., 2010). In addition, the 
Government of Mauritius and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) conducted an 
experimental ecosystem natural accounting project for Small Island Developing States – as 
part of the Mauritius Strategy project in the Eastern and Southern Africa and Indian Ocean 
(ESA-IO) region. This aim of the project was to test the feasibility of ecosystem and natural 
capital accounting systems using data currently available in Mauritius (Weber, 2014a). With 
technical assistance from the IOC’s ISLANDS project, a case study was developed to present 
an overview of the first SEEA-Experimental Ecosystem Accounts and Natural Capital 
Accounts of Mauritius. Natural capital accounts, compiled by Weber (2014a), include land 
cover accounts, biomass-carbon accounts, water accounts, biodiversity of systems and 
species accounts, and marine coastal ecosystem accounts. This study builds on previous 
initiatives to construct water accounts for Mauritius. 
 
2.5 Water Balance 
 
Water data is often recorded on a hydrological year basis, which starts at the onset of the 
rainy season. In Mauritius, the hydrological year starts in October and ends in September of 
the following year. The hydrological year has been adjusted to align with calendar year 
activities – in other words, from January to December. For water accounting, it is assumed 
that the water stock at the end of the year (pre-accounting year) and the water stock at the 
beginning of the post-accounting year are equal. However, if the accounts are prepared on a 
monthly basis, they may show the changes in stock arising from use and replenishment. 
 
The total water from rainfall in Mauritius amounted to 3,821 million m3 in 2013 (Table 2). 
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the fluctuations in rainfall over the period 2000 to 2013. The 
lowest amount of precipitation for the period was in 2012. When water flows, part of it 
flows over the land surface (Proag, 1994). The surface runoff for 2013 is estimated at 2,293 
million m3 – 60 percent of the total water from rainfall. Water is partly depleted when it 
evaporates, transpires or is directed to a sink where it cannot be used again (Chalmers et al., 
2012; Karimov et al., 2012). Evaporation is the conversion of liquid precipitation into water 
vapor, which then returns to the atmosphere (Proag, 1994). Transpiration is the water loss 
from plants and occurs when the vapor pressure in the air is less than that in the leaves. The 
                                                     
6 Households use water tanks and sometimes electrical pumps to cope with service interruptions and 
insufficient pressure. This may affect the the quality of drinking water at the tap. 
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combined process is called evapotranspiration and is estimated at 1,146 million m3 (30 
percent). The remaining water recharges the groundwater tables. 
 
Table 2: Water Balance, 2009 to 2013 (million m³) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
 
Rainfall  
 
4,440 
 
4,470 
 
3,368 
 
3,627 
 
3,001 
 
3,821 
 Surface runoff  2,664 2,682 2,021 2,176 1,801 2,293 
 Evapotranspiration  1,332 1,341 1,010 1,088 900 1,146 
 Net recharge to groundwater 444 447 337 363 300 382 
 
Source: Digest of Environment (Statistics Office) 
 
Figure 2 further illustrates the fluctuations in surface runoff, evapotranspiration and net 
recharge to groundwater over the last 10 years in Mauritius. 
 
Figure 2: Total Rainfall in Mauritius, 2000 - 2013 (million m³) 
 
 Source: Digest of Environment Statistics (2013) 
 
As Figure 2 shows, there is a close relationship between surface runoff, net recharge to 
groundwater, and rainfall. Climate change, which may impact on precipitation, is therefore 
also likely to affect surface runoff and net recharge to groundwater. 
 
Water accounts are constructed for particular spacial domains – in this case the island of 
Mauritius. Figure 3 provides a map of Mauritius which shows the different amounts (or 
distribution) of precipitation across the island for 2013. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of rainfall in Mauritius in 2013  
 
  Source: Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, Hydrology Data Book, 2005  
 
As mentioned earlier in Section 2.3, economic accounting of water is separated into water 
stock accounts and water flow accounts. Water stock accounts are divided into asset and 
quality accounts. Asset accounts reflect the amount of total resource and changes in the 
resource over the accounting period, while the quality accounts record stocks of water in 
terms of its quality. Water flow accounts record the flow of water from the environment to 
national economies. 
 
Table 3 shows the water balance in Mauritius for the year 2013. The total amount of rainfall 
– 3,821 million m3 – is divided into surface runoff, evapotranspiration and net recharge to 
groundwater. Of the total amount of water from rainfall, 2,675 million m3 (70 percent) is 
available for exploitation. This is obtained by subtracting the proportion which is attributed 
to evapotranspiration. The total amount available for exploitation is divided into surface 
runoff (2,293 million m3)and groundwater (382 million m3). The total water available, also 
referred to as internal renewable resources, therefore corresponds to the sum of the annual 
flow of rivers and recharge of groundwater generated from precipitation (UN, 2007) – which 
in this case amounts to 2,675 million m3. 
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Table 3: Water Balance in Mauritius, 2013 (million m³) 
 Water available    Water utilization   
 
(1) 
 
Rainfall  
  
3,821 
   
  Surface runoff  2,293     
  Evapotranspiration  1,146     
  Net recharge to groundwater 382     
       
(2)  Water available for exploitation  2,675    
 Surface runoff 2,293     
 Groundwater 382 
 
    
(3) Water sources for abstraction   608 Water utilization 
in the economy 
 888 
 Surface water  487     
 Groundwater  121 
 
    
(4) Water for Hydropower   280    
       
       
(5) Water flowing to sea or to 
ecological reserve (Flows to sinks) 
 
     
 Surface water  1,806    
 Groundwater to sea  427    
 Groundwater addition to closing  106.7 
 
   
Source: Author’s calculations from Digest of Environment Statistics and Digest of Energy and Water 
Statistics 
 
From the water available for exploitation, water abstraction is estimated at 608 million m3. 
The sources are made up of rivers (136 million m3), reservoirs (351 million m3) and 
groundwater (121 million m3). From an economic perspective, water used for hydropower is 
also important because it generates wealth; but since the water is returned to the water 
cycle after utilization and therefore not removed from the total water available for 
exploitation, it is not counted as an abstraction. The difference between water available for 
exploitation and water abstraction shows the total amount which flows either to the sea or 
to ecological reserves. This is referred to as ‘flow to sink’ in the SEEA-Water terminology 
(UN, 2012). During the year, a certain amount of water consumption from surface water will 
also flow to groundwater. This is accounted for in the flow account. Thus, surface water and 
groundwater are the two sources for replenishing the stock of water in the economy. 
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2.7 Total Water Abstraction: Sources and Users 
 
Water is abstracted for use from two sources: surface water runoff and groundwater. In 
2013, 608 million m3 of water was abstracted (Table 4), of which 487 million m3 came from 
surface water runoff and 121 million m3 from groundwater. 
 
Table 4: Sources of Total Water Abstraction, 2008-2013 (million m³) 
Sources 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Surface water 546 511 513 449 460 487 
Groundwater 143 121 124 122 122 121 
Total  689 632 637 571 582 608 
Source: Digest of Environment Statistics 
 
Figure 4 shows water abstraction for the years 2000 to 2012. A comparison of Figure 2 and 
Figure 4 reveals that the amount of rainfall has a significant influence on water abstraction. 
 
Figure 4: Water Abstraction in Mauritius, 2000 to 2012 (million m³) 
 
Source: Digest of Environment (Statistic Office) 
 
Table 5 shows the water abstraction account for 2013 with further details on users. The left-
hand column shows the total amount used to generate economic activities, which amounts 
to 888 million m3. The right-hand column, shows the uses of water and the sources for each. 
Of the 888 million m3, 487 million m3 came from surface water and was used by the water 
supply industry, the manufacturing industry and agriculture. 280 million m3 was used for 
hydropower, implying a total surface water abstraction of 767 million m3. The remainder is 
made up of groundwater, with figures showing the amount used by the water supply 
industry, the manufacturing industry and agriculture. Table 5, excluding the hydropower 
component, is similar in structure to a GPWA Statement of Water Assets and Water 
Liabilities; the right-hand column shows the water assets while the left-hand column depicts 
the water liabilities. 
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Table 5: Water Abstraction Account, 2013 
Water sources for abstraction Utilization 
Total water 
abstraction  
 
 888 Total water utilization  888 
 
Surface water   487 Surface water  487 
Rivers  136  Water supply industry 112  
Reservoirs  351  Manufacturing  7  
   Agriculture, forestry and fishing 368 
 
 
Surface water to 
Hydro  
 280 Hydropower  280 
Groundwater  121 Ground water   121 
   Water supply industry  108  
   Manufacturing  6  
   Agriculture, forestry and fishing 7  
Source: Author’s own calculations from Digest of Environment Statistics and Digest on Energy and 
Water Statistics 
 
2.8 Water Abstracted by the Water Supply Industry 
 
The water supply industry supplies the economic and household sectors in Mauritius. Water 
abstraction for these sectors is the main focus for investment strategies and pricing policies. 
Following abstraction, the water is treated before it is distributed. Water withdrawl by the 
water supply industry in Mauritius stood at 220 million m3 for the year 2013. As expected, 
this amount is dependent on the storage system. There are 11 storage systems – reservoirs, 
dams and lakes – which store water to be distributed to the population. Table 6 shows the 
capacity of these reservoirs. 
 
Table 6: Storage Capacity of Reservoirs in Mauritius 
Reservoir 
Capacity 
(million m3) District Purpose 
Mare aux Vacoas 25.89 Plain Wilhems Domestic 
Mare Longue 6.28 Plain Wilhems Hydropower and irrigation 
La Ferme 11.52 Black River Irrigation 
Piton du Milieu 2.99 Moka Domestic 
La Nicoliere 5.26 Pamplemousses Domestic, irrigation and industrial 
Tamarind Falls 2.3 Black River Hydropower and irrigation 
Eau Bleue 4.1 Grand Port Hydropower 
Diamamouve 4.3 Grand Port Hydo-power 
Dagotiere 0.6 Moka Hydo-power 
Valetta 2 Moka Hydo-power 
Midlands Dam 25.5 Moka Domestic, irrigation and industrial 
Total Storage Capacity 90.74 
Source: Digest of Energy and Water (2013) 
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The distribution network in Mauritius works on a regional basis, with each of the reservoirs 
(above) supplying particular networks or regions. There are six regions as shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Water Sources by Regions 
Regions Sources Water for distribution 
(million m³)  
Mare Aux Vacoas (Upper) 
Surface 43.2 
Borehole 6.6 
Total 49.8 
Mare Aux Vacoas (Lower) 
Surface 0.0 
Borehole 30.0 
Total 30.0 
Port –Louis 
Surface 20.5 
Borehole 13.2 
Total 33.7 
District water supply - North 
Surface 26.3 
Borehole 21.3 
Total 47.6 
District water supply - South 
Surface 9.7 
Borehole 16.7 
Total 26.4 
District water supply - East 
Surface 9.4 
Borehole 19.7 
Total 29.1 
  Surface 109.1 
Whole Island Borehole 107.5 
  Total 216.6 
Source: Digest of Energy and Water Statistics (2013) 
 
The water resource system in Mauritius is highly influenced by seasonal variations in rainfall. 
As mentioned earlier, the average annual precipitation over the island is 2,000 mm but the 
rate of replenishment of the water resource systems differs across the year. Table 8 shows 
the months when water levels are at their highest and lowest. 
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Table 8: Minimum and Maximum Water Levels in Mauritius 
Reservoir Capacity (million 
m3) 
Minimum – as a 
% of capacity 
(month(s)) 
 
Maximum - as a 
% of capacity 
(month(s)) 
Mare aux 
Vacoas 
 
25.89 52 
(January) 
100 
(April) 
Midlands Dam 25.5 37 
(January) 
100 
(March and 
April) 
 
La Ferme 11.52 21 
(January and 
November) 
100 
(March and 
April) 
 
Mare Longue 6.28 36 
(January) 
100 
(April) 
 
La Nicoliere 
 
5.26 
 
39 
(October and 
November) 
 
100 
(February to 
May)  
 
Piton du Milieu 2.99 27 
(January) 
100 
(February to 
April) 
                  Source: Digest of Energy and Water (2013) 
 
Table 9: Water Abstraction by Water Supply Industry, 2003-2013 (million m³) 
Sources 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Surface water 110 110 99 100 102 107 112 110 94 97 112 
Groundwater 114 114 115 116 99 107 111 113 111 109 108 
Total 224 224 214 216 201 214 223 223 205 206 220 
Source: Digest of Environmental Statistics 
 
Table 9 shows the amounts of water abstraction by the water supply industry over a ten year 
period, from 2003 to 2013. A comparison with Table 2, reveals that only 8 percent of water 
available is abstracted by the water supply industry annually. This indicates that Mauritius is 
a water rich country. 
 
Table 10 shows the uses of water from the water supply industry. This information 
corresponds to the allocation of accounts according to the GPWA. As can be clearly observed 
from the table, the distribution loss amounts to 110 million m3. 
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Table 10: Water Account for the Water Supply Industry, 2013 (million m³) 
Water use by sectors million m3 
Domestic 73.36  
Government 3.80  
Acquired / concessionary prizes 0.01  
Commercial 6.98  
Hotels, guest houses 6.05  
Industrial 3.78  
Shipping 0.00  
Vegetable and livestock producers 1.3  
Sub-total  95.86 
   
Total non-treated water 
 (agriculture/industrial) 
 15.4
2 
Total water requirements from water industry   111 
Distribution loss7  110 
Water abstracted by Water Supply Industry  220 
       Source: Digest of Energy and Water Statistics (2013) 
 
2.9 Physical Flow Account of Water: Supply and Use Table 
 
Tables 11 and 12 show the supply and use tables for Mauritius in 2013. The work follows a 
draft report and capacity building which was prepared by Statistics Mauritius with the 
support of the UN Statistics Division (UNSD).8 The Physical Water Supply and Use Table 
(PSUT) is based on the concepts outlined in Section 2.4 and contains relevant data on water 
flows. The water supply table focuses primarily on the flow of water from the environment 
to the economy, to households and the return flows back to the environment; while the use 
table focuses mainly on the flow of water within the economy and household sector, and the 
return flows back to the environment. Tables 13 and 14 present a simplified version of the 
full PSUT. The household sector is treated separately from the economic sectors given that 
water is used as an intermediate product in the productive sectors while it is consumed as a 
final product in the household sector. 
 
Flows of water in the economy are distinguished between household9 and economic sectors. 
These sectors use water and at the same they supply water. We divide the economy into 
seven sectors – namely, agriculture and livestock, manufacturing services, hydroelectricity, 
cooling of thermoelectricity, water utilities, sewage10 and household. The environment is 
                                                     
7 The term distribution loss follows the definition of the terminology for water accounts given earlier. 
It does not necessarily mean that this amount of water is lost through leaky pipelines. It might also 
pertain to commercial losses, i.e., faulty meters and illegal connections. Therefore, the meaning of 
the term ‘distribution loss’ as used here is closer to the term Non-Revenue Water. 
8 Our thanks go to Ricardo Martinez-Lagunes, Inter-Regional Advisor on SEEA at the UNSD, for having 
made crucial data available to us. 
9 The word ‘residential’, ‘household’ and ‘domestic’ are used interchangeably in this research report. 
10 The sewage sector refers to man-made facilities to collect used water. 
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considered as an additional sector as it both supplies and uses water. Surface water (through 
the environment) forms the bulk of the water supply to the economy and to households, 
estimated at 767 million m3 in 2013. The second environmental component, groundwater, 
supplies 212 million m3 (see Table 11). 
 
Table 11: Supply Table for Water, 2013 
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Surface water        767 767 
Groundwater        121 121 
Total supply         888 888 
Water supply 
industry: 
treated water     
96    96 
Water supply 
industry: 
non-treated water     
15.4    15.4 
Water supply 
industry: loss 
through distribution     
108.6    108.6 
Sewage to sewers  7     34  41 
Sewage to 
environment       28  28 
Treated wastewater  21    41   62 
Water returns to 
the environment 114  280      394 
Evaporation, 
transpiration, 
incorporation in 
products 
262 6 0 0 0 0 11.3  281 
TOTAL 376 34 280 0 220 41 73 888 1025 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
A total of 888 million m3 of water is available for abstraction and hydropower (Table 5). Of 
this, water utilities treat 220 million m3 of water, defined as ‘potable’ water. However, only 
96 million m3 of water is consumed by households. The rest is a loss to the economy –
reflected in water flow accounts as losses of water – which amounts to 124.1 million m3. 
‘Losses of water’ are divided into the losses from the water supply industry of non-treated 
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water – which is distributed to the agriculture/manufacturing sectors – and from 
‘distribution loss’ attributed to ‘Non-Revenue Water’. 
 
From the total of 767 million m3 of surface water supplied by the environment to the 
economy, the agriculture and livestock sector consumed 368 million m3. This sector also 
consumed 7 million m3 and 1.3 million m3 from groundwater and drinking water, 
respectively. This equates to a total of 376 million m3. In the supply table (Table 12), this 
water will have to flow to one or more sectors. While a significant proportion evaporates, 
the rest is counted as a supply to an entity called water returns. Assuming a proportion for 
evaporation, transpiration and incorporation in products, a total of 114 million m3 returns to 
the environment. This is assumed to be ‘used’ by the environment in the use table. Water 
for hydropower has a specific characteristic since it goes back to the environment after 
being used. 280 million m3 is used for hydropower, which then flows back to the 
environment – water returns. The total water returns to the environment, therefore, 
amount to 395 million m3. The manufacturing sector uses 34 million m3 of water from 
surface water, groundwater and drinking water. This amount of water flows back to sewage 
to sewers and treated wastewater. The household sector uses 73.4 million m3 of water. This 
amount comes from the drinking water but then returns the water back to sewage to sewers 
and sewage to environment. 
 
Water is abstracted from surface water (reservoirs and rivers) and groundwater. The 
agricultural sector was the main user of water (376.3 million m3), followed by the water 
supply industry. In Mauritius, the water supply industry is composed of one central, public 
agency, the Central Water Authority (CWA). Water abstracted by the CWA is mainly used for 
drinking water purposes and accounted for 73.4 million m3 in 2013. Water was also received 
by the sewerage sector and amounted to 41 million m3. 
 
Return flows refer to water returned to the environment after use in agriculture (irrigation), 
waste water or through distribution losses such as leaking pipelines. The return was 
estimated at 395 million m3. The distribution loss amounted to 110 million m3 but is 
recorded as 124 million m3 to take into account the non-treated water (15.4 million m3). The 
distribution loss is equivalent to 50 percent of the total supplied by the CWA (220 million 
m³). This figure is seriously high and poses questions about the management of the water 
sector in Mauritius. However, this figure must be treated with caution since it does not 
mean that 50 percent of the total water supplied is lost through leaky pipelines. As 
previously mentioned, the category distribution loss also includes other forms of water 
losses, such as commercial losses – closely related to what is typically refered to as Non-
Revenue Water. The use table also shows that 41 million m3 of sewage flowed to sewers and 
28 million m3 flowed to the environment. In addition, 62 million m3 of wastewater was 
treated prior to discharge or reuse. 
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Table 12: Use Table for Water, 2013 
USE (million m3) 
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Surface water 368 7 280 0 112    767 
Groundwater 7 6 0 0 108    121 
Total abstraction 375 13 280  220    888 
Water supply 
industry: 
treated water  
1.3 21     73.4  95 
Water supply 
industry: 
 non-treated water 
        15.4 
Water supply 
industry to the 
environment, 
including 
distribution loss 
       108.6 108.6 
Sewage to sewers      41  0 41 
Sewage to 
environment        28 28 
Treated wastewater        62 62 
Water returns to the 
environment        395 395 
Evaporation, 
transpiration, 
incorporation in 
products 
       280 280 
TOTAL 376 34 280 0 220 41 73.4 888 1025 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
The supply table shows that returns mainly comprised of sewage and water losses. 
Households discharged 34 million m3 to sewers and an estimated 28 million m3 went directly 
to the environment. The total amount of treated wastewater returns (62 million m3) were 
from industries (21 million m3) and households (41 million m3). Water returns (395 million 
m3) included 280 million m3 from non-consumptive use for hydropower and 114 million m3 
from agriculture. Agriculture accounted for most of the consumptive use – 262 million m3 
out of the total of 281 million m3. 
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It is important to add a caveat at this point. Some of the water flows, particularly the 
returns, losses and consumptions were estimated as differences between other flows and 
the total. For instance, the amount of water consumed in households was estimated by 
subtracting the total wastewater discharged (sewage) from the water use (total received); 
thus, balancing the supply and use columns, and row totals. 
 
2.10 Water Abstraction at Regional and Seasonal Levels 
 
Tables 11 and 12 provide an annual use and supply table for water. Given that around 3,821 
million m3 of water was obtained through precipitation, 220 million m3 of water was 
abstracted by the water supply industry, and 110 million m3 of water was consumed, it 
appears that there is no visible water scarcity in Mauritius. Table 13 adjusts the amount of 
water abstracted and water used by accounting for the 50 percent distribution loss (i.e., 
Non-Revenue Water). On average, water consumption stands roughly at 9.3 million m3 per 
month (dividing the annual consumption by 12). This figure can then be compared with 
water production on a monthly basis. Taking into account the loss of water – which stood at 
50 percent – the water available for consumption from the water utility service is estimated 
at an average of nine million m3 per month. Compared with the monthly consumption of 
water – 9.3 million m3 – there is a gap of 0.3 million m3 a month. As shown in Table 13, 
during the months of September, October, November, and February water production is 
relatively low due to the limited seasonal rainfall. These are periods of water scarcity. 
Households in certain regions of Mauritius do not have 24 hour access to water and often 
experience severe cuts in supply. 
 
Table 13: Estimates of Water Requirements and Water Production on a Monthly Basis 
Month 
 
Monthly water 
production million 
m3 
Monthly water available 
for consumption million 
m3 
Monthly water 
requirements - million 
m3 
 Jan 18.0 9.0 9.3 
 Feb 16.6 8.3 9.3 
 Mar 19.7 9.9 9.3 
 Apr 18.9 9.5 9.3 
 May 19.5 9.8 9.3 
 Jun 18.0 9.0 9.3 
 Jul 18.5 9.3 9.3 
 Aug 18.2 9.1 9.3 
 Sep 17.2 8.6 9.3 
 Oct 17.2 8.6 9.3 
 Nov 16.9 8.5 9.3 
 Dec 17.9 9.0 9.3 
 Source: Statistics Mauritius and author’s own estimates 
 
Figures 5,6 and 7 illustrate water shortages in three regions of Mauritius: the North, South 
and Central regions. These figures show that while the level of water from the water supply 
industry is much higher than the level of potable water consumption, accounting for 
 36 
 
distribution losses (i.e., Non-Revenue Water) of around 50 percent makes a significant 
difference. In fact, with the level of distribution losses, the current level of available water is 
nearly equivalent to water demand. During the months of December to January, a significant 
drop in water abstraction is observed, implying an associated fall in consumption. 
 
Figure 5: Production of Potable Water Versus Water Demand, Northern Region 
 
 
 Source: Information from Central Water Authority and author’s own estimates 
 
Figure 6: Production of Potable Water Versus Water Demand, Southern Region 
 
 
 Source: Information from Central Water Authority and author’s own estimates 
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Figure 7: Production of Potable Water Versus Water Demand, Central Region
 
Source: Information from Central Water Authority and author’s own estimates 
 
Shortages of water are witnessed mainly for the north and the south as shown in figures 5 
and 6. The water situation is particularly acute for the southern region of the island, where 
water consumption in some months is greater than water production – implying water has 
to be transferred from other reservoirs to satisfy the demand in this region. 
 
2.11 Seasonal Water Accounts 
 
Tables 14 to 18 show the water accounts for the summer and winter seasons. Around 77.5 
percent of rainfall is observed in the months from November to April; and the remainder in 
winter, from May to October. Table 14 shows the uneven distribution of rainfall between the 
seasons in 2013: 2,072 million m3 of water was available for exploitation in summer and 862 
million m3 in winter. 455.2 million m3 and 152 million m3 of was abstracted, respectively, in 
these two periods. 
 
Table 14: Seasonal Water Balance, 2013 (million m³) 
 Summer   Winter  
Rainfall 
 
2,960   862 
 Surface runoff (million m3) 1,776   517   
 Evapotranspiration (million m3) 888   258   
 Net recharge to groundwater 296   96   
Water available for exploitation   2,072   613 
Surface runoff 1,776   517   
Groundwater 296   96   
Water resources abstracted    455.4   152.7  
Surface water  393.6   93.5   
Ground water 61.8  59.2  
               Source: author’s own calculation 
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Table 15 shows the total water abstraction on a seasonal basis for 2013. Surface water 
available for abstraction varies significantly: 393.6 million m3 in summer and 93.5 million m3 
in winter.  The agricultural and forestry sub-sector is most vulnerable in the winter season 
when precipitation levels are at their lowest.  
 
Table 15: Total Water Abstraction on Seasonal Basis, 2013 (million m³) 
Water sources for abstraction Water utilization Summer Winter 
Surface water  393.6 93.5 
 Water supply industry (CWA) 57.1 55 
 Manufacturing  4 3 
 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 332.5 35.5 
Surface water to hydro 219.0 61.0 
Groundwater 61.8 59.2 
  Water supply industry (CWA) 54.4 53.6 
  
 Manufacturing  3.4 2.6 
 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 4 3 
Total    601 287 
 
Table 16 shows water abstraction by the water supply industry. The demand for the 
different sectors is more or less constant, implying that the uneven distribution of rainfall 
must be stored to allow a consistent distribution during the year. 
 
Table 16: Water Abstraction by Water Supply Industry on a Seasonal Basis, 2013 (million 
m³) 
Water users 
 
Million m3 
Summer Winter 
Domestic consumers 37.3 36.1 
Business consumers 3.5 3.4 
PSA consumers 1.9 1.9 
Industrial 1.9 1.9 
Agricultural 1 0.3 
Commercial consumers 3.0 3.0 
Concession price 0.0 0.0 
Religious and charitable 0.3 0.3 
Sub-total 48.6 47.3 
Total non-treated water (agriculture/Industrial) 7.8 7.6 
Total water requirements from water industry  56.4 54.9 
Distribution loss1 53.9 54.1 
Water abstracted 110.3 109.0 
Note: 1 Distribution loss refers to the category used by the SEEA and is in fact closer to Non-Revenue 
Water, as previously discussed 
Source: author’s own calculation 
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Tables 17 and 18 provide the supply and use tables for the summer and winter seasons, 
respectively. Demand for water is fairly stable over the year but water availabity is 
dependent on the hydrological cycle. Very low amounts of precipitation in winter lead to a 
lower water supply during this period, which, in turn, results in large disparities between 
supply and use. The storage and distribution systems have to cope with these disparities and 
cater for the need to continuously provide sufficient water to the population. 
 
 
Table 17: Supply and Use Table for Summer Season, 2013 
SUPPLY 
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Surface 
water               420.3 420.3 
Groundwater               68.4 68.4 
Water supply 
industry: 
treated 
water         49.06       49.06 
Losses of 
water         62.4       62.44 
Sewage to 
sewers   3.7         17.2   20.8 
Sewage to 
environment             14.2   14.2 
Treated 
wastewater   11.4       22.6     34.0 
Water 
returns 101.3   219.0           320.2 
Evaporation, 
transpiration, 
incorporation 
in products 236.3 3.3 0 0 0 0 6.0   245.5 
TOTAL 337.5 18.5 219.0 0 111.5 22.55 37.3 488.7 1,235.0 
USE (million 
m3) 
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Surface 
water 332.5 4.0 219.0 0.0 57.1       612.5 
Groundwater 4.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 54.4       61.8 
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Water supply 
industry: 
treatedwater 1.0 11.0         37.3   49.3 
Losses of 
water               68.3 68.3 
Sewage to 
sewers           22.6   0.0 22.6 
Sewage to 
environment               15.4 15.4 
Treated 
wastewater               34.1 34.1 
Water 
returns               217.3 217.3 
Evaporation, 
transpiration, 
incorporation 
in products               153.7 153.7 
TOTAL 337.5 18.5 219.0 0.0 111.5 22.6 37.3 488.7 1,235.0 
 
 
Table 18: Supply and Use Table for Winter Season, 2013 
SUPPLY 
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Surface water        343.9 343.9 
Groundwater        56.0 56.0 
Water supply 
industry: 
treated water     
47.8    47.8 
Losses of 
water     60.8    60.8 
Sewage to 
sewers  3.1     16.6  19.7 
Sewage to 
environment       13.7  13.7 
Treated 
wastewater  9.6    18.45   28.1 
Water returns 11.64  61.02      72.7 
Evaporation, 
transpiration, 
incorporation 
in products 
27.16 2.8 0 0 0 0 5.8  35.7 
TOTAL 38.8 15.5 61.02 0 108.6 18.45 36.1 399.9 678.3 
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USE (million 
m3) 
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Surface water 35.5 3.0 61.0 0 55 
   
154.6 
Groundwater 3 2.6 0 0 53.6 
   
59.2 
Water supply 
industry: 
treated water 0.3 9.9 
    
36.1 
 
46.3 
Losses of 
water 
       
55.8 55.8 
Sewage to 
sewers 
     
18.45 
 
0.0 18.5 
Sewage to 
environment 
       
12.6 12.6 
Treated 
wastewater 
       
27.9 27.9 
Water returns 
       
177.8 177.8 
Evaporation, 
transpiration, 
incorporation 
in products 
       
125.8 125.8 
TOTAL 38.8 15.5 61.0 0 108.6 18.5 36.1 399.9 678.3 
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Chapter 3: Trends in Water Use, Economic Value of Water, and a 
Scenario-based Analysis of Water Demand and Supply for 2030 
Riad Sultan 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 has two main objectives: (i) to provide a detailed analysis of the demand for water 
in Mauritius and (ii) to forecast water demand for the residential and non-residential sectors 
for the period 2016-2030. To meet the first objective, it estimates the price and income 
elasticity of water in the residential sector and non-residential sector using an 
autoregressive distribution lag model (ARDL). The demand for water in productive sectors is 
also analyzed in terms of the output elasticity and marginal productivity, using a trans-log 
production function. The chapter then goes on to estimate the economic value of water and 
contributes to a partial monetary account of water following the work of Wang and Lall 
(2002), Hassan and Farolfi (2005), Lange and Hassan (2006), Lange et al. (2007) and Ku and 
Yoo (2012). 
 
The forecasts of water demand for the period 2016 to 2030 take into account the rise in 
population, economic activities and the impact of climate change on precipitation. 
Residential and non-residential water consumption is analyzed separately by using an ARDL. 
Three demand-side scenarios are constructed – low, moderate and high – corresponding to 
an economic growth of 2 percent, 5.5 percent and 7 percent, up to 2030. On the supply side, 
an adjustment is made to consider the effects of climate change in Mauritius using the 
projections made by McSweeney et al. (2010), under the three emission scenarios, A1B, A2 
and B2 (IPCC, 2000). Combining the use and availability of water, the study provides 
estimates of water shortages by 2030. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.1 is devoted to a brief review of the literature 
on water as an economic good. This is followed in Section 3.2 by a description of water 
utilization in Mauritius. Section 3.3 provides an estimate of price and income elasticity of 
water in the residential sector. This section includes the relevant literature, the conceptual 
framework and the econometric method, data and results. It calculates price and income 
elasticity by estimating a demand function for residential water. Section 3.4 models the 
demand for water using the marginal productivity approach and calculates the output 
elasticity, the marginal productivity of water and the price elasticity in the manufacturing 
sectors using a trans-log production function. Section 3.5 forecasts the demand for water in 
both the residential and non-residential sectors under three economic growth scenarios for 
the period 2015 to 2030 and estimates shortages for the year 2030 using different climate 
change storylines. The last section, Section 3.6, provides a brief analysis of the behavior of 
households facing water shortages using the responses to the household survey conducted 
as part of this study. 
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3.1 Water as an Economic Good 
 
The fourth Dublin principle11 states that water has an economic value and should be 
recognized as an economic good, and that any considerations of water use should address 
affordability and equity criteria (ICWE, 1992). Water generates utility for humans directly 
when it is consumed or used, and indirectly through the production of other activities 
(Savenije, 2002). Water is scarce and entails competing uses. Its use in a specific way 
involves opportunity costs. These correspond to the value of the best alternative forgone – 
in other words, the alternative which had to be given up in order to use the water in the way 
chosen. Once water has been defined as an economic good, the concept of opportunity 
costs allows us to calculate the utility derived from its use and to estimate the benefits. 
Water has an economic value because of its particular specificities. According to Savenije 
(2002), water is essential, scarce, fugitive (if it is not captured, it is gone), bulky, non-
substitutable, and is not freely tradable. 
 
Water has other specific characteristics: water can be captured but it is bound by its location 
or origin and natural conveyance system; there are high production costs involved when re-
allocated to the storage system; and the market for water is heterogeneous – while some 
groups of people are willing to pay (high prices), others are not (for example, farmers). 
 
The economic value of water is an important element in its management. According to 
Rogers et al. (2002), the value of water relates to the benefits to users, the benefits from 
returned flows, the indirect benefits and its intrinsic value. An estimation of the value of 
water can be used to price it efficiently (one of the many objectives of water management). 
 
The concept of ‘total economic value’, which refers to the benenfits people derive from an 
environmental or natural resource, can be used to measure the value of water. Two main 
categories are identified: 
 
1. Use values. These are further differentiated into 
 
(i) Direct use values. These arise from direct interaction with water resources. They may 
be consumptive such as water for irrigation or non-consumptive such as recreational 
swimming. 
 
(ii)  Indirect use values are associated with services provided by water resources. 
 
2. Non-use values are derived from maintaining the resource arising out of ethical concerns 
or altruistic preferences. Non-use values can exist in three different types: 
 
(i)  Existence values. These corresponds to the satisfaction which is derived by the mere 
fact that the water resource continues to exist, regardless of whether or not it is 
being used. 
                                                     
11 The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, also known as the Dublin principles, 
sets out recommendations to reduce water scarcity. 
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(ii) The bequest value. This pertains to the utility which is derived by future generations 
and relates to the idea of ensuring intergenerational equity. 
 
(ii) The philanthropic value. This is the satisfaction gained from guaranteeing that 
resources are available to the current generation (Turner et al. 2004). 
 
From the above theoretical underpinning, a number of market and non-market valuation 
approaches have been developed. 
 
In England and Wales, the value of water use has been assessed by comparing the 
contribution of different sectors to the economy (Moran and Dann, 2008). In contrast, the 
economic valuation for Scotland adopts a variety of approaches, where the choice is dictated 
by the availability of data on revealed values through the market for water services. 
 
This section uses the use and supply tables constructed in the previous chapter to estimate 
the economic value of water. In fact, the value of water can be extracted from its use in 
different sectors of the economy. For example, users in the residential sector derive a 
benefit and the economic welfare of such consumption can be estimated. The value of water 
used as an intermediate input in economic activities can also be extracted using a 
productivity approach. The following section is restricted to the water supplied by the 
Central Water Authority (CWA). However, a more comprehensive estimation of the value of 
water includes groundwater used directly by the agricultural and industrial sectors, as well 
as the non-use value associated with water flowing to sinks. 
 
To conceptualize the economic value of water, it is important to differentiate between final 
water consumption in the residential sector and water used in the production sectors. For 
this reason, the following section treats each of the two sectors separately. 
 
3.2 Water Utilization in Mauritius 
 
Water consumption in Mauritius for 2013 is shown in Table 19. The highest proportion of 
potable water went to the domestic sector, which has more than 317,000 subscribers. The 
domestic sector consumed a total of 73.4 million m3. The manufacturing, business and 
commercial sectors also consumed potable water, as shown below. However, the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors also used non-treated water supplied by the CWA. 
The non-treated water is distributed to users through a separate water pipe system. 
 
 Table 19 also shows the average price per cubic meter: the average price for potable water 
was MUR 13.44 (USD 0.38) per cubic meter and MUR 3.91 (USD 0.11) for non-treated water. 
An important question is whether this consitutes a ‘fair price’. Evidently, this cannot be 
answered without a proper analysis of the cost structure, the ability of households to pay 
and the economic contribution of water. 
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Table 19: Water Consumption in Mauritius, 2013 
Water consumption 
 
Subscribers Volume sold  Amount collectible 
Average 
consumption 
(m³) 
Average 
price per 
m³ 
  
No. % million m³ % 
MUR 
(USD) 
millions 
% 
  
      
Households 317,786 92.9 73.4 65.9 
696.3 
(19.61) 
 
51.6 231 9.49 
Public sector agencies 2,511 0.7 3.8 3.4 
91.1 
(2.57) 
 
6.8 1,512 24.00 
Acquired / 
concessionary prices 38 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1 
(0.003) 
 
0.0 355 9.87 
Businesses 1,118 0.3 7.0 6.3 
241.0 
(6.79) 
 
17.9 6,244 34.52 
Commercial uses 13,646 4.0 6.0 5.4 
160.6 
(4.52) 
 
11.9 443 26.57 
Religious institutions 1,981 0.6 0.6 0.5 
11.5 
(0.32) 
 
0.9 295 19.65 
Industry 598 0.2 3.8 3.4 
68.7 
(1.94) 
 
5.1 6,327 18.16 
Agriculture 3,942 1.2 1.3 1.2 
19.0 
(0.54) 
 
1.4 329 14.67 
Total potable water 341,620 99.9 95.9 86.1 
1,288.4 
(36.29) 
 
95.5 281 13.44 
Total non-treated 
water 332 0.1 15.4 13.9 
60.3 
(1.7) 
 
4.5 46,449 3.91 
Total 341,952 100.0 111.3 100.0 
1,348.7 
(37.99) 
 
100.0 325 12.12 
Source: Statistics Mauritius (2014) 
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Water tariffs for the different groups of consumers are shown in Tables 20 and 21. 
 
Table 20: Domestic Monthly Tarrif for Potable Water, 2013 
Tariff Bracket MUR (USD) 
Minimum charge (up to 10m3) 45 (1.27) 
Next 10 m3 8 (0.23) per m3 
Next 10 m3 10 (0.28) per m3 
Next 30 m3 17 (0.48) per m3 
Every additional m3 32 (0.9) per m3 
CWA (2014) 
 
The fixed monthly minimum charge is MUR 45 (USD 1.27). This is a fixed fee for the first 10 
m3, irrespective of how much is used. Any additional usage (above 10 m3 per month) is 
charged per cubic meter. The tariff structure is not proportional to the amount of water 
consumed, but increases in increments. For example, every cubic meter between 30 and 59 
m3 costs MUR 17 and every additional cubic meter above that costs MUR 32. 
 
Table 21: Non-Domestic Monthly Tarrifs for Potable Water, 2014 
Non-domestic  Tariff 14 Tariff 15 & 18 Tariff 16 Tariff 17 
Minimum charges MUR (USD) 1,122 (31.61) 391 (11.01) 450 (12.68) 220 (6.2) 
All cubic meters MUR (USD) 34 (0.96) 23 (0.65) 18 (0.51) 11 (0.31) 
     
Tariff 53 
Minimum charge MUR (USD) 60 (1.69)    
First 10 m3 MUR (USD) 6 (0.17)    
Next 10 m³ MUR (USD) 8 (0.23)    
Next 30 m³ MUR (USD) 17 (0.48) 
 
   
Source: CWA (2014) 
 
Table 21 shows the tariffs for the non-domestic sector. In fact, there are five different tariff 
structures according to the various types of businesses (commercial, industrial, etc.). 
Minimum charges apply to all the different tarrifs. For tarrifs 14 to 18, consumption is 
charged per cubic meter at a fixed rate; Tarrif 53 is based on an incremental scale. 
 
3.3 Modeling Residential Water Consumption 
 
According to Colby (1989), the economic value of water in the residential sector is 
determined by the willingness to pay and consumer surplus. This approach is useful when a 
demand curve for water can be estimated. Domestic water usually shows an inelastic 
demand function because it has no substitutes for basic uses, and water bills usually 
represent a small proportion of income (Arbues et al., 2003). This section models the 
demand for residential water, based on theoretical underpinnings involving price and 
income as determinants. 
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Theoretical Modeling 
 
The theoretical modeling is based on a non-liner demand function. Suppose the quantity of 
residential water consumed at time t is given by tWRES  and the average price in the same 
period is given by tPRES . The inverse demand function is therefore given by: 
 
t
b
t aPRESWRES =         (1) 
 
The demand function can also be written in logarithmic form such that: 
 
tt PRESln'b'aWRESln −=       (2) 
 
In the above case, 'b is the price elasticity of demand for water. 
 
The above can be extended to include income such that: 
 
ttt RGDPlncPRESln'b'aWRESln +−=      (3) 
 
RGDP  is the real income per capita. 
Econometric Modeling 
 
Using equation 3, the econometric model to estimate the demand function takes the 
following form: 
 
tttt RGDPcPRESbaWRES ε++−= ln'ln''ln     (4) 
 
Where tε is an error term. 
 
The above demand function is referred to as the long-run demand function. In fact, in many 
cases, economic variables are non-stationary. In such cases, a co-integration test is 
performed to test whether the error term is stationary and whether a long-run relationship 
may indeed exist. When variables are co-integrated, an error correction model can be 
estimated. This can take the following forms: 
 
)(lnlnln 1−−∆+∆−=∆ tttt RGDPgPRESedWRES εl    (5) 
and 
1111 −−−− −+−= tttt RGDPlncPRESln'b'aWRESlnε  
Data 
  
Figure 6 shows the demand for consumption of water in the residential sector. Data was 
obtained from CWA annual reports, the Digest of Energy and Water Statistics and the Annual 
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Digest of Statistics. A closer examination of the trend in water consumption shows that there 
is a steep fall in water demand when there is a change in tariff. 
 
Figure 8: Demand for Water Consumption in the Residential Sector 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation from CWA annual reports, Digest of Energy and Water 
Statistics 
 
Econometric Result 
 
The econometric analysis starts with a unit root test of the two variables. Table 22 shows the 
results. 
 
Table 22: Unit Root Test of Variables 
Level form ADF 
statistics 
95% critical 
value 
First 
difference 
ADF statistics 95% critical 
value 
 
tWRESln  
 
-3.135(1) 
 
-2.947 
   
tPRESln  
3.306(1) -2.947    
tRGDPln  0.276(1) -2.947 tRGDPln∆  
-3.759 -3.543 
The optimal lag length is shown in brackets according to Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion 
Source: author’s calculation 
 
Given the mixture of variables which are stationary at level and first difference, the ARDL is 
used. The error correction model is shown in Table 23. As can be observed, the coefficient of 
the price variable is negative and statistically significant, implying that demand is inversely 
related to price. This is an important validity test of the estimated demand function. The co-
integration bounds test is used to test the long-run relationship. 
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Table 23: Results for Demand for Water for Residential Purposes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The long-run estimates are provided in table 24. Water is price inelastic in both the short 
and the long run. In the short run, price elasticity of demand is -0.10 while in the long run it 
is -0.16. Madhoo (2009); using a linear expenditure system estimates price elasticity to be in 
the range of -0.06 to -0.26. The estimates in this study are therefore consistent with 
previous studies. 
 
Table 24: Long-run Demand Function for Water in Mauritius 
Long-run Demand Function for water 
 
constant 
 
3.289(0.323)*** 
 
tPRESln  
 
-0.155(-0.082)* 
 
tRGDPln  
 
0.225(0.044)*** 
 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively 
Source: author’s calculation 
 
Income elasticities in this study are 0.15 and 0.23 in the short and the long run, respectively. 
Again, these estimates are consistent with Madhoo (2009), who shows that income elasticity 
lies in the range of 0.27 to 0.68. 
 
Following Kling (1989), the coefficients from the demand function are used to calculate the 
consumer surplus. The cost paid by a consumer is estimated using the charge by volume. A 
graphical representation is provided in Figure 9. 
 
 
Constant 2.162(0.437)*** 
 
tPRESln∆  
 
-0.102(0.050)** 
tRGDPln∆  
0.148(0.051)*** 
1−tl  
0.657(0.150)*** 
R-bar square 0.407 
F(3, 38) 8.098*** 
 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
Source: author’s calculation 
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Figure 9: Consumer Surplus in Mauritius 
 
                Source: author 
 
The welfare of water is calculated for the range above 40 million m3 because of the 
logarithmic formulation of the demand function. Using the above estimates, the average 
consumer surplus per m3 is estimated at MUR 200 (USD 5.63), while the marginal value of 
water is estimated at MUR 9.91 (USD 0.28) per m3. The total consumer surplus is estimated 
at MUR 697.3 million (USD 19.64 million). 
 
3.4 Modeling the Demand for the non-Residential Sector: Marginal 
Productivity of Water 
 
Water demand can be distinguished according to its consumption. Common uses are 
residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial and recreational. The agricultural demand 
usually refers to water for irrigation and livestock purposes, while commercial use consists of 
water used by warehouses, stores and shopping centers, restaurants, hotels and related 
activities, cinemas and offices, among others. Industrial water demand focuses on uses such 
as cooling, processing and manufacturing operations, and power generation. Finally, 
recreational and environmental uses of water make up the remaining non-residential and 
non-industrial uses that generate a value for the consumer (Worthington, 2011). The 
interest in estimating demand for water and its price elasticity in the non-residential sector 
has been growing among scholars, but to date, very few of these studies have been 
conducted (Worthington, 2011). 
 
The estimation of the value of water in the non-residential sector is based on the 
neoclassical economics of production. In the manufacturing and commercial sectors, the 
demand for water is derived, along with other inputs, as part of a production function. Thus, 
it is not only price that affects the demand for water but also the firm’s output and other 
inputs used. 
 
This section calculates the economic value of water in the non-residential sector, namely the 
manufacturing sector, the commercial sector and the tourism sector, using the marginal 
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productivity approach (Wang and Lall, 2002; Ku and Yoo 2012). To explain the theoretical 
foundation, a production function is considered as follows: 
 
)W,L,K(fQ =          (6) 
 
Where Q , K , L , and W  are output, capital, labor and water consumption. A Cobb-
Douglas production function can be written as follows: 
 
WlnKlnLlnAlnQln 321 ααα +++=       (7) 
 
The elasticity of production for each factor of production is calculated by taking the partial 
derivative of the output with respect to the factor under consideration. Thus, for water the 
elasticity can be expressed as follows: 
 
2αε =∂
∂
=
W
W
Q
Q
CD
         (8) 
 
The marginal productivity of water is then 
 
)
W
Q.(CDCD ερ =
         (9) 
 
Assuming a trans-log function, the production function can be estimated as follows: 
 
198
7
2
6
2
5
2
4
321
lnlnlnln
lnln)(ln)(ln)(ln
lnlnlnlnln
WaterDUMWLWK
LKWLK
WLKAQ
n
i
i∑+++
++++
+++=
αα
αααα
ααα
                     
                     
  (10) 
 
The elasticity of water is given by: 
 
WlnKlnWln
W
W
Q
Q
TL 9863 2 ααααε +++=∂
∂
=
     (11) 
 
 
The marginal productivity of water is given by: 
 
)
W
Q.(TLTL ερ =
         (12) 
 
iiWaterDUM  takes one if the sector is i, for n different economic sectors and zero otherwise. 
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Data from the Census of Economic Activities from the Statistics Office has been used to 
estimate the regression. The dependent variable is the total output in thousands of MUR. 
Water is shown in m3. Capital is the net book value at the end of the period. 
 
Table 25: Regression Analysis of the Marginal Value of Water 
Variables Coefficient Coefficient 
Kln  0.289(0.023)*** 0.316(0.086)*** 
Lln  0.357(0.039)*** -0.129(0.152) 
Wln  0.422(0.026)*** 0.821(.061)*** 
2)K(ln   0.001(0.008) 
2)L(ln   0001(0.029) 
2)W(ln   -0.017(0.008)** 
LlnKln   0.043(0.018)** 
WlnKln   -0.031(0.015)* 
WlnLln   0.021(0.033) 
D – FOOD 0.005(0.010) 0.025(0.010)** 
D- TEXTILE -0.079(0.008)*** -0.077(0.008)*** 
D-PAPER -0.022(0.012)* -0.022(0.012)* 
D-CHEMICAL 0.053(0.014)*** 0.064(0.015)*** 
D-RUBBER 0.030(0.013)** 0.039(0.014)*** 
D-NON METAL -0.045(0.017)*** -0.011(0.016) 
D-METAL 0.035(0.014)** 0.041(0.014)*** 
D-ELECTRICITY 0.075(0.010)*** 0.077(0.022)*** 
D-CONSTRUCTION 0.053(0.029)* 0.044(0.019)** 
D-TOURISM -0.093(0.012)*** -0.069(0.013)*** 
D-WHOLESALE TRADE -0.005(0.010) -0.007(0.010) 
Constant 3.350(0.129)*** 2.827(0.278)*** 
N 1191 1170 
F(14,1176) 364.04 354.30 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 
R-square 0.84 0.85 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
Table 25 shows the regression results. The R-square is 0.85 implying that the variables 
contribute to significant variation in output. The first column shows a regression analysis 
corresponding to the Cobb-Douglas production function and the second one shows the 
trans-log production function. The difference lies in the number of observations that 
correspond to missing variables in the calculation. 
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Table 26: Trans-log Production Function 
 Output 
elasticity of 
water 
Marginal 
productivity of 
water MUR 
(USD)/m3 
Price elasticity 
Food 0.08 195 (5.49) -0.89 
Textile 0.02 20 (0.56) -0.33 
Paper 0.35 536 (15.1) -1.33 
Chemical 0.41 1,501 (42.28) -1.49 
Rubber 0.43 1,479 (41.66) -1.54 
Non-metal 0.27 357 (10.06) -1.17 
Metal 0.41 1,288 (36.28) -1.59 
Electricity 0.54 1,938 (54.59) -1.93 
Construction 0.47 3,666 (103.27) -1.75 
Tourism 0.21 160 (4.51) -1.14 
Wholesale trade 0.42 1,784 (50.25) -1.60 
Average  0.32 1,413 (39.8) -1.34 
       Source: Author’s own estimates from the regression analysis 
 
Table 26 shows the output elasticity, marginal productivity of water and price elasticity of 
water at the sector level. The output elasticity ranges from 0.02 to 0.54. The marginal 
productivity of water ranges from MUR 20 (USD 0.56) to MUR 3,666 (USD 103.27) per m3, 
with an average of MUR 1,413 (USD 39.8) per million m3. The cross-section econometric test 
shows that for most of the economic sectors, water demand is price elastic. The contribution 
of water is significant for the electricity, construction, metal, chemical and rubber industries. 
 
The high price elasticity of water is attributed to the fact that economic sectors are also able 
to exploit surface water directly through rivers. A word of caution is important in 
interpreting the data. Missing variables on other intermediate products may inflate the 
marginal value of water. 
 
3.5 Scenario-based Analysis of Water Use and Water Abstraction 
 
Forecast of water demand from 2015 to 2030 
 
This section attempts to forecast residential and non-residential water demand for the 
period between 2015 and 2030 using a time-series econometric analysis. The analysis 
considers residential demand for water and non-residential demand separately. Non-
residential demand includes industrial, business and government demand for water. The 
determinants for residential demand are real average price, total income and population. An 
ARDL is used with a long-run specification and an error correction model (ECM). The two 
econometric equations are shown below: 
 
Residential demand   
 
Long run:   (13) resttt POPTRGDPPRESTWRES εβββ +++−= lnlnlnln 210
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ECM:  )(lnlnlnln 13210 −−∆+∆+∆−=∆ ttttt POPTRGDPPRESTWRES εφηηηη  (14) 
 
tTWRES is total demand for residential water 
tTRGDP  is total income at time t 
tPRES real price of water at time t 
tPOP  is population at time t 
 
Non-residential demand including government 
 
Long run:   (15) 
 
ECM: )(lnlnln 1210 −−∆+∆−=∆ nrestttt TRGDPPRESTWRES εtnnn  (16) 
 
Table 27 shows the ECM for residential water demand. All the coefficients have the expected 
sign – in other words, negative for average price, positive for income and population. The 
short-run price elasticity is estimated at -0.12 while the long-run price elasticity is -0.17. The 
short-run and long-run income elasticities are 0.21 and 0.30, respectively. 
 
Table 27: Error Correction Model for Domestic Water Consumption 
Variable  Coefficients 
 
tTRGDPln∆  
 
0.206(0.0593)*** 
tPOPln∆  7.544(3.994)* 
1−tl  
 
-0.680(0.145)*** 
Long-run coefficient 
 
 
tPRESln  -0.173(0.078)** 
tTRGDPln  
 
0.303(0.048)*** 
 
R-bar square 
 
0.432 
F(3, 29) 
 
9.4406*** 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
Source: Author’s own calculations 
 
Table 28 provides the regression results for non-domestic consumption. Again, the 
coefficients have the expected sign. The price elasticities in both the short and the long run 
are higher than those for residential water demand, namely equal to -0.63 and 0.72 
respectively. Income elasticity is also higher at 0.39 in the long run and 0.22 in the short-run. 
 
nresttt TRGDPPNRESTWNRES εχχ ++−= lnlnln 10
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Table 28: Error Correction Mode for non-Domestic Water Consumption 
Variables Coefficient 
 
tPNRESln∆  
 
-0.627(0.101)*** 
tTRGDPln∆  0.224(0.063)*** 
CONS 1.143(0.985) 
1−tl  
 
-.570(0.100)*** 
Long-run coefficients 
 
 
tPNRESln  0.717(0.161)*** 
tTRGDPln  0.393(0.059)*** 
Cons 2.012(1.084) 
 
 
R-bar square 
 
0.481 
F(3, 29) 9.4406*** 
 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1%, respectively 
Source: Author’s estimates from regression analysis 
 
Using the ARDL estimates, we forecast the demand for water for the years 2015 to 2030. 
Figures 10 and 11 show the results. Three scenarios are estimated, related to economic 
growth rates of of 2, 5.5 and 7 percent. 
 
Figure 10: Forecast of Demand for Residential Water, 2016-2030 
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Figure 11: Forecast of Demand in the non-Residential and Government Sectors, 2015-2030 
 
 
A summary of the forecast for 2030 is shown in Table 29. The percentage increase from the 
2014 water level is given in brackets. As expected, the 2 percent growth rate provides the 
lowest increase – 14.5 percent for the domestic sector and 27.7 percent for the non-
domestic sector. The increase is higher for a 5.5 percent economic growth rate and highest 
for the 7 percent growth rate. 
 
Table 29: Residential and non-Residential Demand for Water in 2030 
 Actual  Economic growth 
2% 
Economic Growth 
5.5% 
Economic Growth 
7% 
Household consumption 
(million m3) 
 
73.4 85.0 (14.5) 99.7 (34.4) 108.0 (45.6) 
Non-domestic (including 
government ) 
(million m3) 
 
22.3 27.7 (22.2) 34.0 (49.6) 38.0 (67.4) 
Total (million m2) 95.7 112.7 (16.3) 133.7 (38.0) 146.0 (50.7) 
Source: Author’s own estimates 
 
Figure 12 shows the aggregate demand for water under the three economic growth 
scenarios. The total demand for water in 2030 is estimated at 113 million m3, 134 million m3, 
and 146 million m3, under the 2, 5.5 and 7 percent economic growth scenarios, respectively. 
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Figure 12: Aggregate Demand for Water in 2030 Under Different Economic Growth 
Scenarios 
 
Source: Author’s own estimates 
 
3.6 Water Abstraction Under Climate Change Scenarios 
 
Water abstraction is dependent on the amount of precipitation, which, in turn, is likely to be 
affected by climate change. The impact of climate change on precipitation is estimated using 
different scenarios or storylines developed by the IPCC (2000). McSweeney et al. (2010) 
work out the expected impacts of these climate change scenarios for Mauritius using three 
storylines: A2, A1B and B1. 
 
The A1 scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth, with a global 
population that peaks mid-century and declines thereafter. It involves the rapid introduction 
of new and more efficient technologies, and assumes convergence among regions, capacity 
building, and increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in 
regional differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three groups 
that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy system. The three 
A1 groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis: fossil intensive (A1FI), non-
fossil energy sources (A1T) or a balance across all sources (A1B). ‘Balanced’ is defined as not 
relying too heavily on one particular energy source. The underlying assumption is that 
similar improvement rates apply to all energy supply and end-use technologies. 
 
The A2 storyline describes self-reliance and the preservation of local identities, with fertility 
patterns across regions converging very slowly. Economic development is primarily 
regionally oriented and per capita economic growth and technological change are more 
fragmented and slower than in other storylines. 
 
The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with a global population 
that peaks mid-century and declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but the emphasis is on 
global solutions to economic, social and environmental sustainability, including improved 
equity, but without additional climate initiatives. 
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The impact of climate change on precipitation by 2030 is shown in table 30. Only the 
maximum and minimum is provided. 
 
Table 30: Climate Change Scenarios for Rainfall by 2030 (A2, A1B and B1) 
 Climate change scenarios (% change in rainfall) 
 A2 A1B B1 
 Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum 
Annual -9 14 -12 12 -3 3 
Summer -10.8 21.5 -17.3 17.5 -11.8 10.8 
Winter -18.2 14.5 -21.7 12.5 -21.2 8.2 
Source: McSweeney et al. (2010) 
 
Based on the above predictions, we estimate water abstraction by the water supply industry 
for the worst of the different climate change scenarios. Choosing the worst case scenario 
makes sense since the storage system should be prepared for this scenario in order to 
guarantee a sustainable provision of water. Estimating the impact of climate change on 
water storage can be done using highly sophisticated modeling tools. However, this is 
beyond the scope of this study. We perform a simple analysis, applying the percentage 
change to the average rainfall over the last 10 years. This is shown in Figure 13. An annual 
total of 188 million m3 is abstracted under the A2 scenario and 177 million m3 under the A1B 
scenario . Accounting for the rate of Non-Revenue Water, and assuming the leakage rate and 
the rate of commercial losses are constant, Figure 13 also shows the amount of potable 
water that is available for distribution to the residential, economic and government sectors. 
 
Figure 13: Total Water Production Under Climate Change Scenarios in 2030 (millions m³) 
 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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We have three climate change scenarios – A2, A1B and B1 – and three economic growth 
scenarios. By combining these, nine different scenarios for water abstraction can be 
constructed. The water shortages to be expected under these various scenarios are depicted 
in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Water Shortages Under Different Climate Change and Economic Growth 
Scenarios (millions m³) 
 
 
Source: Author’s own estimate 
 
Figure 14 shows the shortages of water which are expected to prevail in 2030 with the 
current storage system. With the rise in demand for water and the impact of climate change, 
shortages of water range from 15 million m3 to 58 million m3 annually. Under A2, water 
shortages will be in the range of 19 million m3 to 52 million m3, corresponding to an 
economic growth of 2 percent and 7 percent, respectively. Similarly, under A1B, the water 
shortages are computed to be between 24 million m3 and 58 million m3; and under B1, the 
shortages will lie somewhere between 15 million m3 and 49 million m3. With an economic 
growth of 5.5 percent, the shortages range from 36 million m3 to 45 million m3 (B1 and A1B 
respectively). 
 
3.7.  Behavior of Households Toward Water Shortages: Evidence From the 
Water Use Survey 
 
It was deemed important to understand the behavior of households as far as water is 
concerned. As mentioned earlier in the report, the economic sustainability of water is a 
serious issue, particularly in terms of financing water storage systems or repairing pipe 
networks. With this in mind, a ‘Household Water Use Survey’ was undertaken between 
October 2015 and November 2015, to analyze the impacts of water tariffs and water 
shortages at the household level. A questionnaire was prepared and administered to 375 
respondents through face-to-face interviews. The island was divided into five regions and 
respondents were chosen according to region. Sample areas were selected randomly and in 
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each area around 15 locations were identified. Within these locations, random streets were 
selected and eventually interviewers were requested to select predetermined households – 
in other words, every nth house. 
 
Expenditure on water at the household level 
 
The first results relate to expenditure on water at the household level (Table 31). The 
average water bill stands at MUR 177. 
 
Table 31: Indicators on Water from the Survey 
Indicators Averages 
 
Household income per month 
 
MUR 23778.4 (USD 700) 
 
Water bill per month 
 
MUR 177.3 (USD 5.2) 
 
Household size 
 
3.53 
 
From this, the share of the water bill in household income can be calculated. The average 
household income stands at MUR 23,778 and the average water bill is MUR 177. This means 
that the average water bill is 0.7 percent of the average household income. However, this 
ratio varies with changes in income, as can be seen in Table 32. 
 
Table 32: Ratio of Water Bill to Monthly Household Income 
Household Income (MUR) 
 
Water bill as % of 
household Income 
 
 5001 - 7000 1.92 
 7001 - 9000 1.739 
 9001 - 12000 1.347 
12001 - 15000 1.175 
15001 - 20000 0.942 
20001 - 25000 0.84 
25001 - 30000 0.707 
30001 - 35000 0.602 
35001 - 40000 0.56 
40001 - 45000 0.472 
45001 - 50000 0.48 
50001 - 55000 0.413 
55001 - 60000 0.358 
60001 - 70000 0.35 
 
Table 32 shows that for households in the 5001-7000 income bracket, their water bill is a 
relatively higher proportion of their income (1.92 percent). As income rises, the ratio 
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declines (0.35 percent for those earning between MUR 60,001-Rs70,000 per month). A 
graphical illustration is provided in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Ratio of Water Bill to Monthly Household Income 
 
The results show that households in the lower income bracket pay a higher share and that, 
therefore, the water tariff is highly regressive. To analyse the regressive nature of the water 
tariff we conducted a regression analysis to control for household size. The results are 
shown in Table 33. 
 
Table 33: Relationship between Share of Water Bill, Household Income and Household Size 
Constant 1.200 (0.0363)*** 
 
Household income 
 
-0009(0004)*** 
Household size 0.0185(0.009)** 
R-bar square 0.07 
F(2, 372) 263.03 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
Source: Author’s own calculation from Household Survey 
 
Controlling for household size, the regression analysis still shows a negative relationship 
between the share of the water bill and household income. A positive relationship, as 
expected, is observed for the variable household size. 
 
Impacts of water scarcity 
 
One of the impacts of water scarcity is that households installed water tanks to ensure a 
constant supply of water. The survey reveals that 43.4 percent of respondents own a water 
tank. Table 3 shows a logit regression explaining the relationship between water tanks and 
household income. As expected, household with higher incomes are more likely to install a 
water tank. We include two additional variables in the regression as controls, household size 
and age. The latter is statistically significant but the former is not. 
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Table 34: Logit Regression – Water Tank and Household Income 
Constant -0.624(0.072)*** 
 
Household income 
 
0.023(0.001)*** 
Household size 0.009(0.023) 
Age 0.008(0.001)*** 
Pseudo R-bar square 0.035 
Log-pseudolikelihood -4216.980 
 
*, **, *** represent statistically significant at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively 
Source: Author’s own calculations from Houshold Survey 
 
The survey also reveals that around 13.44 percent have installed a water pump because of 
lower pressure. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The forecasting exercise concludes that Mauritius may be heading toward a water crisis if 
appropriate water management strategies are not adopted. The results from the water 
accounts, the analysis of the economic value of water, and the scenario-based forecast of 
water shortages, provide the basis for designing water policies and strategies. A summary of 
findings is provided in Section 3 together with policy implications. 
 
This section (Section 1) analyzes the current and future situation of the Mauritian water 
sector using water accounts and a demand and supply analysis. Parts 2.10 and 2.11 show 
that during recent years, and at certain times of the year and in specific regions, Mauritius is 
already facing situations of water scarcity. All other things being equal, this is likely to be 
exacerbated by climate change. 
 
A typical answer to these challenges is to look for supply-side driven solutions – namely, to 
increase storage capacity and work on the physical and commercial distribution losses (i.e., 
reduce the amount of Non-Revenue Water). The following section (Section 2), proposes an 
alternative solution to the challenges facing the Mauritian water sector. It argues that water 
sector performance can be improved if specific governance issues are addressed. To this 
end, Section 2 analyses the Mauritian water sector from a governance perspective. It will 
provide an in-depth analysis of the institutional setting of Mauritian water sector 
governance and then discuss specific problems, in order to deduce a number of policy 
recommendations to enhance governance and thereby the performance of the Mauritian 
water sector. These recommendations will be summarized in Section 3 of this study. 
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Chapter 4: The Institutional Setting of Mauritian Water Sector 
Governance: What Place for Sustainability? 
 
Aleksandra Peeroo 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapters of this report analyzed the current water status in Mauritius and 
highlighted the fact that, at certain times of year (during the winter and the beginning of 
summer) and in certain regions, water supply barely meets demand. Furthermore, the 
scenario-based analysis shows that these tensions are likely to be exacerbated in future as a 
result of climate change. According to estimates by the Mauritius Meteorological Services, 
published on the website of the Ministry of Environment, rainfall is set to decrease by 8 
percent and usable water resources by 13 percent, by 2050.12 In addition, according to the 
United Nations, Mauritius is already facing a situation of water stress which will lead to 
water scarcity by 2020 (National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 11). This is supported 
by findings in the previous chapters. 
 
However, water stakeholders in Mauritius seem to agree on the fact that Mauritius is a 
water rich country. Even though rainfall is becoming more erratic, there should be enough 
water available to meet demand. So why the concerns over water scarcity? A recent OECD 
report explains that the water crisis is largely a crisis of governance (OECD, 2011, p. 17). This 
means that, even if water is available in sufficient quantities, the mismanagement of water 
resources will lead to a situation where there is not enough water available for the different 
water uses. Therefore, we need to examine whether water sector governance – the system 
in place to plan, monitor and direct the water sector – is prepared for such a situation. 
 
Being prepared for a water crisis entails that water sector governance must take the 
question of sustainability into account. Only sustainable water resources and services will 
allow Mauritius to meet the demand in the long term. Isnard and Barraqué (2010), 
distinguish three facets of sustainability that are important for the water sector. Firstly, 
economic sustainability, which entails the capacity of water services to recover their costs, 
not only for the operation and maintenance of water services, but also for long-term 
investments (ibid., pp. 4 ff.). Secondly,  environmental sustainability, which requires that 
water corresponds to defined safety norms, that the use for water of future generations is 
guaranteed, and that the quality and quantity of water resources is safeguarded (ibid., p.12). 
Thirdly, ethical or social aspects of sustainability, which means that users are able and 
willing to pay for the water services received (ibid., p. 18). 
 
It is only when water sector governance addresses these three aspects that we can expect to 
achieve sustainability for water services. 
                                                     
12 http://environment.govmu.org/English/Climate_Change/Pages/Climate-Change.aspx (03.05.2015) 
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This chapter will, therefore, study the institutional setting for water sector governance in 
Mauritius and identify to what extent sustainability considerations are taken into account. 
Section 4.1 elaborates on the nature of water sector governance; namely, its close 
relationship with regulation and the important question of vertical and horizontal decision-
making decentralization. Section 4.2 presents a theoretical framework for providing a micro-
institutional mapping of governance according to the various tasks and dimensions of water 
sector governance. Section 4.3 analyzes the respective roles of the different water actors in 
Mauritius, with particular attention paid to their sustainability considerations. Section 4.4 
provides an application of the theoretical framework to the Mauritian case and presents a 
governance matrix. This matrix depicts the distribution of governance responsibilities among 
the various water actors. The final section concludes. 
 
 4.1 The Nature of Water Sector Governance 
 
Governance generally refers to binding decision-making in the public sphere (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2003, p. 233). Water sector governance can be understood as the system in place to 
oversee, plan, direct, monitor and enforce the transactions between the various water uses. 
It determines the rules and practices for decision-making on water policy and 
implementation, and involves political, institutional and administrative processes. These 
processes define how decisions are taken and implemented and how stakeholder interests 
are reflected (OECD, 2009, p. 2). Therefore, water sector governance comprises questions on 
how responsibilities and tasks around different dimensions of water resources and drinking 
and wastewater services are allocated, and how different actions are coordinated. 
 
Because water sector governance concerns the very nature of decision-making in the water 
sector, it is significant for the success of water resource management and the delivery of 
drinking and wastewater services. It is, therefore, an important determinant of water sector 
performance. Problems in the governance of the water sector are at the source of 
dysfunctions that may translate into indicators illustrating low performance – for example, 
polluted water resources or high leakage rates of water distribution systems. A coherent 
system of water sector governance requires a clear distribution of tasks and responsibilities 
among various water actors. In order to be able to address institutional dysfunctions, the 
governance of the sector needs to be well understood (Peeroo, 2014, pp. 79, 158). 
Therefore, the role of information is critical. Information must be relevant, standardized and 
coherent in order to provide a basis for effective decision-making (ibid., p. 166). 
 
Closely linked to the governance of the water sector, is the question of water sector 
regulation. Regulation can, in fact, be seen as a subcategory of governance since it also deals 
with planning, directing, monitoring and enforcing rules related to specific dimensions of the 
water sector. Regulation in the water sector is unavoidable. From a standard economic 
approach there are several market failures that call for intervention. First of all, water 
systems are natural monopolies. The prevention of the abuse of the monopolistic position 
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motivates regulation.13 Secondly, water services imply the possibility of important negative 
externalities on the environment, on health and on road infrastructures and economic 
activity (via maintenance and extension works). A third reason for regulation lies in the 
existence of ‘asymmetric information’14 – for instance, difficulties in observing the state and 
condition of underground assets. Furthermore, the evolution of hydrologic and demographic 
factors is a source of uncertainties. Finally, regulation plays an important role because water 
is a ‘critical infrastructure’. As Ménard (2009a, pp. 84 ff.) explains, water is essential for a 
viable society. We need water for our survival, directly, and indirectly through the 
production of food and (in some cases) for energy. This need for regulation can culminate in 
the creation of a regulatory agency – although, this is the exception rather than the rule. The 
Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT) for England and Wales is one such example. 
 
Not only is regulation inevitable in the water sector, it also plays an important role in its 
performance, as Andres et al. (2007) demonstrated in a study of 1,000 privatization and 
concession contracts in the telecommunication, electricity, water and transportation sectors 
in Latin America. The study demonstrates how performance measures, such as the quality of 
services, prices, productivity and the number of renegotiations, are affected by the 
regulatory and governance framework. Since both governance and regulation are embedded 
in a specific institutional framework, institutions play a key role in the governance and 
regulatory performance and should not be left out of the analysis (Peeroo, 2014, p. 41). 
Shirley and Ménard (2002) present various case studies that corroborate these findings. In a 
study on corruption, Peeroo (2012) analyzes how the performance of the water sector is 
lowered by weaknesses in governance. Governance, therefore, is a critical issue in the water 
sector. 
 
The debate on governance centers around the question of the levels at which it should take 
place. This question is closely related to the idea of institutional decision-making 
decentralization. Peeroo (2014, p. 21) defines institutional decision-making decentralization 
as the “distribution of formal authority to make binding decisions across government 
bodies”. As such, institutional decentralization has a vertical and a horizontal facet. Vertical 
institutional decentralization means the involvement of various levels of government – for 
example, national, regional and local. This has been the focus of the fiscal federalism 
literature since its inception (ibid., pp. 13 ff.). At the same time, the transaction cost 
literature has highlighted the multi-actor nature of government, stressing that ‘government’ 
at any given vertical level is not a unified body but consists of various ministries, agencies, 
committees and other actors (Estache and Martimort, 1999, pp. 2 ff.). This multi-actor 
nature of government can be referred to as horizontal decentralization (Peeroo, 2014, pp. 20 
f.). The governance and regulatory designs are often vertically and horizontally 
                                                     
13 The idea of the necessity to protect monopolistic rents in this neo-classical approach is close to the 
idea of new institutional economics – that highly specific assets of water systems generate quasi-
rents that need to be protected from opportunistic behavior. 
14 Information is said to be asymmetric when one party of an economic transaction holds more 
information than the other. This information advantage might then be used to the other party’s 
detriment. The most famous illustration was provided by Nobel Prize winner George Akerlof who 
showed that information asymmetry can cause the disappearance of certain goods – in his example 
good quality second hand cars (Akerlof, 1970), but it might also apply to good quality water services.  
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decentralized, because different parties are involved in the regulation of utilities. Vertically, 
distinct levels of government can be included in the regulatory process. Some of the 
regulation might be done at the national level, some at the local. Horizontally, various 
bodies, such as different ministries, might be responsible for the regulation of a particular 
aspect, for instance the environmental regulation. 
 
Many different regulatory models exist and they imply significant trade-offs. For example, 
the potential benefits from a better adaptation to local conditions must be weighed against 
potential problems arising from the higher number of regulatory entities that this would 
entail, as well as the difficulities in coordinating these. In the case of Mauritius, one 
important feature must be kept in mind: Mauritius is a small, insular country. Therefore, 
institutional decentralization, particularly vertical decentralization, might be a less attractive 
option. The transaction costs of decentralizing – namely, the costs of coordinating the 
various levels of government – might be too high.15 
 
The water sector typically represents a multi-actor setting. There are several reasons for this. 
First of all, the definition of water sector governance involves a multitude of aspects – 
planning, monitoring, and other tasks – which require a range of actors. Secondly, the water 
sector is comprised of different activities related to water resources, raw water distribution, 
water treatment, distribution of treated water, retail, sewage collection, sewage treatment, 
sludge treatment, sludge disposal (Maziotis, 2012, p. 2) and, where applicable, storm water 
control. Thirdly, there are multiple uses of water: domestic, industrial, commercial and 
public, and therefore a variety of user groups. Finally, water sector governance concerns 
different responsibilities related to environmental, social or safety aspects. A combination of 
all these factors helps to explain the multi-actor nature of the water sector and its 
governance. 
 
By analyzing the extent of decentralization of water sector governance, this study also aims 
to gain a deeper understanding of how the global institutional setting translates to lower 
levels. This question has not been entirely explored yet. In order to fully comprehend this 
topic, Ménard (2009b, p. 40 and 2009c) stresses the importance of micro-institutions, which 
he defines as “… specific institutions that operate at the local and/or sector level under the 
umbrella of the general rules of the game established by legal and political institutions and 
that transform these general rules into operational ones” (Ménard, 2009a, p. 84). Thus, 
micro-institutions translate the global institutional framework to the micro-level. Peeroo 
(2014) provides such an analysis for the French and German water sectors. Our analysis of 
the micro-institutional setting of the governance of the water sector aspires to add to this 
new strand of literature. 
 
 
                                                     
15 Sobhee (2009, p. 38) also points out that decentralization might not be efficiency enhancing, unlike 
the predictions of the fiscal federalism literature (Tiebout, 1956; Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972 and 
1999).  He highlights the fact that the  institutional setting, in particular its political context, is a very 
important factor, especially  where locally elected parties do not belong to the parties forming the 
central government. In this case, they might be reluctant to adhere to rules and procedures set by 
the center. 
 72 
 
 4.2 A Framework for the Analysis of Water Sector Governance 
 
The framework used to analyze water sector governance is based on the work of Trémolet 
and Binder (2010), which has been further developed by Peeroo (2014). The framework 
proposes a matrix that allows identifying how regulatory functions and tasks are distributed 
among various actors. The identified tasks include the collection of information and data, the 
definition of rules, the monitoring of the implementation of existing rules, and the 
enforcement of decisions. To complete the tasks for governance, we also include strategy 
and planning, which concerns the definition of water policies and the coordination of 
stakeholders (such as government bodies or different user groups). 
 
Alongside these governance tasks, we identify various dimensions of water sector 
governance. According to Trémolet and Binder (2010) and Peeroo (2014), these dimensions 
involve tariffs, service quality, competition, consumer protection, safety, the environment, 
technical requirements and social considerations. 
 
In this study, we refine this approach to better account for the various aspects of water 
sector governance. Firstly, we distinguish three broad areas of action; namely, water 
resources, drinking water services and wastewater services. Secondly, for each of these 
three areas, we define specific dimensions of water sector governance. For water resources, 
we take their allocation (access) and quality (environmental considerations) into account. 
For drinking water services, we consider tariffs, service quality, consumer protection, safety 
regulation, technical regulation and social regulation. For wastewater services, we highlight 
environmental regulation, tariffs, technical regulation and social regulation. As a result, the 
analysis of these dimensions and tasks of water sector governance requires a six-by-twelve 
matrix with 72 fields, showing the actors participating in the different areas of governance. 
 
The regulation of the quality of services comprises aspects such as water pressure, 
unaccounted for water, reliability and coverage, but also more specific indicators such as 
phone waiting times (for customers trying to reach the water operator) or the time taken to 
resolve a customer’s complaint (Marques, 2010, pp. 189 ff.). Consumer protection pertains, 
primarily, to what happens when consumer complaints are not properly addressed by the 
operator (ibid., pp. 28 f.). Safety regulation mainly concerns the quality of drinking water and 
the elimination of health hazards. Environmental regulation involves the protection of water 
resources and wastewater discharges. Social regulation refers to equity between users and 
access to water services (ibid., p. 29). Technical regulation, such as the specification of 
technical requirements for the physical infrastructure, is important given the fact that water 
infrastructure comprises of large technical systems. Therefore, the regulation of 
technological aspects of water utilities plays a big role in safety and the environment. A 
recent strand of literature analyses the need for coherence between institutions and 
technologies in infrastructure (Finger et al., 2005; Künneke and Finger, 2007; Künneke et al., 
2010). Technical regulation in the water sector concerns a variety of aspects – for instance, 
the interoperability of different infrastructure components (for example, the physical 
interconnection of the primary and secondary network or, more specifically, the precise 
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prescriptions on how to fill the space between casing pipes and product pipes16). Technical 
regulation also refers to the maintenance and operability of water systems (for example, the 
ventilation of drinking water pipes17 or dynamic changes of pressure in water supply 
systems18) or the requirements for cold water storage tanks.19 
 
In order to compile the micro-institutional matrix of water sector governance in Mauritius, it 
was necessary to collect data on the various water actors and their respective 
responsibilities. Part of this data was gathered from the literature. To support the validity of 
this data and, more importantly, to fill in any possible gaps, further data was collected with 
the help of a survey of the main governance actors (as well as interviews and a workshop). 
The information collected represents a new and original qualitative data set, which allows us 
to paint a clear picture of the micro-institutional setting of water sector governance in 
Mauritius. 
 
The design of the survey draws extensively on the OECD Survey on Water Governance 
(OECD, 2009) and has been adapted to reflect the situation in Mauritius and address 
sustainability issues.20 A copy of the survey can be found in Annex B. We were able to collect 
answers from the eight major public water players in Mauritius: the Ministry of Energy and 
Public Utilities,21 the Central Water Authority, the Wastewater Management Authority, the 
Water Resources Unit, the Irrigation Authority, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of 
Agroindustry and the Ministry of Health. The next section details their involvement in 
Mauritian water sector governance. 
 
 4.3 Mauritian Actors for Water Sector Governance and Their Sustainability 
Considerations 
 
Due to the multi-actor nature of the water sector, a variety of ministries, agencies and other 
bodies are responsible for carrying out the different aspects of water sector governance. 
What follows is an overview of the main actors and their respective functions in the 
Mauritian context. Particular attention is paid to the extent to which these actors are aware 
of sustainability issues in the water sector. 
                                                     
16 http://www.dvgw.de/no_cache/angebote-
leistungen/regelwerk/regelwerkverzeichnis/?id=28281&tx_dvgwregelwerkverzeichnis[q]=w+307 
(17.12.2013). 
17 http://www.dvgw.de/regelwerknews-de/archiv-rw-news/dvgw-regelwerk-newsletter-nr-132007/ 
(17.12.2013). 
18 http://www.dvgw.de/regelwerknews-de/archiv-rw-news/dvgw-regelwerknews-nr-608/ 
(17.12.2013). 
19 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English//DOCUMENTS/WATERTANK-SPECS.PDF (27.04.2015). 
20 The original OECD survey is available at http://oecd.org/governance/regional-policy/44689618.pdf 
(31.08.2015). 
21 The Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities participated in a preliminary version of the survey but 
was unfortunately the only main water actor not to attend the workshop where governance issues 
were discussed in detail. 
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Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities 
 
The Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities (MEPU) is responsible for water and waste water 
policymaking and legislation.22 On its website, it describes its objectives as follows: to ensure 
“judicious use of available water resources”, to provide 24-hour, good-quality water 
provision to the entire population, and to extend wastewater services to the entire 
population.23 In July 2014, it published a National Water Policy, which can be seen as the 
first step toward a holistic framework for an integrated water legislation (Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities, 2014). This National Water Policy proposes a new approach for water 
sector governance, identifies areas of future reform and provides an action plan for the 
government. However, progress was halted by national elections in December 2014, which 
brought in a new government. Although the new government asserts the need for water 
sector reform, it is questionable whether it will implement the 2014 National Water Policy. 
 
The MEPU is responsible for proposing legal frameworks for the entire water sector but the 
legislative power lies with the National Assembly. Annex A contains a list of the water 
legislation and regulations in Mauritius and their main features. Other governance functions 
– identified in the matrix of the micro-institutional setting for water sector governance in 
Mauritius – concern planning, monitoring, and enforcement tasks. 
 
The MEPU also has a number of parastatal organizations and other bodies under its umbrella 
– namely, the Central Water Authority, the Wastewater Management Authority, the Water 
Resources Unit and the Water Advisory Council. The latter was created in 1985 but has not 
been functional until very recently. The MEPU can be described as the line ministry of water. 
The fact that it has control over the most important micro-institutions related to water 
shows its dominant role in the sector. 
 
According to our governance survey, the Ministry itself defines its main role in water 
governance as setting strategies and developing policy outlines for the entire water cycle – 
in other words, drinking water provision through to wastewater services. As such, it acts as a 
line ministry for water issues. However, responses to the survey questions indicate that the 
MEPU does not undertake specific efforts to coordinate issues that fall within the water-
food-energy nexus or urban and regional planning activities,24 nor does it provide a 
coordination platform where various water actors could meet to share information and 
discuss their respective actions with regard to the water sector.25 In fact, the MEPU 
identifies the overlapping, unclear and non-existent allocation of responsibilities, and the 
absence of clearly defined objectives and indicators, as the major impediments to effective 
coordination between the various water actors. This might be linked to the absence of 
information for policymakers and a lack of political commitment and leadership, also 
                                                     
22 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (01.05.2015). 
23 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/Pages/default.aspx (01.05.2015). 
24 One notable exception are the broad environmental guidelines for Smart Cities underpinning green 
options for water supply, such as rainwater collection. 
25 It is also worth noting that the Ministry does not provide a platform to formally involve water users 
in governance. 
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highlighted as important impediments to the coordination of water actors. Findings from the 
survey also reveal that a further obstacle to effective coordination lies in the fact that 
reforms initiated by one government are subsequently discontinued by the next. For 
instance, one idea for reform in the past was to merge several water institutions under a 
single body – more specifically, to merge the Central Water Authority and the Wastewater 
Management Authority, both of which are parastatal organizations under the aegis of the 
MEPU, together with the Irrigation Authority which falls under the Ministry of Agro Industry 
and Food Security. Although this idea has not completely disappeared and is still mentioned 
by water actors, according to the survey data, this reform has been discontinued. 
 
Another example is the attempt to introduce a Public-Private Partnership for the provision of 
drinking water. In 2000, a consortium of French water companies, together with a local 
partner, were given an 18 month management contract to introduce new technologies for 
detecting leaky pipelines. The idea was that this management contract would be followed by 
a 25 year contract, similar to a concession. A public tender was organized and five bidders 
submitted offers. However, following a change of government later that year, the project 
was brought to a halt. 
 
Similarly, a Utilities Regulatory Authority Bill that was passed in Parliament in 2004, with the 
aim of creating a regulatory agency for utilities, has not been subsequently proclaimed. 
However, according to one interviewee, the idea of an independent utility regulator is still 
pending and might yet come back on the agenda. Indeed, the Bill was recently amended in 
June 2016. It remains to be seen whether the Bill will lead to the creation of a utility 
regulatory authority, and to what extent this will involve the water sector. 
 
On its website, the Ministry states that it is vital to ensure the development of water 
resources, and the provision of water and wastewater services to guarantee sustainable 
development. Furthermore, water and wastewater services should be delivered at 
affordable prices26 – which can be seen as a desire to address social sustainability. However, 
this assertion does not translate into concrete governance mechanisms other than keeping 
tariffs so low that they do not cover investment costs. Yet, the National Water Policy, 
developed by the former MEPU, places a strong emphasis on sustainability concerns in its 
various aspects: environmental, economic and social (Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, 
2014, pp. 10 ff.). Interestingly, the current MEPU acknowledges in its responses to the 
survey that the lack of political will constitutes a very important challenge for governance in 
the water sector and regrets the absence of a valid National Water Policy. To what extent 
the 2014 National Water Policy, developed by the former government, will be brought into 
play, remains to be seen. In light of the failure to adopt the policy, it is hardly surprising that 
the MEPU does not see sustainability as a major cause for concern in water sector 
governance (as revealed in the responses to the survey). For instance, according to the 
Ministry, cost recovery – a prerequisite for economic sustainability – has not been perceived 
as an important governance challenge for a very long time. It is only very recently that the 
Minister started announcing the need to increase tariffs in order to improve the Central 
Water Authority’s budgetary situation. This could be very cautiously seen as a signal of a 
                                                     
26 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/AboutUs/Pages/Mission-and-Vision.aspx (01.05.2015). 
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change in policy. Whether it is followed with concrete measures is yet to be seen.27 The 
Central Water Authority would welcome an increase in tariffs since it deplores the fact that 
it cannot recover its costs. The next subsection elaborates on this. 
Central Water Authority 
 
The Central Water Authority (CWA) was established in 1971. It is the operative arm of the 
MEPU,28 and the parastatal body responsible for the provision of drinking water services. 
Until 1993, it was also responsible for water resources. This function has since been taken 
over by a newly-created micro-institution, the Water Resources Unit.29 The CWA’s Board 
members are appointed by the Minister, who must approve the budget ex ante and who 
also has the right to give directions.30 Independence from the MEPU is, therefore, very 
limited. 
 
The CWA is involved in data collection, planning and monitoring activities primarily 
concerning drinking water services, and to a lesser extent, water resources. For instance, the 
CWA monitors salinity and the level of heavy metal residues in public boreholes. It also has 
laboratories that monitor the quality of drinking water before it is injected into the 
distribution network (National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 11). Although the 
CWA’s monitoring activities show that the distributed drinking water is generally safe for 
human consumption and in accordance to standards set by the World Health Organization, 
there are concerns about the safety of drinking water when it arrives at the consumer.31 The 
crucial issue is, therefore, whether the water flowing from the tap is safe for human 
consumption. It is possible for water in leaking pipes to be contaminated with bacteria and 
parasites. This risk is even higher when the pressure in the pipes is low, a typical problem in 
Mauritius, where many households rely on private pumps connected to the domestic pipe 
system to achieve sufficient pressure for tap water. It is also important to note that some 
users illegally install pumps directly into the CWA water pipeline, further reducing the water 
pressure for other users. In addition, in Mauritius, 42.7 percent of households do not have a 
continuous water supply, with 25 percent only receiving water for 10-17 hours a day and 1.4 
percent receiving water for less than 10 hours a day (Proag, 2014, p. 4). This means that for 
long periods, no water is flowing in the distribution system, making it easy for contaminating 
agents to penetrate through cracks and leaks. Hence, it is possible that water, that was of 
satisfactory quality at injection, might be contaminated later on in the distribution system. 
 
                                                     
27 http://defimedia.info/ivan-collendavelloo-hausser-les-tarifs-pour-assainir-les-finances-de-la-cwa 
(20.09.2016). 
28 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (01.05.2015). 
29 The Water Resources Unit is not a parastatal body with a proper legal framework but a department 
of the Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities. 
30 http://cwa.govmu.org/English/AboutUs/Pages/About-CWA.aspx (27.04.2015). 
31 One interviewee raised concerns about the quality of drinking water even at the stage where it is 
injected into the network. The drinking water is not tested for many pesticides and fertilizers which 
are commonly used in Mauritius and the respondent claimed that drinking water is in fact 
contaminated with these substances. This could lead to severe long-term health problems. 
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In order to address the question of drinking water quality, it is therefore necessary to test 
the water at the taps. Such monitoring, however, is not routinely carried out in Mauritius, 
except for tap water in public buildings such as schools and hospitals, which are tested by 
the CWA and the Ministry of Health. The CWA justifies the absence of monitoring of the 
water quality after injection into the distribution network by pointing to the consumers’ 
responsibility for their internal distribution network. From the point where the CWA’s 
pipelines end, it is indeed the consumer’s responsibility to keep their internal distribution 
network, as well as their water tank, clean from contaminating agents. Furthermore, 
according to the CWA, the only time that consumers complain about the quality of drinking 
water is after heavy rains and cyclones, which may cause turbidity in water, giving it a murky 
aspect. At such times, the relevant authorities typically advise the population to boil tap 
water before drinking it. The CWA’s argument has some weaknesses though. The fact that 
tap water appears safe for consumption – based on its appearance, odor and taste – does 
not guarantee that it has not been contaminated after having been injected into the 
distribution network . This contamination might be undetectable to the naked eye. Resulting 
adverse health effects might then not be attributed to the contaminated water but to other 
causes. Therefore, the argument that consumers do not complain about the quality of the 
drinking water that flows from their tap does not necessarily imply its quality is fine. Given 
the leaks in the distribution network, coupled with the problems of discontinuous supply 
and low pressure, tap water may be contaminated despite the injection of clean water into 
the distribution system. Because consumers are responsible for the hygiene of their internal 
water distribution network, the CWA should monitor the water not only at the point of 
injection into the distribution network, but also at the point where it leaves the CWA’s 
network to enter the household’s network. Only if such tests show that the quality of the 
drinking water is irreproachable, is it safe to conclude that the leaky pipelines of the CWA’s 
distribution system are not a concern for public health. To conclude, the CWA’s monitoring 
of water quality in its current state, because of the lack of routine checks of the quality of 
water that arrives at the household, can be considered a gap in Mauritian water sector 
governance.32   
 
Furthermore, according to the CWA, problems relating to information management create 
important obstacles to effective coordination between water actors. For instance, a lack of 
common framework for information means that different water actors work with data that 
is not defined in the same way, leading to inconsistencies and making comparisons more 
difficult (although it is noted that these differences are not very important). More critical is a 
lack of internal communication, which reduces the effectiveness of the flow of information 
and decisions within the CWA. This issue typically emerges when different officers attend 
consecutive meetings on the same subject and important decisions are not passed on or 
followed up. However, the CWA’s Board is now committed to address these specific internal 
management issues and is developing a new management information system. 
 
With regard to sustainability, it seems that the CWA is aware that the very low tariffs and 
the high rate of Non-Revenue Water (between 50 and 55 percent) make its services 
                                                     
32 At times, the Ministry of Health and Quality of Life will take samples from household taps, but only 
in specific cases (see subsequent subsection on the Ministry of Health for more on this). 
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economically unsustainable. As a consequence, special programs for replacement and 
rehabilitation of ailing infrastructure have been designed. However, the execution of these 
plans has, to date, been slow and lagging behind set targets (National Economic and Social 
Council, pp. 14 f.).33 At the same time, tariff increases, that are needed to cover costs for 
investments, have been politically undesirable for a long time (ibid., 2014, pp. 21 ff. and 28). 
In fact, the current government announced in its 2015 budget, that a new policy will be 
implemented, whereby the first six cubic meters of water would be provided to households 
free of charge. The CWA is faced with the difficulty of implementing a policy which will 
further endanger the economic sustainability of its activities and put even more pressure on 
its already fragile budget. Discussions are ongoing about whether these six cubic meters 
should be free to all consumers, or only to those consuming not more than six cubic meters, 
or only to those in low-income brackets. According to our survey, the CWA is aware that its 
tariffs are among the lowest in Africa. Therefore, issues relating to social sustainability and 
the users’ ability and willingness to pay are of little concern. The typical water bill only 
amounts to 0.6 percent of the average household income in Mauritius,34 which is much 
lower than what is usually considered an affordable water bill – somewhere between 2.5 
and 5 percent of household income (National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 24). It is 
only very recently, that the Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities has started mentioning 
tariff increases.35 
 
The financial viability of the CWA is recognized as a very important governance challenge in 
the water sector. This issue is exacerbated by other very important governance challenges 
revealed through the questionnaire: the CWA is responsible for drinking water provision, 
which is why water tariff levels should reflect real costs – in other words, costs for 
investments as well. In Mauritius, investment in the physical infrastructure is much needed, 
because a huge portion of the pipe network is non-performing. The CWA, however, is not 
generating sufficient funds for reinvestment and expansion of the network. Instead, it relies 
heavily on loan funding, but its debt repayment capacity is very low due to high levels of 
Non-Revenue Water (exceeding 50 percent). At the same time, the CWA lacks independence 
from the MEPU and tarrifs are set by the government. This leads to what is typically referred 
to as a ‘time inconsistency’ problem, whereby rather short-term oriented political 
considerations – gaining political support – take precedence over necessary long-term 
considerations; a problem which is particularly acute in the water sector, where pipelines 
have a life span of up to 100 years. 
                                                     
33 An interesting point was raised by one respondent: because of Mauritius’ small size, no more than 
200 km of pipes per year can be replaced without seriously disrupting the country’s economy. With 
1,600 km of pipes in need of replacement, this would require at least eight years of work. 
34 According to the Central Water Authority, the average drinking water bill amounts to MUR 185 
(USD 5.28) (CWA, as cited in National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 24) and according to 
Statistics Mauritius, the average disposable household income in 2012, the latest figure, was MUR 
29,360 (USD 833) (http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/HBS2012.aspx 
(04.08.2016)). 
This differs slightly from the figure given in Chapter 3.7 (0.7 percent), which is based on data from 
the household water survey. 
35  http://defimedia.info/ivan-collendavelloo-hausser-les-tarifs-pour-assainir-les-finances-de-la-cwa 
(20.09.2016). 
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The CWA also sees environmental sustainability as a major governance challenge, 
particularly in relation to climate change. Rainfall patterns have become more 
unpredictable, leading at times to water resource deficiency for prolonged periods. This 
problem is exacerbated by newly emerging forms of pollution endangering water resources, 
boreholes drying up faster during dry seasons, and by the danger of seawater seeping into 
underground water reservoirs as a result of overexploitation. Technological innovation might 
be one way to solve these issues but, as the survey reveals, there seems to be a lack of 
capacity in the CWA because of unattractive salary packages and the fact that state of the 
art technology is prohibitively expensive. For these reasons, the CWA is currently considering 
looking for a private partner in the hope of becoming more efficient and benefiting from its 
technological expertise. 
 
All in all, our research reveals that the CWA is well aware of the lack of economic 
sustainability of drinking water services for which it is responsible. This subsection has also 
shown that environmental sustainability is at stake because of the risk of contamination of 
drinking water in the distribution network. 
 
The analysis of the CWA’s role for water sector governance indicates that the main reason 
for the lack of sustainability is that, although the CWA is responsible for providing drinking 
water, it is short of decision-making power and the power to raise funds. 
Wastewater Management Authority 
 
The Wastewater Management Authority (WMA) was created in 2001 and is responsible for 
wastewater services. Like the CWA, it falls under the responsibility of the MEPU,36 its Board 
is appointed by the Minister (Wastewater Management Authority Act §11(1)), its budget 
must be approved ex ante (Wastewater Management Authority Act §24) and the Minister 
can give directions (Wastewater Management Authority Act §9). With the exception of 
strategic planning and stakeholder coordination, this micro-institution is involved in all tasks 
relating to water sector governance of relevance to wastewater. 
 
The responses to the water governance survey highlight similar issues to those of the MEPU 
and CWA. There are a number of major obstacles to effective coordination between water 
actors: a lack of common information, objectives and indicators; a lack of leadership and 
political commitment; and overlapping and poorly-defined responsibilities. 
 
The survey and the workshop also revealed the WMA’s concern for economic sustainability, 
particularly as the agency’s funding has been reduced rather than increased, making it more 
and more difficult to provide the required investments to replace pipelines where needed 
and to extend the network. 
 
                                                     
36 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (01.05.2015). 
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Water Resources Unit 
 
The Water Resources Unit (WRU), established in 1993, is responsible for the assessment, 
development, management and conservation of water resources.37 It also falls under the 
responsibility of the MEPU.38 Unlike the CWA and the WMA, however, the WRU is not a 
parastatal body but rather a department of the Ministry. It is involved in data collection and 
monitoring,39 and also grants water rights to private users – permits to abstract raw water 
either from a river or canal flowing through private property or through a private borehole. 
In addition, it coordinates various stakeholders related to water resources. 
 
In many high-income countries, the governance of water resources is very distinct from the 
governance of water services (drinking water and wastewater). Each of these sectors has its 
own specific set of policies and actors with (generally) well-delineated responsibilities. Such 
is the case in France, for instance, where water resource governance takes place at the river 
basin level and involves the Agences de l’Eau (water agencies); and where the governance of 
water services takes place at the local level. In many developing countries, however, there is 
only one overall water sector, as is the case in Mauritius. This means that the policies for 
water resources are not distinct from the policies of water services, and that the different 
agencies have little autonomy. This is important since it might explain the supply-side driven 
approach to Mauritian water policy. Mauritius’ response to the perceived water scarcity is to 
augment the capacity for water storage through the construction of new dams and 
reservoirs – effectively annexing water resources. It could be argued that this is due to the 
absence of a distinct approach to water resource governance. Particularly in light of climate 
change, this could have repercussions for sustainability, both economic and environmental: 
economic, because funds are directed toward the creation of new dams and reservoirs even 
though other solutions to address water scarcity might exist; environmental because the 
alteration of natural water flows has negative environmental impacts. The National Water 
Policy (Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, 2014, pp. 20 f.) could be interpreted as a 
desire to move toward more specific water resource governance with a plan to develop a 
full-cost approach relating to these resources. 
 
According to the responses to our survey, one issue that hampers the coordination between 
the CWA and the WRU is the fact that the WRU does not have any specific legal framework. 
Rather, its role and responsibilities are embedded in the CWA Act. For this reason, respective 
tasks and functions are not clearly demarcated resulting in overlapping responsibilities. 
 
Another issue hampering governance is the existence of water rights, which allow their 
holders to control a major part of total water resources in Mauritius. These water rights 
holders constitute a very powerful lobby and any attempt to revoke these rights over the 
years, or to reform the water rights system, has been largely unsuccessful. 
 
                                                     
37 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/WRU/Pages/default.aspx (27.04.2015). 
38 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/AboutUs/Pages/default.aspx (01.05.2015). 
39 http://publicutilities.govmu.org/English/WRU/Pages/default.aspx (27.04.2015). 
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Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development, Disaster and Beach 
Management 
 
The Ministry of Environment is involved in water sector governance in so far as 
environmental considerations of water resources and water services are concerned. More 
precisely, its tasks include strategic planning, the definition of rules, monitoring (through the 
Pollution Prevention and Control Division, and the National Environmental Laboratory) and 
enforcement of decisions (through its Law and Prosecution Division). The latter task is 
executed with the help of, among others, the Environmental Police which forms part of the 
Ministry. The Environmental Police has a hotline which citizens can call to make complaints, 
which are then examined. 
 
The National Environmental Laboratory analyses the quality of surface water. It also assists 
the enforcing agencies of the MEPU, the CWA and the Ministry of Health in all surface and 
drinking water quality issues, if there are doubts concerning the accuracy of the agencies’ 
measures. 
 
As the Ministry’s name suggests, sustainability considerations form part of its approach 
toward the environment. However, the implications this has for the water sector, other than 
environmental legislation, have not been identified. 
Ministry of Health and Quality of Life 
 
The Ministry of Health is involved in the monitoring of the quality of drinking water. It is, in 
fact, the enforcement agency for drinking water quality under the Environment Protection 
Act. As such, it ensures a regular monitoring of drinking water through daily sampling 
exercises and analyisis of the bacteriological and physio-chemical parameters. On average, 
5,000 samples are taken and analyzed yearly. The sampling points are primarily located at 
outlets of treatment plants and service reservoirs, so as to cover the water being distributed 
throughout the island. The samples are analyzed in the Ministry’s laboratories. In addition, 
in-situ testing of residual chlorine is conducted at the sampling point, so as to prevent 
microbial contamination within the pipelines during distribution. Samples of drinking water 
are also taken on a regular basis at sensitive locations such as hospitals, the airport, office 
buildings and schools. As such, the sampling and analysis conducted by the Ministry, 
provides a representative coverage of the island, but with an emphasis on treatment plants 
and sensitive end users. 
 
The Ministry of Health and Quality of Life does not usually take samples from household 
taps; although it may take random samples if complaints are received or when notable cases 
of water-related diseases are reported in a specific area. 
Ministry of Agro Industry and Food Security / Irrigation Authority 
 
The Ministry of Agro Industry and Food Security houses the Irrigation Authority, which helps 
the agricultural sector in the planning and execution of irrigation projects. To facilitate 
coordination between water actors, it had been envisaged in the past to merge the CWA, 
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the WMA, and the Irrigation Authority into one major water authority. However, according 
to the respondents, these plans are currently on hold. 
 
4.4 The Micro-institutional Set-up for Mauritian Water Sector Governance 
 
Using the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 4 and the collected data, it is now 
possible to draw a precise picture of the set-up for water sector governance in Mauritius. 
Table 35 (below) shows a matrix which depicts which micro-institutions carry out which 
tasks, for specific dimensions of the governance of water resources, drinking water services 
and wastewater services. 
 
Several aspects emerging from the governance matrix are worth highlighting. Firstly, there is 
very little vertical decentralization in the water sector in Mauritius. Whereas, in most other 
countries water services are organized at the local level, water services in Mauritius are 
organized at the national level. Similarly, water resource governance is conducted at the 
national level, not at the river basin level. Nath and Schroeder (2007, p. 123) point out that 
even compared to other developing countries, there is very little vertical decentralization in 
Mauritius. Neither local councils (municipal or village) nor regional councils (district), or any 
of their attached bodies, are involved in the water sector. The size of Mauritius – the country 
has a surface area of only 1,870 km2 – might in itself provide an explanation for the vertical 
centralization of water sector governance. In fact, its area is roughly equivalent to the 
average Dutch waterboard or French Water Resource Planning and Management Unit 
(Schéma d’Aménagement et de Gestion des Eaux, SAGE). Given the size of the country, a 
national level approach to water governance is more appropriate – at least for water 
resource governance.40 According to the fiscal federalism literature, the advantages of 
centralization at the national level are, among others, the existence of economies of scale 
and scope realized by national rather than local bureaucracies (Prud’homme, 1995, p. 209) 
and the prevention of a duplication of bureaucracies and therefore waste (Treisman, 2002, 
p. 7). In addition, the absence of vertical decentralization in the Mauritian context helps 
economize on transaction costs: the big reservoirs in Mauritius provide water to several 
localities in different districts, simultaneously. If water sector governance was vertically 
decentralized, this could lead to typical issues arising from shared resources, which have 
attracted a lot of attention in the literature on transboundary water governance.41 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
40 Our thanks go to Bernard Barraqué, emeritus professor at AgroParisTech, for bringing this to our 
attention. 
41 We are grateful to Virendra Proag, associate professor of civil engineering at the University of 
Mauritius, for bringing this point to our attention. 
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Table 35: Micro-Institutional Setting for Water Sector Governance in Mauritius 
  
 Tasks of water sector governance 
  
 
Collection of 
information and 
data 
Strategy and 
planning, i.e. 
policy outline 
Definition of rules Monitoring of 
implementation of 
existing rules 
Enforcement of 
decisions 
Coordination of 
stakeholders, 
e.g. 
government 
bodies, users 
Di
m
en
sio
n 
of
 w
at
er
 se
ct
or
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
W
at
er
 re
so
ur
ce
s 
Q
ua
lit
y 
/ e
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
• Water Resources 
Unit 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Water Resources 
Unit 
• National Assembly 
(CWA Act, 
Environment 
Protection Act, 
Rivers and Canals 
Act) 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Water Resources 
Unit 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
(Pollution 
Prevention and 
Control Division, 
National 
Environmental 
Laboratory) 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Environmental Police 
(under ME) 
• Water Resources Unit 
• Ministry of Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Ministry of Health and 
Quality of Life 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Water 
Resources 
Unit 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
Al
lo
ca
tio
n 
/ a
cc
es
s 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Water Resources 
Unit 
• Irrigation Authority 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
(Climate Division) 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Water Resources 
Unit 
• Irrigation 
Authority 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
• National Assembly 
(Ground Water Act 
and Rivers and 
Canals Act) 
• Water Resources 
Unit 
• Water Resources Unit 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Supreme Court of 
Mauritius 
• Water 
Resources 
Unit 
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Tasks of water sector governance 
Collection of 
information and 
data 
Strategy and 
planning, i.e. 
policy outline 
Definition of rules Monitoring of 
implementation of 
existing rules 
Enforcement of 
decisions 
Coordination of 
stakeholders, 
(government 
bodies, users) 
Di
m
en
sio
n 
of
 w
at
er
 se
ct
or
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
Dr
in
ki
ng
 w
at
er
 
Ta
rif
fs
 • Central Water 
Authority 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
    • Water 
Advisory 
Council 
Se
rv
ice
 
qu
al
ity
   • Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
   • Water 
Advisory 
Council 
Co
ns
um
er
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n • Water Advisory 
Council 
  • Ministry of 
Industry, 
Commerce and 
Consumer 
Protection 
• ACIM (Consumer 
Association of 
Mauritius) 
 • Water 
Advisory 
Council 
Sa
fe
ty
 re
gu
la
tio
n • Central Water 
Authority 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Ministry of Health 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Ministry of Health 
and Quality of Life 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Water 
Advisory 
Council 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n   • Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
• Ministry of 
Industry, 
Commerce and 
Consumer 
Protection 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
  
So
ci
al
 
re
gu
la
tio
n • Central Water 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
  • Water 
Advisory 
Council 
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Tasks of water sector governance 
 
Collection of 
information and 
data 
Strategy and 
planning, i.e. 
policy outline 
Definition of rules Monitoring of 
implementation of 
existing rules 
Enforcement of 
decisions 
Coordination of 
stakeholders, 
e.g. 
government 
bodies, users 
Di
m
en
sio
ns
 o
f w
at
er
 se
ct
or
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
W
as
te
w
at
er
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• National Assembly 
(CWA Act, 
Environment 
Protection Act) 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Environment 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
• Environmental Police 
(under ME) 
• Environment 
Coordination 
Committee 
Ta
rif
fs
 
• Central Water 
Authority 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
• Parliament 
 • Central Water 
Authority 
• Ministry of Energy and 
Public Utilities 
 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Industry, 
Commerce and 
Consumer 
Protection 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of Health and 
Quality of Life 
 
So
ci
al
 
re
gu
la
tio
n • Wastewater 
Management 
Authority 
• Ministry of 
Energy and 
Public Utilities 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
• Ministry of Energy 
and Public Utilities 
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Public Utilities 
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Energy and 
Public Utilities 
Source: Author’s own compilation
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Secondly, at the national level, a multitude of actors is involved in Mauritian water sector 
governance, resulting in a horizontally decentralized setting. The major actors are the MEPU 
and its subsidiary bodies (the WRU, the CWA and the WMA); the National Assembly; the 
Ministry of Agro Industry and Food Security and its subsidiary, the Irrigation Authority; the 
Ministry of Environment, and its National Environmental Laboratory and Law and 
Prosecution Division; and the Ministry of Health and Quality of Life (in particular, the 
Environmental Health Unit). There is also a Water Advisory Council, which has been 
provided for in the Mauritian legislation since 1985, but which has not been functional until 
very recently. Treisman (2002) points out that an institutional setting involving many 
different actors might lead to a lack of coordination, resulting in high transaction costs. In 
light of this, it may be argued that the beneficial effects of possible cost and efficiency 
savings linked to vertical decision-making centralization might be negated by high 
transaction costs caused by the horizontal decentralization of Mauritian water actors. 
 
This last point leads us to the third important aspect that emerges from the governance 
matrix. The multitude of actors involved in the Mauritian water sector is likely to result in a 
number of governance issues. For one, coordination problems need to be considered. In 
addition, since a number of different bodies are simultaneously responsible for certain 
functions – for example, the monitoring of the quality of water resources – there is an 
inherent risk of duplication if tasks are not clearly allocated across the various actors. This 
might hamper the efficiency and effectiveness of governance. The data collected through 
the governance survey, the workshop and the interviews corroborates these views – this 
will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
Fourthly, it also appears that water users’ associations, although an important stakeholder, 
are not formally involved in the governance of the Mauritian water sector. They are not part 
of the Water Advisory Council, nor are they represented in any of the agencies. Although a 
consumer association defends the interests of water users, it does not have a specific public 
mandate to do so. 
 
Finally, the matrix clearly shows the prominent role of the MEPU, which is involved in 
almost every aspect of water sector governance. The MEPU also acts as the line ministry for 
water since it has under its umbrella, along with the Water Advisory Council, all of the most 
important micro-institutions: the CWA (responsible for drinking water services), the WMA 
and the WRU. Provided that the MEPU exerts strong leadership in the water sector, 
transaction costs can be reduced through the coordination of the various water actors. 
However, as already mentioned in subsection 4.3, the MEPU does not appear to exert 
effective leadership. It is therefore not clear whether the role of the MEPU reduces or 
increases transaction costs. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the institutional setting of water sector governance in 
Mauritius and the extent to which water actors take sustainability considerations into 
account. 
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First, the crucial role of governance for water sector performance was discussed. 
Dysfunctions in the water sector, such as high rates of Non-Revenue Water or leakage from 
pipelines, can result from inappropriate mechanisms to oversee, plan, direct, monitor and 
enforce water transactions. It is also clear that, because water involves many stakeholders, 
a multitude of actors are involved in water governance. 
 
Then, a framework was developed to depict the micro-institutional setting for water sector 
governance. An original set of qualitative data was collected in order to understand the 
respective roles and functions of the various water actors. With the help of this data, a 
governance matrix was constructed. This matrix identifies which actors are responsible for 
the different aspects of water sector governance in Mauritius. Specific attention was given 
to sustainability considerations of the various water actors. 
 
The findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly, unlike most countries, Mauritian water 
sector governance is not vertically decentralized. The responsibilities for all tasks related to 
governance lie with actors at the national level. This might not be too surprising given the 
size of the island and its population of barely 1.3 million. This may have some advantages as 
vertical decentralization bears the risk of high transaction costs related to coordination in 
multi-level and multi-actor settings. The MEPU (2014, p. 23) under the previous government 
envisaged a vertical decentralization of responsibilities, but according to our research, there 
is a perception among stakeholders that the current government will not go forward with 
these reforms. 
 
Secondly, as expected, water sector governance in Mauritius involves a multitude of 
different actors, although all at the national level. Interestingly, none of these actors are 
independent. Either, they are a division of a Ministry, such as the Pollution Prevention and 
Control Division of the Ministry of Environment, or they are parastatal bodies, such as the 
CWA, under the close control of the relevant Ministry, in this case the MEPU. Because 
coordination in a multi-actor setting generates transaction costs, a line ministry like the 
MEPU might help to minimize these costs if it takes on an effective leadership role. 
However, according to the data collected, the perception is that the Ministry does not 
assume this role. One reason for this lack of leadership could be insufficient personnel. 
 
With regards to sustainability considerations, some of the water actors, such as the CWA, 
are acutely aware of sustainability issues in the Mauritian water sector. However, our 
analysis reveals that these actors do not have sufficient decision-making powers to address 
such concerns. In fact, none of the water actors are autonomous. Many of them depend on 
the MEPU as their line ministry. Our analysis has, therefore, shown that the sustainability of 
various aspects of the Mauritian water sector is endangered. In order to better understand 
why governance in the Mauritian water sector does not sufficiently address sustainability, it 
is necessary to go beyond an analysis of the institutional setting. Answering this question 
requires a close study of the problems and issues encountered by the various actors in 
water sector governance. This is the focus of the following chapter (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 5: Governance Issues in the Mauritian Water Sector 
Impeding Sustainability 
 
Aleksandra Peeroo 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Tortajada’s (2010, p. 303) description of low performance services in developing countries 
with water scarcity aptly describes the water sector in Mauritius: “[…] non-revenue water, 
often up to 40-60 percent, infrastructure either scarce or becoming complex and 
deteriorating, water supplies largely underpriced, and investment needs, possibly reaching 
billions […]”. 
 
When the need for reform is acknowledged by decision-makers, it is often driven by a 
supply-side approach (World Bank, 2000, p. 9), meaning that water scarcity leads to the 
development of large-scale infrastructure such as new dams and reservoirs. This is contrary 
to the more prevalent view that “a ’water crisis’ is largely a governance crisis” (OECD, 2011, 
p. 17). For this reason, there has been a paradigm shift toward demand-based solutions, 
where the role of institutions is specifically taken into account in order to build sustainable 
water services (Ferdous Hoque and Gunawansa, 2013, p. 412). Many countries, however, 
continue to focus on the supply side of the water sector and concentrate on large 
infrastructure projects rather than looking at the problems from a governance perspective 
(Falkenmark and Xia, 2013, p. 62). 
 
Mauritius is no exception. Dysfunctions in the Mauritian water sector are usually considered 
the result of insufficient storage capacity or a desolate distribution network. It is, therefore, 
not surprising that the ‘big reform’ and ‘restructuring’ of the water sector announced by the 
MEPU at the beginning of 2015, focuses primarily on the construction of new reservoirs and 
the replacement of leaky pipelines.42 Until now, inappropirate governance has not been 
considered the reason for poor sector performance. 
 
Governance concerns binding decision-making in the public sphere (Hooghe and Marks, 
2003, p. 233). In the water sector, it refers to the system in place to oversee, plan, direct, 
monitor and enforce transactions between the various water uses. Flawed rules and 
practices for decision-making on water policy and implementation will inevitably lead to 
poor water sector performance. Even if storage capacity is increased, problems of water 
scarcity will not be solved as long as unsuitable governance hinders an efficient coordination 
between the multitude of water actors, thereby preventing effective decision-making and 
the implementation of decisions. The Mauritian water sector will continue to suffer from 
issues such as a very high level of Non-Revenue Water (50-55 percent) and remain 
                                                     
42 http://www.lexpress.mu/article/260089/pailles-virulente-sortie-divan-collendavelloo-contre-cwa 
(28.06.2016). 
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unsustainable, if poor governance is not addressed. It is therefore necessary to redirect the 
public debate toward a greater focus on governance issues. 
 
The literature highlights a number of governance problems. These are not specific to 
developing countries, yet tend to be more acute in these contexts. One of the most 
common problems is that of a fragmented institutional setting characterized by an 
overlapping and unclear distribution of decision-making power (Tortajada, 2010, p. 300). 
 
This chapter is, therefore, dedicated to: (i) analyzing specific issues hindering effective water 
sector governance in Mauritius and (ii) highlighting the reasons for the failure of governance 
to sufficiently address sustainability. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: 
Section 5.1 briefly describes how the original data was collected; Section 5.2 presents a 
number of specific governance issues based on the analysis of the data; Section 5.3 presents 
the main findings; and Section 5.4 concludes. 
 
5.1 Data 
 
In order to understand the issues that water sector governance faces in Mauritius, a survey 
has been designed for the purpose of this research. It draws extensively on the OECD Survey 
on Water Governance (OECD, 2009) and has been adapted to reflect the situation in 
Mauritius and address sustainability issues.43 The survey can be found in Annex B. The 
survey was then sent to the main Mauritian water actors. The respondents to this survey 
were from eight main institutions: the Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities (MEPU), the 
Water Resources Unit (WRU), the Central Water Authority (CWA), the Wastewater 
Management Authority (WMA), the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Agroindustry, the 
Irrigation Authority and the Ministry of Environment. 
 
The survey was not submitted to the private sector nor to domestic users because, although 
consumers of water, they are not involved in water sector governance in Mauritius. In fact, 
these parties have no voice when it comes to decision-making on water issues. The 
submission of the survey to public decision-makers, therefore reflects the reality of 
Mauritian water sector governance. In addition, as well as providing an institutional 
mapping of the allocation of governance responsibilities across the various decision-makers 
in the water sector, the aim was to highlight the concrete governance challenges these 
public decision-makers face, given the variety of water actors and stakeholders involved. 
Furthermore, we endeavored to understand the mechanisms in place to facilitate the 
coordination of these various actors and stakeholders and to discern the role that 
sustainability considerations play in Mauritian water sector governance. 
 
The responses to the survey were then used as an indication of the most urgent problems in 
water sector governance, which were subsequently discussed in a workshop on sustainable 
water sector governance in Mauritius, involving the eight main Mauritian actors. Because 
                                                     
43 The original OECD survey is available at http://oecd.org/governance/regional-policy/44689618.pdf 
(31.08.2015). 
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much of this data is sensitive and critical of the status quo, the respondents have been 
guaranteed anonymity. 
 
The collected data highlights a number of governance issues which will be presented in the 
following section. The main difficulties obstructing efficient governance in Mauritius seem 
to fall within the categories identified by the literature. Tortajada (2010, p. 303), for one, 
stresses the problem of the lack of long-term vision for the water sector. Decisions are often 
made to address more immediate concerns. This is closely linked to the idea advocated by 
Tortajada that “system-thinking” is needed in the water sector (ibid, p. 304); in other words, 
strategic planning and a global vision, rather than merely patching up specific ‘hot spots’. 
The author acknowledges at the same time that this is difficult given the fragmentation of 
institutions for water governance and the associated lack of clarity in the allocation of, often 
overlapping, responsibilities (ibid.). This fragmentation also complicates the required 
coordination of the various water actors, which consequently hampers the implementation 
of policies (Bied-Charreton et al., 2006, p. 47). An additional prominent governance issue is 
a lack of transparency (Tortajada, 2010, p. 305). The following section elaborates on these 
issues, and others, from a Mauritian perspective.44 
 
5.2 Governance Issues in the Mauritian Water Sector 
Discontinued Water Sector Reforms 
 
The survey revealed that water sector reforms are not followed through and are often 
discontinued. An illustration of this has already been provided in Chapter 4 – a Public-
Private Partnership involving the CWA, a local partner and a consortium of French 
companies was cancelled by the MEPU following the election of a new government. 
 
The workshop on governance has revealed that although a real paradigm shift in the 
approach towards reform of the water sector would be needed – in other words, moving 
away from supply-side driven solutions to the problems encountered – the changes that 
actually are being made are too small and insignificant to constitute a reform. Nine water 
reform papers have already been produced by local and external consultants but none of 
them have been implemented. These reports have become increasingly similar in recent 
years – an indication that the most important issues in the Mauritian water sector had 
already been identified in previous reports. The fact remains, however, that these reports, 
many of which have been described as being of excellent quality, have not been 
implemented. A common complaint during the workshop was that “they just end up in a 
drawer”. 
 
This issue of discontinued water reforms is a typical governance problem which results from 
the so-called ‘time inconsistency’ problem, where short-term political considerations such 
as gaining political support are more important to decision-makers than long-term 
                                                     
44 The analysis of these issues also points to a number of possible solutions and policy 
recommendations. These are presented in Chapter 6. 
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sustainability considerations. As previously mentioned, this problem is particularly acute for 
water utilities because pipelines might have a life span of up to 100 years. 
Lack of High-level Political Commitment and Leadership in Water Policy 
 
The time inconsistency issue also explains another common governance problem in public 
utility sectors – namely, the lack of high-level political commitment. The underlying difficulty 
is that politicians may be reluctant to push for painful but necessary reforms, such as an 
increase in tariffs, out of fear of losing the support of citizens, who are not only public utility 
users, but also voters.45 This might explain why a National Water Policy exists in Mauritius 
but has not been implemented; nor is it clear whether this is likely to happen in the future.46 
On a smaller scale, it might also explain why the replacement of distribution pipes is more 
advanced in certain electoral constituencies but not in others. The CWA has a masterplan 
for renewing the distribution network but in order to implement it, ministerial approval is 
needed to release the funding; this might not happen unless the works are in the “right 
electoral constituency”, as one respondent put it. 
 
In addition, even if  the MEPU showed  greater willingness to take over the leadership of 
water sector issues, effective leadership might be hindered by the formal set-up of the 
numerous water actors, as was pointed out by discussions with participants of the workshop 
on water sector governance. There are, in fact, so many different committees and boards 
intervening in the decision-making process that the Ministry’s leadership role might 
effectively be diluted . The matrix depicting the micro-institutional setting of the Mauritian 
water sector presented in Chapter 4 shows the large number of water actors connected to 
the Ministry. This dilution of leadership is particularly an issue because responsibilities are 
not clearly defined across the various water actors. 
 
Moreover, a lack of leadership makes it is difficult to manage and sustain projects through 
from their inception to their end. A particular problem relates to the fact that no 
government body seems to be accountable for specific projects and, therefore, no agency is 
willing to take the responsibility for dysfunctions. As a consequence, infrastructure 
performance is reduced. This is illustrated by disruptions to traffic and economic activity 
when heavy rainfall causes flooding of a major bridge on the Grand River South-East or 
similar problems in Rivière du Poste in the south of the island. 
 
 
                                                     
45 In this respect, it may be welcomed that very recently, the Minister of Energy and Public Utilities 
announced plans to increase the tariffs for drinking water services. (http://defimedia.info/ivan-
collendavelloo-hausser-les-tarifs-pour-assainir-les-finances-de-la-cwa (20.09.2016)). 
46 It should be noted that the underlying concept of the Water Policy – integrated water 
management – might be effective only in theory. Although it has been extensively promoted in 
recent decades, Biswas (2008) shows that the results of integrated water management from 
different parts of the world are disappointing and that it is unlikely to work in the future. 
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Overlapping, Unclear, non-Existing Allocation of Responsibilities 
 
A number of examples illustrate the problems caused by a lack of a clear demarcation of 
responsibilities across the actors involved in water sector governance. The WRU, which is 
responsible for assessment, development, management and conservation of water 
resources, does not have a legal framework of its own. Rather, its legal framework is 
embedded in the Central Water Authority Act. As a result, the responsibilities of the CWA 
and the WRU partly overlap. The implications of this problem are well-known to decision-
makers as an unpublished report on this issue already exists. 
 
The absence of a proper legal framework for the WRU also leads to dysfunctions in the 
enforcement of regulations. For instance, the WRU does not have the tools to prevent the 
discharge of effluents into water resources despite the fact that it is responsible for water 
resource conservation. 
 
The discussions with decision-makers also illustrate clearly how this lack of clarity in the 
allocation of responsibilities hampers the decision-making process in the Mauritian water 
sector, as well as the enforcement of regulations. It seems that a common issue in meetings 
involving water decision-makers is which water actor should handle which specific problem. 
Ministries and parastatal bodies will often argue that the responsibility for a specific issue is 
not theirs. On one occasion, for example, both the WRU and the WMA argued that the 
discharge of effluents into sea water was not their responsibility; instead, the issue had to 
be handled by the Ministry of Fisheries.47 
Lack of Transparency 
 
Transparency is often seen as key to effective governance and regulation (Tortajada, 2010, 
p. 305). The perception of water actors, though, seems to be that transparency is lacking in 
Mauritian water sector governance. It is often unclear how decisions are reached. 
Furthermore, stakeholders are informed of final decisions without having been properly 
involved in the decision-making process. This is also true for user participation. Consumers 
and water users lack a voice in water sector governance and are not formally involved in the 
decision-making processes. However, it must also be noted that users do not always show 
enough concern for water policies, as the next point illustrates. 
Lack of Citizens’ Concern for Water Policy 
 
In recent times, user participation has become a more integral part of water sector 
governance (Kodjovi, 2011). Users’ concerns should be taken into account when water 
policies are made. At the same time, it is important to educate users. In discussions with the 
                                                     
47 An interesting point was raised by a water sector expert who provided an explanation for the 
overlapping responsibilities of water governance actors. The argument is closely related to 
Niskanen’s model of bureaucratic behavior and empire-building: a new Minister entering office is 
interested in enlarging his power by increasing the amount of departments he controls. In the 
process of this empire-building, responsibilities are not clearly demarcated, and often duplicated. 
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various stakeholders, it appears that users’ behavior sometimes goes against the interests of 
sustainable water utilities. For instance, users’ expectations of the CWA may be too high. 
For example, in one case, inhabitants of Tamarin, who live quite high up a mountain on the 
west coast of Mauritius, expected to have a large quantity of water with adequate pressure 
to fill their swimming pool. This is technically very difficult to achieve and also very 
expensive. Another example is that of a manufacturing company in La Tour Koenig, a dry 
region suffering from water stress in the northwest of the island, which expanded its 
operations without taking into consideration the water scarcity. The CWA is unable to 
provide more water to the company. It appears, therefore, that there is a real need to 
inform people about water issues, but this is not done. As was remarked during the 
governance workshop, when people lack information, they might not understand the 
decisions and therefore become frustrated and revolt. 
 
This also means that users need to be educated to understand that water and wastewater 
services must be paid for. There is a perception that users are typically more willing to pay 
for electricity and telecommunications but that they feel that water tariffs should remain 
very low. Even worse, illegal connections are a real problem in the Mauritian water sector – 
for example, in Bonne Terre and Carreau Laliane in Vacoas, a municipality in the central 
region of the island. As well as siphoning of water, illegal connections and pumps reduce the 
water pressure in the CWA’s pipelines, thereby reducing the pressure for other users. 
 
It is therefore important to educate users, to help them understand the sustainability 
problems that the water sector faces. Users should be aware of the real cost of water in 
order to prevent the water sector from becoming even more unsustainable through illegal 
practices or unreasonable expectations. At the same time, , it is important to note that, 
according to the experts that were interviewed, users are willing to pay higher tariffs if the 
service quality improves. 
Interference of Lobbies 
 
Strong political leadership might also be hindered by the interference of lobbies. Our 
research has shown that this is perceived to be one of the main governance issues in the 
Mauritian water sector. For instance, government and consumer lobbies try to prevent 
tariffs from increasing. It is assumed that these lobbies are successful as there were no 
increases in tariffs between 2002 and 2012, not even to adjust for inflation.48 
Socio-cultural lobbies demand free water or water at very low tariffs. A question raised by 
one respondent was why water should be provided for free to these organizations, 
particularly given the fact that they do not seem to make an effort to save water. 
 
As well as lobbying for low tariffs, our research reveals that that lobbying from water rights 
holders is very intense. Water rights provide access to water resources, for instance, for 
industrial or agricultural purposes, at very advantageous conditions. For decades, isolated 
voices have called for a reform to the water rights system which goes back to 1863, but  
                                                     
48 According to one respondent, water tariffs would be around 40 percent higher today if they had 
been indexed to inflation. 
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without much success.49 Furthermore, there have been indications that even individual 
users ‘lobby’ for lower bills and in some cases do not hesitate to resort to bribery.50 
Lack of Independence of Water Agencies 
 
The lack of political commitment might not be such a big problem if the various water 
agencies were more independent. Because they lack autonomy, water agencies are highly 
dependent on the approval of their line ministry to implement their projects and plans. In 
part, these agencies also depend on each other. Wastewater issues, for instance, should be 
independent of the CWA, according to the Central Water Authority Act. However, in realtiy 
they are not. Wastewater fees are collected by the CWA. 
 
In addition, under the Central Water Authority Act, the CWA should be able to take 
decisions on its own but in reality it requires the approval of the MEPU, its line Ministry. 
According to procedure, the CWA needs to approach representatives of the Ministry before 
an issue is presented to the Minister. However, the Ministry is not involved in the CWA’s 
daily operations and, therefore, does not know the details of the dossier. The Ministry’s 
officers then present the issue to the Minister who will then decide whether to give his 
approval. During the workshop, it was suggested that one reason why the Minister may 
refuse a proposal, is that important information may have been misunderstood by Ministry 
officials so the Minister does not have the correct information on which to base a decision. 
 
It was also noted that a number of water agencies are highly political and that there is an 
urgent need to de-politicize these institutions. Ministerial approval is often needed to 
promote officers working at some of the water agencies. Our research has also found that 
there is a perception that officers are appointed on the basis of their ethnicity, cast51 or 
family background. 
Absence of Strategic Planning, Global Vision, and Sequencing of Decisions 
 
Another typical governance problem, especially when strong leadership is missing, is the 
absence of strategic planning and a global vision for the water sector, as well as the 
sequencing of decisions. Land drainage and works by the CWA and the WMA should be 
carried out at the same time to guarantee as little disturbance to traffic as possible, 
particularly in Port Louis, Mauritius’ capital, where the streets are very narrow and there is a 
lot of traffic. This is, however, not the case. In addition, because Mauritius is such a small 
island, it is not possible to replace more than 200 km of pipes a year because of the 
disruption it would cause to traffic and economic activity. There is also a lack of 
                                                     
49 The water rights issue is quite complex. There is a need to ensure that lobbies are not successful in 
preventing necessary reform. However, the allocation of water would also require a harmonized 
Water Act. Water legislation in Mauritius is very scattered and consists of many different legislative 
texts. 
50 Commercial losses in the Mauritian drinking water sector, which amount to 10-15 percent 
(National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 15), are not only due to defective meters; corruption 
provides an additional explanation for Mauritius’ high levels of non-revenue water (50-55 percent). 
51 The majority of Mauritius’ population is Hindu. 
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coordination between urban planning, and the water and electricity sectors when it comes 
to new development projects. 
 
More generally, the water sector and the various water agencies lack a strategic vision. The 
CWA, for instance, has more of a focus on its operational objectives, rather than any 
strategic outlook. Therefore, there is a need for global planning for projects, rather than the 
current haphazard case-by-case planning. The WMA has, in fact, developed a masterplan, 
but it is not being properly adhered to. The lack of global vision is illustrated by the fact that 
there seems to be more treatment plants for wastewater in Mauritius than needed. As well 
as putting a greater strain on the public budget, it also has an impact on environmental 
sustainability. 
Problems in Coordinating the Multitude of Water Actors 
 
Because of the multi-actor nature of the water sector, it is necessary to coordinate their 
actions. Ineffective coordination will gravely hinder water sector governance since it will 
lead to information asymmetries, a lack of leadership and difficulties in the implementation 
of decisions, among others. 
 
A particular issue that can be observed in the Mauritian context is that, sometimes, 
coordinating bodies exist de jure, but not de facto. The Water Advisory Council, for example, 
has been in existence since 1985, but has only very recently been operationalized. Similarly, 
the National Environment Commission – which is under the chair of the Prime Minister and 
was set up under the Environment Protection Act 2002, with the aim of developing 
environmental policies and coordinating stakeholders – held it last meeting in 2003. 
 
It is important to note that even where coordination bodies exist de facto, they might not 
enhance effective governance and, in fact, often dilute decision-making processes (as 
previously mentioned). Our research has revealed that some of the committees in the 
Mauritian water sector may add to the administrative burden, resulting in long delays to the 
implementation of projects as dossiers go back and forth between a multitude of water 
actors. 
Difficulties in Implementing Central Government Decisions at the Local Level 
 
It was also noted that the implementation of central government decisions is sometimes 
difficult at the local level. For instance, by law, the calibration of bulk water meters has to be 
done by the metrological department. However, this department lacks the necessary 
equipment and the bulk meters need to be sent to South Africa for calibration. 
 
More generally, there seems to be a perception that the process of developing and passing 
new laws is relatively smooth but that implementation is often problematic. 
 
5.3 Findings from the Analysis of Water Governance in Mauritius 
 
The governance challenges faced by the Mauritian water sector corroborate much of the 
literature on this topic. These challenges are linked to institutional weaknesses pertaining to 
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issues of transparency, overlapping responsibilities and a lack of a long-term vision. The 
latter is particularly crucial for the sustainability of the water sector since sustainability 
explicitly entails catering for the needs of future generations. 
 
The following points seem of particular importance: Firstly, transparency in the governance 
of the Mauritian water sector is very low – a particularly contentious issue for the National 
Economic and Social Council (2014, pp. 23 and 28), especially with regards to tariff setting 
and the costs of the CWA. Water actors also criticize the lack of transparency in decision-
making. Related to this is the lack of voice for water users. In an attempt to address these 
issues, the MEPU (2014, p. 18) proposed, in their National Water Policy, the creation of a 
Water Observatory and other institutional mechanisms that would be responsible for the 
collection of coherent and uniform data, and its dissemination. 
 
Secondly, there is a lack of coordination between the various actors. Again, this missing, 
crucial element is highlighted in the National Water Policy (Ministry of Energy and Public 
Utilities, 2014, p. 14) which asserts the need for an Inter-Ministerial Committee to ensure a 
coherent and coordinated approach for the different tasks related to water sector 
governance. Our water governance survey has revealed these coordination issues. Water 
actors note the lack of clearly demarcated responsibilities, the absence of commonly-shared 
data and information, as well as a lack of clear political leadership and will, as being among 
the main impediments to effective coordination of actors related to water governance. 
However, to what extent will the creation of yet another micro-institution responsible for 
water – without first addressing the issue of overlapping responsibilities – improve water 
sector governance? 
 
Thirdly, sustainability issues are largely ignored. With regard to environmental sustainability, 
a coherent approach is lacking. Different micro-institutions such as the CWA, the WRU and 
the WMA, are responsible for tasks related to environmental considerations. Yet, there is no 
coordination of their efforts. More importantly, the absence of clear data on the water 
situation in Mauritius prevents effective measures that might foster a sustainable 
environment. We cautiously express the hope that water accounting will help to better 
understand environmental issues in the Mauritian water sector. 
 
In terms of economic sustainability, water charges and tariffs in the Mauritian water sector 
are so low, that they barely, if ever, cover operating costs (National Economic and Social 
Council, 2014, pp. 23 ff.). They are not sufficient to pay for the investments required to 
change the roughly 1,600 km of pipes in need of replacement. The recent National Water 
Policy might provide some hope (Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities 2014, pp. 10, 21). It 
advocates a full-cost approach, which considers not only operating, maintenance and capital 
costs, but also the social costs of any negative externalities – in accordance with the 
‘polluter pays principle’ and real costs of water resources. However, our respondents 
advised caution, questioning whether this water policy will ever be implemented. The CWA 
is well aware of its economic unsustainability and notes that it is difficult even to cover 
operating costs. The much needed investments to replace ailing pipes are not covered by 
the tariffs. However, tariffs are set at the Ministry level and the government has always 
been very reluctant to increase them, at least until now. The CWA lacks the decision-making 
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power to improve its financial situation and find a solution to the very high levels of Non-
Revenue Water (50-55 percent). 
 
With regards to the social aspects of sustainability, the Mauritian situation is such that 
about one-third of households supplied by the CWA benefit from highly subsidized social 
tariffs, even though they do not fall into the group of economically vulnerable households 
(National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 27). This does not correspond to the idea of 
social tariff setting and constitutes a form of public waste that should be quickly addressed 
by the relevant authorities, if their aim is to increase the efficiency of the water sector. 
However, the highly politicized nature of the Mauritian water sector means that tariffs are 
only sporadically and very rarely reviewed. The last tariff increase was in 2012, after ten 
years of no change. Moreover, the 30 percent increase in 2012 did not cover the cumulative 
increase in costs since the last tariff revision in 2002 (ibid, pp. 22, 28). To what extent tariffs 
will increase in the future, is yet to be seen. 
 
So why is Mauritian water sector governance not better geared toward sustainability 
considerations? One explanation might be the problems of time inconsistency and 
government opportunism, which typically occur in infrastructure with a long lifespan 
(Savedoff and Spiller, 1999; Ménard and Peeroo, 2011, p. 316). Consider, for instance, the 
life cycle of water pipes. If properly maintained, these pipes can last roughly 80 years, even 
longer in some cases. For this reason, elected officials, who usually only remain in power for 
a couple of terms, are not committed to the long-term sustainablitly of the infrastructure or 
concerned about the impacts of the solutions they adopt. In the long run, providers of water 
services need to recover the high costs of their fixed assets, but in the short-run, they can 
survive by covering only operating costs, which are well under average costs.52 This provides 
a strong incentive for government opportunism – keeping prices low for electoral gains.53 
This also implies that, because decision-making power in the water sector essentialy lies 
with politicians, painful but long-term, beneficial measures and reforms are evaded in order 
to gain short-term political support. As a result, tarrifs may continue to remain artificially 
low. 
 
5.4 Quo Vadis? 
 
In order to prepare for the potential negative effects of climate change on the water sector, 
water sector governance in Mauritius needs to address these different issues. Mauritius is 
already at risk of water scarcity by 2020 (National Economic and Social Council, 2014, p. 20). 
Therefore, it appears to us that it is of utmost importance that the government and the 
relevent authorities react immediately to push forward the much needed reforms in the 
water sector. We share the view in the literature that the focus of reform should be directed 
toward issues of water sector governance rather than exclusively replacing or constructing 
new infrastructure. 
                                                     
52 This results from the fact that water utilities have the characteristics of a natural monopoly (Noll, 
2002). 
53 Mauritian water tariffs are among the lowest in Africa and the typical household bill amounts to 
only 0.6 percent of the average household income (see Chapter 4). 
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Chapter 6 will elaborate on some policy recommendations for improving water sector 
governance: to prepare a harmonized Water Act, to give more independence to the main 
water agencies, to develop performance indicators and make them publicly available, and to 
introduce benchmark competition. 
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Chapter 6: Summary of Key Findings and Policy Recommendations 
 
Aleksandra Peeroo and Riad Sultan 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a short synthesis of the major findings of our study and presents some 
policy recommendations. It includes a summary of the water accounts for Mauritius, the 
estimation of the demand function for water, the analysis of the economic contribution of 
water, and the forecast of water supply and demand up to 2030. This forecast is based on a 
scenario-based analysis, taking the likely effects of climate change into account. 
 
The conclusion is that certain issues in the water sector might be related to inadequate 
governance. Some of the main findings from the governance part of this study are then 
drawn on in order to propose a number of policy recommendations for a more sustainable 
water sector. 
 
6.1 Water Accounts 
 
The study compiles four sets of water accounts for the purpose of providing a systematic 
record on water in Mauritius – namely, water balance, total water abstraction, water 
abstraction by water supply industry, and supply and use tables. The major findings are as 
follows: 
 
• There have been large fluctuations in precipitation in recent years. For example, in 2008, 
precipitation was estimated at 4,440 million m3, while in 2012, it fell drastically to 3,001 
million m3. Furthermore, 77.7 percent of rain in 2013 fell during the summer and only 
22.3 percent during the winter. 
 
• Of the total available water – in other words, precipitation less evapotranspiration – 8 
percent is abstracted through the storage system and 4 percent is utilized by the 
residential and non-residential sectors (including government sectors). 
 
• Non-Revenue Water (a result of a leaking distribution network, faulty meters and theft) 
amounts to approximately 50 percent of total available water. 
 
• The agricultural sector, the largest user of water in Mauritius, uses 14.1 percent of total 
water available. Of the 375 million m3 abstracted by the sector, 98 percent stems from 
surface runoff. This sector uses only 1.4 percent of the treated water provided by the 
water supply industry; the remaining is abstracted directly from surface and ground 
water. 
 
 106 
 
For a proper understanding of the water situation in Mauritius, it was important to prepare 
water accounts on a seasonal basis – in other words, separate accounts for the winter and 
the summer seasons. The main findings are as follows: 
 
• The agricultural sector uses much more water in summer but faces a scarcity of water in 
winter. 
 
• Water demand is more or less constant throughout the year. This implies that in winter, 
and at the beginning of the summer season (December and January), water supply can 
scarcely meet demand – largely because of the amount of Non-Revenue Water (50 
percent). 
 
• There is a strong correlation between precipitation and water abstracted by the water 
supply industry, implying that a reduction in precipitation leads to a fall in water stored 
in the storage system. Studies on climate change impacts on precipitation in Mauritius 
conclude that under the worst scenarios (A2, A1B and B1 storylines), the fall in 
precipitation is estimated at between 3 and 9 percent annually in the 2030s. In summer, 
the worst scenarios conclude that rainfall might decrease by between 10.8 percent and 
17.3 percent, while for the winter months, the decrease is estimated at between 18.2 
percent and 1.2 percent. This means that there is a high probability that in some years, 
levels of water abstraction by the water supply industry will be low and, therefore, a 
water crisis may seriously jeopardize the island. 
 
6.2 Price, Income and Output Elasticity of Water 
 
On the demand side, the study attempts to analyse the current trends as well as future 
trends in the consumption of water. As an aid to policymaking, the price and income 
elasticity of water has been calculated for the residential sector as well as the non-
residential sector. In the economic sectors, the output elasticity, marginal productivity of 
water and price elasticity are estimated using a trans-log production function. 
 
• We calculated the price and income elasticities for both the residential and non-
residential sectors using an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model. The long-run price 
elasticity for water is -0.16 for the residential sector and -0.72 for the non-residential 
sector, respectively. Income elasticity in the long run is estimated at 0.23 for the 
residential sector and 0.49 for the non-residential sector. 
 
• The study uses a trans-log production function to estimate the output elasticity. Output 
elasticity for water ranges from 0.02 to 0.47 for the different sectors of the economy. 
The paper, chemical, rubber, metal, construction and wholesale trade sectors have an 
average output elasticity of 0.41. The food and textile sectors have a lower output 
elasticity. 
 
6.3 Household Survey on Water Use 
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To have a better picture of water use and the impact of water scarcity on households, a 
survey was undertaken with a sample of respondents across Mauritius. The survey collected 
information on water use, water bills and socioeconomic characteristics, including income. 
The survey results show that the ratio of water bills to household income declines as 
household income rises. This means that the water tariff structure is highly regressive. 
Moreover, around 43.5 percent of respondents reported owning a water tank. This behavior 
can be seen as an adaptation strategy to the absence of a continuous water supply in 
Mauritius. 
 
6.4 Economic Value of Water 
 
The marginal benefit of water used by the residential sector stands at MUR 9.91 per m3 
(USD 0.28), while the marginal productivity of water in the manufacturing sector is 
estimated at MUR 1,413 per m3 (USD 39.8). These values can be used to estimate the 
economic benefits of investment in reservoirs such as the Bagatelle Treatment Plant, which 
aims at ensuring a more regular water supply to residents in the district of Port Louis, Lower 
Plaines Wilhems and the northern part of the Black River district. The project costs MUR 1.7 
billion (USD 47.9 million) and is expected to mobilize around 25 million m3. This implies that 
the economic benefits – calculated at MUR 250 million (USD 7 million) a year, using the 
marginal benefit of water for the residential sector – will outweigh the cost of construction 
after nearly seven years. 
 
6.5 Forecast of Demand for Water and Climate Change Scenarios 
 
The forecasting exercise estimates the residential and non-residential demand for water in 
2030 under three economic growth scenarios – namely, a GDP growth of 2, 5.5 and 7 
percent, respectively. Household consumption is estimated at 85 million m3, 99.7 million m3 
and 108 million m3, respectively. The total demand for drinking water is projected to be 
112.7 million m3, 133.7 million m3 and 146 million m3, respectively. Basing our calculations 
on the actual water storage system, water abstracted is expected to amount to 220 million 
m3. Using the actual figures and the rate of distribution loss, significant shortages are 
expected in 2030, unless effective policies are implemented in the water sector. 
 
Evidently, water supply depends on the amount rainfall which, in turn, is subject to climate 
change. Three climate change scenarios are considered, A2, A1B and B1. The A2 storyline 
projects slower economic growth and technological change than storylines A1 and B1. The 
A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid economic growth; a 
global population that peaks mid-century and declines thereafter; the rapid introduction of 
new and more efficient technologies; and a balance of fossil and non-fossil energy across all 
sources (A1B). The B1 storyline and scenario family describes a convergent world with a 
similar global population that peaks mid-century and declines thereafter; with rapid changes 
in economic structures toward a service and information economy and reductions in 
material intensity; and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. 
 
Under A2, water shortages will be in the range of 19 million m3 to 52 million m3, 
corresponding to an economic growth of 2 and 7 percent, respectively. Under A1B, water 
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shortages will be somewhere between 24 million m3 and 58 million m3; and under B1, the 
shortages will range from 15 million m3 to 49 million m3. With an economic growth rate of 
5.5 percent, the shortages are estimated to range from 36 million m3 to 45 million m3 (B1 
and A1B respectively). 
6.6 Ensuring the Sustainable Supply of Water: Policy Implications 
 
The main aim of constructing water accounts, analyzing current and future trends of water 
use, and scrutinizing governance in the water sector is to ensure a sustainable water supply, 
both in the short and long term. According to Isnard and Barraqué (2010), sustainability in 
the water sector involves three main facets: (i) economic sustainability, which refers to the 
capacity of water services to recover their costs, not only of operation and maintenance, but 
also of long-term investments; (ii)environmental sustainability, which requires that water 
corresponds to defined safety norms, that the use for water of future generations is 
guaranteed, and that the quality and quantity of water resources is safeguarded; and (iii) 
ethical or social aspects of sustainability, which means that users are able and willing to pay 
for the water services received. 
 
The main issue is whether the present situation is economically sustainable. In relation to 
revenues and expenses, the CWA is currently able to cover its operating costs. However, this 
is far from ensuring a sustainable water service in the long run because the revenue 
structure does not allow for the costs of investments. It does not answer questions on 
financing long-term water storage systems or resolving the issue of faulty meters and 
pipelines in a systematic manner. Funding for these types of projects usually comes from 
the central government budget, although the WRU (under the Ministry of Energy and Public 
Utilities) is responsible for water resources in Mauritius. 
 
Water storage and drinking water distribution are treated separately, thereby separating 
the production of raw water from water services (for drinking water and sanitation). In 
order to transform raw water into drinking water, heavy investments are needed: to store 
water adequately and properly; to provide a 24/7 service; and to prevent high leakage, 
which, in turn, ensures adequate pressure in the distribution network and helps avoid 
contamination. In this respect, the price of water should, as far as possible, include the costs 
of treatment, distribution and the storage of water. Under the current tariff regime, 
however, the price of water for consumers includes only the cost of the treatment of raw 
water and the maintenance of the distribution network. The cost of repairing pipes has to 
be paid for from central government budgets. 
 
It is clear that the high level of Non-Revenue Water is one of the major issues facing the 
water sector in Mauritius. Half of this Non-Revenue Water is due to leaking pipelines. Thus, 
adopting a policy to address the issue of Non-Revenue Water will save 110 million m3, which 
is sufficient to cater for the rising demand for water, as well as for the effects of climate 
change on precipitation up to the year 2030. Taking the Bagatelle Dam project as an 
example – estimated at MUR 1.7 billion (USD 47.9 million) for 25 million m3 of storage – and 
allowing for losses of 50 percent through Non-Revenue Water, we would need more than 
five such projects to generate 110 million m3, at a cost of roughly MUR 9 billion (USD 253.5 
million). Water is supplied through a distribution network made up of some 4,175km of 
pipes, excluding house connections. More than 1,000km of this network are subject to 
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frequent leaks and bursts. Using figures for the amount disbursed for pipelines, and new 
estimates, it appears that the average cost per kilometer stands at MUR 13 million (USD 
366,000). Repairing these faulty pipes will cost a minimum of MUR 13 billion (USD 366.2 
million). 
A major finding is that the demand for water is highly price inelastic in the short as well as 
the long run. Pricing policy therefore cannot be used to curb demand for water. However, it 
can be used to raise revenue in the water sector if the tariff is increased. Water tarrifs, 
especially in the residential sector, may be restructured since household consumption forms 
the largest segment of total (treated) water demand. 
 
Let us consider the cost of replacing 1,000km of pipe. If we allow a period of 30 years to 
recover these costs, they may amount to MUR 400 million (USD 11.3 million) a year, at 
current values. Thus the water sector has to cater for this additional amount on a annual 
basis. With a price elasticity of -0.12, and a current annual revenue of MUR 696.3 million 
(USD 19.6 million), a 73 percent rise in average price would be needed to increase revenue 
by MUR 400 million. This excludes the additional revenue that would be obtained through 
reducing the level of Non-Revenue Water. This proposition, however, is far more complex 
than it first appears. Currently, all households are charged a fixed fee of MUR 45 (USD 1.27) 
per month for up to 10m3 of water, irrespective of use. Therefore, up to 10 m3, the average 
price is MUR 4.5 (USD 0.13) per cubic meter. The cost for additional cubic meters starts at 
MUR eight (USD 0.23) and increases exponentially (in increments). Therefore, a household 
may find it cheaper to install a second meter and to pay another MUR 45 for an additional 
10m3, rather than pay for any additional cubic meters of water used. There is, therefore, a 
need to review the tariff structure, with due consideration to low-income or vulnerable 
households. 
 
Alongside the revenue generated by household water consumption, the non-residential 
sector, including the manufacturing, services and government sectors, brings in an annual 
revenue of about MUR 592 million (USD 16.7 million). Estimates of output elasticity, the 
marginal productivity of water, and price elasticity of water in the economic sectors can be 
used to work out a tariff structure to maximize revenue. 
 
However, restructuring the tariffs to increase revenue will not be enough to ensure 
economic sustainability in the Mauritian water sector. Chapter 4 of this study has identified 
one important reason for this lack of economic sustainability; namely, the separation of the 
requirements for water resources and drinking water distribution. The main bodies 
responsible for these tasks – the WRU and the CWA, respectively – have distinct approaches 
to securing funding for their tasks. A more holistic view of the water sector seems to be 
needed. This issue has been examined in detail in Section 2, in the analysis of governance in 
the water sector. 
 
6.7 The Institutional Setting of Water Sector Governance 
 
Water sector governance has been defined as the system in place to oversee, plan, direct, 
monitor and enforce the transactions between the various water uses. Its task is therefore 
to determine rules and practices for decision-making in the water sector. In order to be able 
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to draw an accurate picture of water sector governance in Mauritius, an analytical 
framework has been developed to identify the distribution of tasks related to the various 
dimensions of water sector governance among the different water actors. As a result, it has 
been found that water sector governance in Mauritius is not vertically decentralized – in 
other words, all water actors operate at the national level of government and no regional or 
local actors are involved. This finding is interesting because it is a stark contrast to 
practically all other countries in the world, where water sector governance is usually 
vertically decentralized to a significant degree, allocating key responsibilities to regional 
and/or local actors. Even though the very small geographic size of Mauritius might explain 
centralized policymaking by actors at the national level, especially with regard to water 
resources, it is questionable whether the provision of drinking water, which is typically a 
local public service, should also be organized at the national level. 
 
However, even though water governance is vertically centralized, it has been shown that 
there is a great deal of horizontal decentralization, meaning that a multitude of actors and 
government bodies intervene at the national level. The main actors are: the MEPU (with its 
parastatal bodies, the WRU, the CWA, and the WMA); the National Assembly; the Ministry 
of Agro Industry and Food Security, along with the Irrigation Authority; the Ministry of 
Environment and its Pollution Prevention and Control Division, the National Environmental 
Laboratory, the Law and Prosecution Division and the Environmental Police; the Ministry of 
Health and Quality of Life and its Environmental Health Unit; and the Water Advisory 
Council.54 All of these ministries, ministry divisions and parastatals fulfill various tasks in 
water resource planning, development and management, drinking water services and 
wastewater services. 
 
6.8 Water Sector Governance and (the Lack of) Sustainability 
 
Given the likelihood of water scarcity, predicted by the climate change scenarios in Chapter 
3, the extent to which sustainability is addressed in the governance of the water sector is 
particulary important. A sustainable water sector requires that it is economically viable, in 
the sense that it is able to recover the costs of services provided, including the costs for 
long-term investments; that the quality and quantity of water resources is safeguarded for 
future generations; and that tariffs are designed in such a way as to reflect the users’ ability 
and willingness to pay. 
 
As the findings of this study suggest, it is questionable whether Mauritius is prepared to face 
expected water scarcity in the future. There are existing plans to raise the capacity for water 
storage through the construction of new dams and reservoirs, but it is debatable whether 
this is an efficient approach given the very high rate of Non-Revenue Water (of between 50 
and 55 percent). The CWA is currently addressing this particular issue by trying to reduce 
the leakage rate and commercial losses linked to defective water meters. It is, nevertheless, 
unclear how much time this will take. 
 
                                                     
54 According to our respondents, the Water Advisory Council has not been operational until very 
recently. 
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The economic sustainability of water services provided in Mauritius is also in danger. Tariffs 
are very low – among the lowest in Africa – and currently barely cover operating costs. Since 
current costs (for example, for energy) are expected to rise in the future, the situation will 
probably deteriorate further. A change in government policy toward the elimination of 
government subsidies for long-term investments is putting additional pressure on water 
service finances. 
 
As for social sustainability, social tariffs are offered to one-third of households, although, 
according to official government statistics, only one-tenth of these are really in need of such 
preferential tariffs. In addition, the current tariffs do not take into account the size of the 
household. This might have a regressive effect on large, low-income families who might 
have to pay a higher bill than families with fewer children and more financial means. 
Another problem lies in the very high levels of cross-subsidization from commercial to 
domestic users. The latter benefit de facto from tariffs that do not even cover the operating 
costs for the services provided. As a consequence, rather than  providing financial support 
to those consumers in need, social tariff setting in Mauritius is a source of public wastage,  
further endangering the economic sustainability of the water sector. This is because 
consumers who could afford to pay tariffs that are closer to reflecting the full cost of 
providing water services are paying the social tariff which is too low to even cover operating 
costs – entailing a foregone opportunity to generate revenue. 
 
In light of the urgent sustainability issues that the Mauritian water sector faces, the National 
Water Policy, as outlined in July 2014, seems to mark a turning point toward more 
sustainable water sector governance. It addresses imminent problems such as the need for 
full-cost recovery or integrated water resource management (Ministry of Energy and Public 
Utilities, 2014). However, this document was prepared by the last government and it 
remains to be seen whether the current government, elected in December 2014, has 
enough political will to commit itself to such an ambitious program. The perception among 
our respondents was that it was unlikely that this water policy would be implemented. 
 
Furthermore, it appears that the MEPU is unaware of the sustainability issues in the 
Mauritian water sector. Our study suggests that one of the main reason for this might lie in 
weaknesses in governance. Several issues seem of particular importance and lead to a 
number of policy recommendations presented in the following section. 
 
6.9 Policy Recommendations to Improve Water Sector Governance 
 
Our study revealed several water governance issues. For one, responsibilities are unclearly 
delineated so that they often overlap. This makes it difficult for water actors to take firm 
decisions and act upon them. A policy recommendation would, therefore, be to review the 
responsibilities of the various water actors and delineate them properly. For instance, the 
WRU, which comes under the Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities, should be provided 
with a distinct legal framework, rather than being embedded in the CWA Act, which 
currently results in overlapping tasks and functions. To achieve this, a possible solution 
would be to develop a Water Act which would harmonize current legislation and allocate 
functions and responsibilities clearly among the various water actors. 
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This is closely related to the second recommendation. It would be highly desirable to 
provide key water actors, such as the CWA, the WMA and the WRU, with more autonomy. 
Our study shows that the CWA is well aware of the lack of economic sustainability for its 
drinking water services but it can do little to tackle the issue because the decision-making 
power for tariff setting lies with its line ministry, the MEPU. More independence for 
Mauritian water actors would also enable them to overcome the issue of time inconsistency 
– in other words, the fact that the government sacrifices necessary sustainable long-term 
considerations in order to gain short-term political support. This lack of strong political will 
has been pervasive in the Mauritian water sector over the last few decades. 
 
The third obstacle to effective water governance, highlighted in this study, concerns the 
issue of transparency and of information sharing between the various water actors, which is 
hampered by the absence of indicators and objectives. As a policy recommendation, water 
actors should aim at developing such indicators. These could include (among others): the 
leakage rate, the rate of Non-Revenue Water, the number of unplanned interuptions of 
service, the ratio of employees to connections, the time needed to respond to consumer 
complaints, the renewal rate of the distribution network; as well as indicators related to the 
chemical and biological composition of the water. These indicators can be developed for the 
national level but should also be constructed for a lower geographical scale. Performance 
indicators could be developed for the various water reservoirs, for instance, and also for the 
six points of distribution that the CWA uses. All these indicators should be made publicly 
accessible on a website so that all water stakeholders, including users, can access the data. 
In France, for instance, the National Office for Water and Aquatic Environments 
(Observatoire National de l’Eau et des Milieux Aquatiques) has recently been created for the 
purpose of collecting and publishing data on all aspects of drinking and wastewater services. 
 
This leads to the fourth and final policy recommendation on water sector governance. These 
regional performance indicators should then be used to introduce performance 
benchmarking for the various water services – for example, to compare the performance of 
different water resources, drinking water distribution points and wastewater treatment 
plants.55 This would not only enhance the transparency of the water sector but also of 
decision-making processes, by providing a higher level of information to all water actors. 
Furthermore, it would lead to benchmark competition, a type of virtual competition which is 
known for its efficiency enhancing effects and which is particularly suited to monopolistic 
sectors such as the water sector. By comparing the performance of the various regional 
segments, each segment would have an incentive not to be the one with the lowest 
performance. This type of regulation is also known as ‘sunshine regulation’ since it sheds 
light on the (previously hidden) performance of a utility. This option is less costly than 
setting up a specific regulatory body. Creating a seperate regulatory agency might be very 
difficult in light of strained public budgets and the Mauritian institutional context, which 
might not allow for sufficient independence of the regulator to be effective. In addition 
sunshine regulation is much easier to implement. Basically, it requires a certain amount of 
                                                     
55 This could be done even though the points of distribution are partly interconnected. 
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data and a website to publish it. This type of regulation could help to improve levels of 
efficiency and performance in the water sector. 
 
All in all, these measures would help Mauritius to be better prepared for current and future 
challenges to its water sector. 
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Annexes 
 
Annex A: Water Legislation in Mauritius 
 
Central Water Authority legislation: 
Title of Act Number Year Main features 
Central Water Authority 
Act 1971 updated 
Act 
20/1971 
1971 Creation and outline of the Act in the current version. 
Board composition decided by Minister (§7). Budget needs 
ex ante approval by Minister (§27). No liability for damages 
for impure water or insufficient / irregular water supply 
(§42). 
Central Water Authority 
Act 1971 
Act No. 20 
of 1971 
1971 Original CWA Act.  
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 1975 
Act No. 26 
of 1975 
1975 Change of Board composition. Definition of fines for 
tampering with water meters. 
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 1982 
Act No. 39 
of 1982 
1982 Change of Board composition. 
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 1985 
Act No. 4 
of 1985 
1985 Establishment of a Water Advisory Council with a Board, 
whose Chairman appointed by Minister, comprising CWA 
and several Ministries, namely Ministry of Finance; Energy 
and Internal Communications; Economic Planning and 
Development; Labor and Industrial Relations; and members 
with experience in agricultural, industrial, commercial, 
financial, scientific or administrative matters, appointed by 
the Minister. 
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 1989 
Act No. 31 
of 1989 
1989 Definition of fines for discharging polluted water. 
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 1992 
Act No. 4 
of 1992 
1992 Change of time span appointed members of Board may 
serve. 
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 2000 
Act No. 27 
of 2000 
2000 Possibility of concession contracts for the supply of water. 
Central Water Authority 
(Amendment) Act 2005 
Act No. 3 
of 2005 
2005 Defines fines for water offences (§3(a)). 
        
Title of regulation Number   Main features 
Central Water Authority 
(Census of Water Rights) 
Regulations 2013 
GN No. 
106 
2013 Census of water rights holders from various sectors to 
collect information on water sources, consumption and 
return flows. 
Central Water Authority 
(Census of Water Rights) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2011 
Notice No. 
206 of 
2011 
2011 Not online. 
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Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 1992 - 
updated 
GN 
123/1992 
1992 Metering of water and applicable tariffs. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 1992 - 
updated 
GN 
122/1992 
1992 Domestic water supply tariffs. 
Central Water Authority 
(Irrigation) Regulations 
1973 - updated 
GN 5/1973 1973 Regulations concerning water for irrigation and 
corresponding tariffs. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2008 
GN No. 10 
of 2008 
2008 Regulations and fees for non-domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2008 
GN No. 9 
of 2008 
2008 Regulations and fees for domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2006 
GN No. 
175 of 
2006 
2006 Regulations and tariffs for non-domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2006 
GN No. 
174 of 
2006 
2006 Regulations and tariffs for domestic water supply including 
social considerations. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2005 
GN No. 12 
of 2005 
2005 Regulations and tariffs for non-domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2003 
GN No. 5 
of 2004 
2004 Regulations for non-domestic water supply. Single bill for 
water and wastewater. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2003 
GN No. 4 
of 2004 
2004 Regulations for domestic water supply. Single bill for water 
and wastewater. 
Central Water Authority 
(Irrigation) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2003 
GN No. 81 
of 2003 
2003 Regulations for irrigation due to newly available water from 
Midlands Dam. 
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Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2002 
GN No. 98 
of 2002 
2002 Regulations and revised tariffs for domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2002 
GN No. 97 
of 2002 
2002 Regulations and revised tariffs for non-domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Drought Period) (Repeal) 
Regulations 2000 
GN No. 36 
of 2000 
2000 Repeal of drought regulations from 1999. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2000 
GN No. 15 
of 2000 
2000 Regulations and revised tariffs for non-domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
2000 
GN No. 14 
of 2000 
2000 Regulations and revised tariffs for domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Drought Period) 
Regulations 1999 
(Repealed) 
GN No. 70 
of 1999 
1999 Drought regulations prohibiting non-essential water use. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1998 
GN No. 
114 of 
1998 
1998 Regulations and revised tariffs for non-domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1998 
GN No. 
113 of 
1998 
1998 Regulations and revised tariffs for domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1998 
GN No. 76 
of 1998 
1998 Regulations and revised tariffs for non-domestic water 
supply for use of water from Midlands Dam. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
GN No. 
123 of 
1992 
1992 Regulations and revised tariffs for non-domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 1992 
GN No. 
122 of 
1992 
1992 Regulations and revised tariffs for non-domestic water 
supply. 
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Central Water Authority 
(Irrigation) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1988 
GN No. 27 
of 1988 
1988 Revised tariffs and rates for irrigation. 
Central Water Authority 
Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1988 
GN No. 26 
of 1988 
1988 Regulations and revision of 1980 tariffs for non-domestic 
water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1988 
GN No. 25 
of 1988 
1988 Regulations and revision of 1980 tariffs for non-domestic 
water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Designation of Catchment 
Areas) Regulations 1986 
GN No. 44 
of 1986 
1986 Designation of catchment areas with maps. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment No. 2) 
Regulations 1984 
N No. 143 
of 1984 
1984 Amendment of 1980 regulations for domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment No.2) 
Regulations 1984 
GN No. 
142 of 
1984 
1984 Amendment of 1980 regulations for non-domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1984 
GN No. 11 
of 1984 
1984 Amendment of 1980 regulations and tariffs for non-
domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1984 
GN No. 10 
of 1984 
1984 Amendment of 1980 regulations and tariffs for non-
domestic water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Election of Employees) 
Regulations 1983 
GN No. 11 
of 1983 
1983 Change of procedural rules for election of employees in the 
Board. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1982 
GN No. 
304 of 
1982 
1982 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for non-domestic 
water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1982 
GN No. 
303 of 
1982 
1982 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic water 
supply. 
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Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1981 
GN No. 
349 of 
1981 
1981 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for non-domestic 
water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
D6mestic Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1981 
GN No. 
348 of 
1981 
1981 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Census of Water Rights) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1981 
GN No. 75 
of 1981 
1981 Regulations for carrying out a census of water right holders. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 1980 
GN No. 
271 of 
1980 
1980 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for non-domestic 
water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 1980 
GN No. 
270 of 
1980 
1980 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Census of Existing Water 
Rights) Regulations 1980 
GN No. 
174 of 
1980 
1980 Regulations for carrying out a census of water right holders. 
Central Water Authority 
(Irrigation) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1980 
GN No. 
173 of 
1980 
1980 Regulations for irrigation with rates and charges. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic, Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
(Amendment No. 4) 
Regulations 1979 
GN No. 
281 of 
1979 
1979 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic, Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
(Amendment No. 3) 
Regulations 1979 
GN No. 
255 of 
1979 
1979 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic, Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
(Amendment No. 2) 
Regulations 1979 
GN No. 
213 of 
1979 
1979 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
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Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic, Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1979 
GN No 167 
of 1979 
1979 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water for Domestic, 
Commercial and Industrial 
Purposes) (Amendment 
No. 2) Regulations 1974 
GN No 163 
of 1974 
1974 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
Supply for Domestic, 
Commercial and Industrial 
Purposes) (Amendment) 
Regulations 1974 
GN No. 
153 of 
1974 
1974 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic, Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
Regulations 1974 
GN No. 91 
of 1974 
1974 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic, Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
(Amendment) Regulations 
1974 
GN No. 55 
of 1974 
1974 Amendment of regulations and tariffs for domestic, 
commercial and industrial water supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Vesting Day) Order 1973 
GN No. 10 
of 1973 
1973 Rates and charges for irrigation. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Commercial and 
Industrial Purposes) 
Regulations 
GN No. 6 
of 1973 
1973 Regulations for domestic commercial and industrial water 
supply. 
Central Water Authority 
(Irrigation) Regulations 
1973 
GN No. 5 
of 1973 
1973 Regulations, rates and charges for irrigation. 
Central Water Authority 
(Vesting Day) Order 1973 
GN No. 4 
of 1973 
1973 Not important. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for 
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 2011 
GN No. 
228 of 
2011 
2011 Incorrect document. Refers to Wastewater Management 
Authority Act. 
Central Water Authority 
(Water Supply for Non-
Domestic Purposes) 
Regulations 2011 
GN No. 
239 of 
2011 
2011 Incorrect document. Refers to Wastewater Management 
Authority Act. 
 121 
 
Central Water Authority 
(Production of Drinks) 
(Fees and Other Charges) 
Regulations 2011 
GN No. 
241 of 
2011 
2011 Incorrect document. Refers to Wastewater Management 
Authority Act. 
Central Water Authority 
(Irrigation) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2011 
GN No. 
241 of 
2011 
2011 Incorrect document. Refers to Wastewater Management 
Authority Act. 
 
Ground water legislation: 
Title of Act Number Year Main features 
The Ground Water Act 
1969 
Act 
55/1969 
1969 Creation of the Ground Water Act on the ownership, 
control and use of groundwater. Groundwater as public 
property. Definition of rules for licensing of groundwater 
abstraction and sanctions for failure of compliance with 
them. 
The Ground Water Act 
1969 
Act No. 55 
of 1969 
1969 Same as Act 55/1969. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1989 
GN No. 68 
of 1970 
1970 Repeal of former regulations. 
The Ground Water Act 
1973 
Act No. 6 
of 1973 
1973 CWA responsible for groundwater. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1973 
GN No. 74 
of 1973 
1973 Regulations, fees and charges for licenses for 
groundwater abstraction. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1989 
GN No. 74 
of 1973 
1973 Regulation of yearly license fees. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1989 
GN No. 124 
of 1992 
1992 Regulation of license fees for domestic, irrigation, and 
industrial groundwater abstraction. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1989 
GN No. 128 
of 1996 
1996 Regulations, fees and penalties relating to groundwater 
abstraction. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1998 
GN No. 115 
of 1998 
1998 Regulations and charges for use of groundwater for 
industrial purposes. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 1989 
GN No. 5 of 
1998 
1998 Regulations and fees for groundwater abstraction. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 2002 
GN No. 96 
of 2002 
2002 Regulations, fees and charges for licenses for 
groundwater abstraction. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 2006 
GN No. 173 
of 2006 
2006 Regulations for licenses for groundwater abstraction. 
The Ground Water Act 
Regulations 2011 
GN No. 240 
of 2011 
2011 Incorrect document. Refers to Wastewater Management 
Authority Act. 
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Wastewater legislation: 
Title of the Act Number year Main features 
The Waste Water 
Management Authority 
Act 2000 
Act 
39/2000 
2000 Creation of WMA, tasks and rules in updated version. 
Board composition decided by Minister (§8). Budget 
needs ex ante approval by Minister (§24). 
The Waste Water 
Management Authority 
(Amendment) Act 2000 
Act No. 
39 of 
2000 
2000 Original version of WMA Act. 
The Waste Water (Fees) 
Regulations 2001 
GN No. 
105/2001 
2001 Amendment of wastewater fees. 
The Waste Water 
Regulations 2001 
GN No. 
105 of 
2001 
2001 Revision of wastewater fees for households and 
businesses. 
The Waste Water 
Authority (Licensing of 
Effluent Carriers and 
Disposal of Effluent) 
Regulations 2001 
GN No. 
48 of 
2001 
2001 Regulations for the licensing of effluent carriers and the 
disposal of effluent. 
The Waste Water 
Management Authority 
(Amendment) Act 2002 
Act No. 
42 of 
2002 
2002 Extension of transitory period for internal issues of WMA. 
The Waste Water 
Regulations 2001 
GN No. 
10 of 
2002 
2002 Revision of wastewater fees. 
The Waste Water 
Management Authority 
(Amendment) Act 2003 
Act No. 
33 of 
2003 
2003 Amendment of rules concerning banking cheques. 
The Waste Water (Fees) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2003 
GN No. 
114 of 
2003 
2003 Revision of wastewater fees. 
The Waste Water 
Management Authority 
(Amendment) Act 2004 
Act No. 
26 of 
2004 
2004 Prohibition on free disposal of effluent and wastewater. 
The Waste Water 
(Standards for Discharge 
of Industrial Effluent into 
a Waste Water System) 
Regulations 2004 
GN No. 
182 of 
2004 
2004 Definition of standards for discharge of industrial effluent 
into a wastewater system 
The Waste Water (Fees) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2004 
GN No. 6 
of 2004 
2004 Revision of wastewater fees for business consumers. 
The Waste Water 
(Registration of Waste 
Water Carriers & 
Disposal of Waste 
Water) Regulations 2006 
GN No. 
37 of 
2006 
2006 Regulation of wastewater carriers. 
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The Waste Water (Fees) 
(Amendment) 
Regulations 2008 
GN No. 
40 of 
2008 
2008 Revision of wastewater fees for different consumer 
groups. 
The Waste Water (Fees) 
Amendment (No.2) 
Regulations 2011 
GN No. 
228 of 
2011 
2011 Regulation of wastewater fees. 
Waste Water 
(Miscellaneous Waste 
Water Services) (Fees) 
Regulations 2012 
GN No. 
186 of 
2012 
2012 Regulation of applications for wastewater services and 
fees. 
 
Surface water legislation: 
Name of Act Number Year Main features 
Rivers and Canals Act 
1863 
Act 
35/1863 
186
3 
Creation of the Rivers and Canals Act on the ownership, 
control and use of groundwater. Rivers and canals are 
public property. Private parties may have a right. 
Rivers and Canals Act 
1968 
Act No. 41 
of 1968 
196
8 
Procedural regulations related to documents on official 
meetings. 
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Annex B: Water Governance Survey 
 
 
 
 
Survey on Water Governance in Mauritius56 
 
 
Survey Respondent 
Name  
Title  
Organization  
Email  
Telephone  
 
ALL INFORMATION IS GOING TO BE TREATED ANONYMOUSLY. 
 
Contact person 
Please return the survey and any accompanying documents to ap@infragovernance.com. Dr 
Aleksandra Peeroo is Chief Consultant at InfraGovernance Consulting. For additional 
questions, do not hesitate to contact her by email or by phone: 5713 3422. 
 
 
Background information 
This survey is part of a research project on the Mauritian water sector funded by the Global 
Development Network, a public international organization. The project is entitled 
“Governance and Economic Accounting Issues in the Mauritian Water Sector: Toward 
Sustainable Management of a Natural Resource” and is carried out by Dr Aleksandra Peeroo 
(InfraGovernance Consulting) and Mr Riad Sultan (University of Mauritius). 
 
The aim of this research project is to analyse the status quo of water resources through the 
establishment of water accounts and scenarios for future development in the light of 
climate change and to analyse the framework for water sector governance in order to 
understand whether Mauritius is, or will be, facing a water crisis. 
 
This survey is a key step in providing a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of water 
governance in Mauritius, pinpointing substantial issues such as coordination, inclusion of 
stakeholders, and sustainability. 
 
                                                     
56 The design of this survey draws extensively on the OECD Survey on Water Governance (2009-
2010) and has been adapted to reflect the situation in Mauritius and address sustainability issues. 
The original OECD survey is available at http://www.oecd.org/governance/regional-
policy/44689618.pdf (31.08.2015). 
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Objectives of the questionnaire 
Decision-makers from different government ministries and agencies are targeted in this 
survey. Your responses will help us to answer the following questions: 
 
- What coordination issues arise in water governance from the variety of water actors 
and stakeholders? 
 
-  What are the mechanisms in place to facilitate coordination? 
 
- What are the main governance challenges? 
 
- What role do sustainability considerations play in Mauritian water sector 
governance? 
 
 
Some definitions 
This survey uses the following terms: 
- Water Governance: the system in place to oversee, plan, direct, monitor and enforce 
the transactions between the various water uses. It determines the rules and 
practices for decision-making about water policy and implementation and involves 
political, institutional and administrative processes. 
 
- Multi-level Governance: Different actors typically intervene in water governance, 
leading to a decentralised governance setting. Vertically, different levels of 
government might intervene in water governance, e.g. the national, the municipal / 
district council, and the village council level. Horizontally, several actors might 
intervene at the same level. For instance, at the national level, several ministries and 
public agencies / bodies are typically involved in water governance. 
 
- Sustainability: three facets of sustainability are important for the water sector, 
namely economic, environmental and social sustainability. 
o Economic sustainability: refers to the capacity of water services to recover 
their costs, not only for the operation and maintenance of water services, but 
also for long-term investments. 
o Environmental sustainability: requires that water corresponds to defined 
safety norms, that the use of water for future generations is guaranteed, and 
that the quality and quantity of water resources is safeguarded. 
o Social sustainability: concerns users’ ability and willingness to pay for the 
water services received. 
 
 
  
 126 
 
Q1: Beyond the list of following ministries and bodies, are there any other actors 
responsible for water sector governance at the national level? 
- Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities 
- Central Water Authority 
- Wastewater Management Authority 
- Water Resource Unit 
- Ministry of Environment, Sustainable Development, Disaster and Beach 
Management 
- Ministry of Health and Quality of Life 
- Irrigation Authority 
- National Assembly 
 Yes  No   
 If yes, please specify (names and functions): 
 
 
Q2: How are national government roles and responsibilities in water governance defined? 
 Please check all answers that apply and specify if necessary: 
 By Constitution?  Yes  No   
 By Law?   Yes  No   
     If yes, please specify which law(s): 
  
 Ad hoc?   Yes  No  
 Other?   Yes  No  
     If yes, please specify: 
 
 
Q3: Are there legislations on compulsory service delivery commitment? 
 Yes  No   
 If yes, which one(s)? 
 
 
 
Q4: Is the quality of drinking water monitored at the tap of households? 
 Yes  No   
 If yes, by what actor and how often? 
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Q5: How are the actions of the different water actors at the national level coordinated? 
 
Existing coordination mechanism 
across governance actors at national 
level 
Yes No Details (Name, examples etc.) 
Ministry of water 
   
Line ministry 
   
Central agency for water-related 
issues 
   
Ad hoc high-level structure (National 
Council…) 
   
Inter-ministerial body (Committee, 
commission…) 
   
Inter-agency program 
   
Coordination group of experts 
   
Inter-ministerial mechanism for 
addressing territorial water concerns 
   
Other (please specify) 
   
No specific coordination mechanism 
  
 
 
Q6: Are there efforts to specifically coordinate water and energy policies at national level? 
 Yes  No   
 If yes, please specify: 
 
 
 
Q7: Are there efforts to specifically coordinate water and agricultural policies at national 
level? 
 Yes  No   
 If yes, please specify: 
 
 
Q8: Are there efforts to specifically coordinate water, urban / regional planning at 
national level? 
 Yes  No   
 If yes, please specify: 
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Q9: At the national level, what are the most frequent obstacles to effective coordination 
between various actors in charge of water sector governance? 
Please tick the appropriate box (1 = not important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important, N/A = not applicable) and 
give some examples: 
 
Obstacles to effective 
coordination at national level 1 2 3 N/A Examples 
Overlapping, unclear, non-existing 
allocation of responsibilities      
Intensive competition between different 
ministries (political rivalries etc.)      
Interference of lobbies 
     
Absence of common information and 
frame of reference for policymakers      
Lack of high political commitment and 
leadership in water policy      
Lack of staff and time 
     
Lack of institutional incentives for 
cooperation (objectives, indicators…)      
Lack of technical capacities 
     
Difficult implementation of central 
government decisions at local and 
regional level 
     
Mismatch between ministerial funding 
and administrative responsibilities      
Absence of strategic planning and 
sequencing decisions      
Absence of monitoring and evaluation of 
the outcomes of national water policies      
Difficulties related to implementation / 
adaptation to recent reforms      
Contradiction between national 
organization and supranational 
recommendations 
     
Lack of citizens’ concern on water policy 
     
Other (please specify) 
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Q10: How frequently does your institution interact with other water actors? 
 Please check all that apply: 
Water actor 
Da
ily
 
W
ee
kl
y 
Ev
er
y 
se
co
nd
 
w
ee
k 
M
on
th
ly
 
Q
ua
rt
er
ly
 
Tw
ice
 a
 y
ea
r 
Ye
ar
ly
 
Ne
ve
r 
Ministry of Energy and Public Utilities 
        
Central Water Authority 
        
Wastewater Management Authority 
        
Water Resource Unit 
        
Ministry of Environment, Sustainable 
Development, Disaster and Beach 
Management 
        
Ministry of Health and Quality of Life 
        
Irrigation Authority 
        
National Assembly 
        
 With what other water actors does your institution interact and in which frequency? 
 
 
 
Q11: Are there any actors involved in water governance at subnational level? 
 Please check all that apply: 
  WATER 
RESOURCES 
WATER 
SUPPLY 
WASTE-
WATER 
Ac
to
rs
 a
t s
ub
na
tio
na
l l
ev
el
 Municipalities    
Districts    
Villages    
Inter-municipal / -district / -village bodies    
Water specific bodies (e.g. elected Waterboards…)    
River basin organizations    
Other (specify)    
 
 Please specify for any checked box (role in water sector governance): 
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Q12: Beyond official actors in water sector governance, are some Water Users’ 
Associations involved? 
  Yes  No   
  If no, please go directly to Q15. If yes, please answer Q13 and Q14. 
 
 
Q13: Please specify which Water Users’ Associations are involved in water sector 
governance (name, website, contact details)? 
 
 
 
Q14: How do these groups participate in water sector governance? 
 
 
 
Q15: What are the main governance challenges in the water sector? 
 Please tick the appropriate box (1 = not important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = very important, N/A = not 
applicable) 
 
Challenges 1 2 3 N/A Examples 
Mismatch between hydrological and 
administrative boundaries      
Allocation of water resources across 
uses (domestic, industrial, agriculture)      
Resource stress      
Subnational governments’ capacity to 
design / implement water policies      
Tariffication      
Cost recovery      
Investment needs in infrastructure      
Insufficient independence / powers of 
your institution      
Lack of capacity (Human Capital)      
Absence of National Water Policy (for 
entire water cycle)      
Environmental norms      
Public safety      
Service quality standards      
Limited citizen participation      
Horizontal coordination across 
ministries / government bodies      
Vertical coordination between 
different levels of government      
Quality / quantity of information      
Managing the specificity of rural areas      
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Challenges 1 2 3 N/A Examples 
Managing the specificity of urban 
areas      
Managing the specificity of mountain 
areas      
Managing the specificity of coastal 
areas      
Lack of political will      
Limiting the influence of interest 
groups      
Climate change (droughts, changing 
rainfall patterns, torrential rains…)      
Economic sustainability      
Environmental sustainability      
Social sustainability      
Other      
 
 
Q16: Has Mauritius recently experienced innovative practices in water governance or 
intends to do so in the near future (new design of water policies, new legislative or 
regulatory framework, coordination reforms, innovative delivery of water services, e.g. 
desalination, recycling used water…)? 
  Yes  No   
  If yes, please specify: 
 
 
Q17: Is there anything you would like to add? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for having taken the time to answer this questionnaire. Your effort is very 
much appreciated. 
 
 
 
 
 
